Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to compensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this Article takes a more moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and bylaw provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an acquisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits while allowing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four standard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitration. Because enforcement would be customized on a company-by-company basis, shareholders could set a better balance between costs and benefits than the ham-fisted, one-size-fits-all regime functioning today. This proposal requires no legislative action; it requires only that the SEC bring its statutory interpretation in line with current Supreme Court precedent.
© 2013 J. Reuben Clark Law School
The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws,
2013 BYU L. Rev.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2013/iss1/2