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Belonging and Trust: Divorce and Social Capital

Margaret F. Brinig

In other work, I have discussed at some length how trust functions within ongoing marriages and families.\(^1\) Marriages, I claim, “are viewed as good when the spouses trust each other. They founder when trust is no longer there.”\(^2\) When a wife, typically, loses trust in her husband’s acting unselfishly and for the benefit of the marriage, she may file for divorce.\(^3\) Meanwhile, trust is the foundation for teaching children about love—love of parents for each other, love they have for you, and how God loves.\(^4\) The loss of trust that dissolution of marriage occasions is both immediate and carried from one generation to the next. This paper explores how that trust relates to belonging and to

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\(^2\) BRINIG, supra note 1, at 70.

\(^3\) Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 473. In fact, work by Liana Sayer and Susanne Bianchi shows that the wife’s satisfaction with the relationship predicts divorce, while his does not. Liana Sayer & Susanne Bianchi, Women’s Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906, 932 (2000) (“Wives who believe that their marriages are troubled have odds of divorce twice as high as wives who do not believe their marriages are troubled. Women who feel that their marriage is unhappy have risks of divorce within the subsequent 5 years almost 2.5 times as high compared to wives who do not feel their marriage is unhappy . . . . Interestingly, none of the husband’s predictors of marital stability is associated with higher risks of marital dissolution.”). Women most often file for divorce despite the possible financial losses. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 127 (2000) (stating that women file about two thirds of the time). Other research, based on the National Survey of Families and Households, concludes that women are actually the ones desirous of ending the relationship (i.e., the predominance in filing behavior corresponds to dissatisfaction with the marriage). Sanford L. Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993); see also Frequency Distribution of Respondents’ Reports of Which Spouse Wanted the First Marriage to End, by Sex: National Survey of Families and Households, 1987–88 and 1992–94, reprinted in Brinig & Allen, supra, at 159 app. The citation to the study is Brinig & Allen, supra, at 129. Another paper found that the same is true of a sample of divorces in Texas. James Alan Neff et al., Divorce Likelihood Among Anglos and Mexican Americans, 15 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 75, 85, tbl.1 (1991) (stating that Spanish-surnamed women filed 59% of the time).

the related concept of social capital.

The argument, using statistics to bolster every step, is essentially that marital stability involves trust: trust by the spouses in each other, trust by each spouse in the institution of marriage, and trust by each in the support of the outside community. The married person “belongs” to the spouse, to the family, to the shared idea of marriage, and to the surrounding community, and this linked network supports the marriage. When any of these links of trust weakens or fails, the marriage becomes less stable.

I begin the argument with the links of trust that run between generations. Tables 1–3 show that the loss of trust continues between generations and reveal two ways that mechanism may work. A March 2010 Census report shows, among its other findings taken from the National Survey of Family Growth (2002), that while about half of all Americans between fifteen and forty-four cohabit at some point, they are significantly more likely to do so if their parents were not living together at the time the young people were fourteen. In other words, if the parents were not living together in an intact relationship at the time of the child’s adolescence, the child was less likely to move directly into marriage for a first union. In other words, if the parents were not living together in an intact relationship at the time of the child’s adolescence, the child was less likely to move directly into marriage for a first union. Further, if the wife’s parents were divorced when she was fourteen, the wife in the present generation was 1.73 times more likely to herself divorce. This finding from the mid-1990s is echoed in the recent Census report (for women aged fifteen to forty-four, the probability of a first marriage surviving ten years is only two-thirds as high if the woman’s parents were not living together when she was fourteen). Venturing away from the respondents’ parents themselves, my earlier work with Steven Nock reported that respondents to the National Survey of Families and Households were 2.67 times more likely to divorce if they lived in a state where

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5 The use of various ages at which respondents are questioned was determined by the way the questions were asked by the Census, the National Survey of Families and Households, and so forth. These arbitrary assessments should not change the findings in any systematic way. Since age fifteen is, in the vast majority of states, the earliest age in which people can marry, even with parental permission, the Census’s use of 15–44 for persons of childbearing age was probably not an accidental choice. The age of fourteen has legal significance as well, since in many states children may then choose with which parent they’d like to live if the parents divorce. But I am not sure that either reason swayed the Census Bureau in framing questions.

6 See infra Table 1 (noting the change in the “Ever cohabitated” column, which is between 47.5% and 60.8%).

7 See infra Table 2 (noting “Wife’s parents divorced”).

8 See infra Table 3.
the divorce rate was high in the year they were sixteen.⁹

Table 1. Relationship between parents’ living arrangements and child’s subsequent cohabitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Number of cohabiting partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number in thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental living arrangements at age 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two biological or adoptive parents</td>
<td>49,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11,622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Odds of divorce as a function of marital status of the population in the state and year the respondent was 16¹⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>exp B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohabited before marriage</strong></td>
<td>0.333 (0.131)**</td>
<td>1.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>−0.489 (0.06)***</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s wages</td>
<td>0.001 (0.00)***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s wages</td>
<td>0.001 (0.00)***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband is black</td>
<td>0.426 (0.186)*</td>
<td>1.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband is Hispanic</td>
<td>−0.343 (0.258)</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband is Asian</td>
<td>−0.438 (0.73)</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹ See infra Table 2 (last lines); Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 483 & tbl.2.
¹⁰ Table adapted from Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 471, 483 & tbl.2. B is the coefficient in the regression equation. The standard error is in parentheses and indicates how closely associated with the value for B was each error the sample data generated. The statistical significance is indicated by the asterisks, with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. P is the probability that the correlation coefficient value was reached by chance. In the first line of Table 2, the ** therefore indicates that the likelihood the coefficient was accidental is only about 1%. When the result is a single value (divorce or no divorce), the exponent of B (or likelihood) is a measure of effect size—how much of a difference in the likelihood of divorce, say, does cohabiting before marriage make (here 1.395), with values in excess of 1 indicating that divorce is more likely to occur given cohabitation.
Husband is American Indian  
−0.088  
(0.561)  
0.918

Spouses are of the same race  
−0.012  
(0.079)  
0.989

Wife’s highest level of education  
−0.006  
(0.03)  
0.994

Husband’s parents divorced  
−0.113  
(0.154)  
0.894

Wife’s parents divorced  
0.549  
(0.136)***  
1.731

Husband’s age when married  
0.017  
(0.11)  
1.017

Wife’s age when married  
0.19  
(0.018)***  
1.209

DIVPC (% divorced)  
0.984  
(0.059)***  
2.675

SEPPC (% separated)  
0.415  
(0.092)***  
1.514

NEVPC (% never married)  
−0.012  
(0.014)*  
0.972

DIVPC, percent divorced in respondent’s then state in year when respondent was sixteen; SEPPC, percent separated in respondent’s then state in year when respondent was sixteen; NEVPC, percent never married in respondent’s then state in year when respondent was sixteen.

Table 3. Probability that a first marriage will remain intact (survive) at specified durations, by selected characteristics and with standard errors, for women aged fifteen to forty-four: United States, 2002.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>3 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of survival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of survival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of survival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Sayer & Bianchi, supra note 3, consider reasons for the dissymmetry between husbands’ and wives’ parents.


13 The average length of a marriage’s duration if it ends at divorce was 8.2 years for men and 7.9 years for women in 2001. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001, 1, 9 tbl.6 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-97.pdf. Figure 2 shows that the yearly percent of first marriages for women that end in divorce peaks at 4% between seven and eight years. Id. at 10 fig.2. This timing may affect the much larger spread between the two parental
Parental living arrangements at age 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Two biological or adoptive parents</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.95 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.93  (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.86 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.82  (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.79 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.72  (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.67 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.48  (0.045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, the three tables show that if parents divorced, their children are more likely to cohabit.\textsuperscript{14} A marriage preceded by the child’s cohabitation (whether or not solely with one’s spouse) gives a greater likelihood of divorce.\textsuperscript{15} And when a child goes through adolescence with more examples of divorced people around (the proportion of divorced in the state when the child was sixteen), there’s a separate, and in fact larger, likelihood that the child’s eventual marriage will dissolve.\textsuperscript{16}

Children of divorce may cohabit because they know, from personal experience, that marriage may not work out and they want to be absolutely sure before they make a more substantial commitment. They may also feel they can take advantage of all the good points and risk none of the bad points of marriage by cohabiting.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, they may have either a more cautious or a less sanguine attitude about marriage (or, I suppose, both). Once they cohabit, they are more apt to see their relationship in terms of the short-term, exchange model, in which they expect immediate reciprocation for anything they contribute to the marriage or the partner.\textsuperscript{18} It is then difficult to transition to marriage, with its unconditional giving.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, children grow-

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{14} Supra Table 1.
\textsuperscript{15} Supra Table 2. While studies using U.S. data consistently show this, data from continental Europe show that cohabitation followed by marriage may be a more stable arrangement. Kathleen Kiernan, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 98 POPULATION TRENDS 11, 19 tbl.11 (1999).
\textsuperscript{16} Supra Table 3.
\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnerships and Default Rules, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 269–83 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra, at 305.
\textsuperscript{18} For another discussion of the problems of exchange, see Robert C. Ellickson, Unpack ing the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 223, 305 (2006) (concluding that intimate relationships are very difficult to maintain if based on tit-for-tat exchanges, for “temporary imbalances of trade are likely to arise”).
\textsuperscript{19} See Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J.
ing through their teens with more divorce around may downplay the difficulties of divorce or may not have as much exposure to good, lasting marriages.\textsuperscript{20}

Prominent proponents of social capital theory argue that in neighborhoods where trust decreases and there is less social cohesion and more disorder, there will eventually be more crime.\textsuperscript{21} While this hypothesis does not go unchallenged,\textsuperscript{22} it is at least easy to follow. This paper will go still further, showing from recent Chicago divorces (Cook County divorces from late 2002–2007) that, holding other aspects of the community constant, disruptions in social capital also precede increased divorces. Thus, trust between spouses keeps marriages together.\textsuperscript{23} Trust is more difficult to maintain without trust in the institution of marriage itself (as with the divorce of one’s parents\textsuperscript{24} or others one knows\textsuperscript{25}). As will be shown, generalized trust that others in your neighborhood will “be there for you” affects one’s sense of belonging—even to a spouse—as well.

James Coleman used schools as one example illustrating his conception of social capital.\textsuperscript{26} He argued that successful schools tended to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item See Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 484, 483 tbl.2 (showing that a 16-year-old residing in “a state with a high percentage of divorced adults” will have a “higher chance[] of divorce when [that] individual becomes an adult”).
\item Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 473, 474–76.
\item See supra Table 2.
\item See supra Table 3.
\item James S. Coleman, \textit{Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital}, 94 AM. J. SOC. S95 (1988). Another example in the article was the diamond market, where relationships functioned as extralegal and comparatively inexpensive sources of control. \textit{Id.} at S98.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
be distinguished by parents’ connections to their children’s school and to the parents of their children’s peers. These connections, he reasoned, “closed the loop” between school, teachers, and parents, thus guaranteeing the enforcement of appropriate norms. Coleman further argued that these kinds of connections—and the norm-enforcement authority that they enabled—helped explain Catholic high schools’ extremely low drop-out rates in particular. Conceivably, elements of this distinctive character also generate positive externalities beyond the classroom walls. For example, Catholic schools’ emphasis on discipline inside the school might affect the behavior of teenage students, some of whom might be graduates, outside the school, in the surrounding neighborhood. Additionally, the demands that Catholic schools make of parents may generate social capital by closing the network between parent, school, child, and neighborhood. More generally, a resident who counts on her neighbors to address community problems has less cause to seek to move to a new community; a resident who does not know her neighbors—or worse, does not trust them—tends not to enlist their assistance in efforts to address neighborhood problems.

Other positive effects of social capital are being considered currently in the public health literature. One study has determined that

27 For more recent work along these lines see M I K E SAVAGE, ET AL., GLOBALIZATION &BELONGING (2005) (qualitative study of the nature of local belonging in a global world, focusing on northwest England); Gaynor Bagnall et al., Children, Belonging and Social Capital: The PTA and Middle Class Narratives of Social Involvement in the North-West of England, 8 SOC. RES. ONLINE 4 (2003), available at www.socresonline.org.uk/b8/4/bagnall.html (different patterns of generating social capital produced very different communities); Edward L. Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. 437 (2002) (finding that social capital first rises and then falls with age, declines with expected mobility, rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills, is higher among homeowners, falls sharply with physical distance, and is more pronounced among those who invest in human capital also invest in social capital, but also finding no significant effect of religious denomination).

28 Coleman, supra note 26, at S115 tbl.2.

29 Id. at S112–18.


31 See, e.g., Jonathan Lomas, Social Capital and Health: Implications for Public Health and Epidemiology, 47 SOC. SCI. MED. 1181 (1998) (discussing a Canadian study of heart problems that suggests more concentration on levels higher than the typical individual one); Ichiro Kawachi et al., Social Capital and Self-Rated Health: A Contextual Analysis, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1187 (1999) (reporting more self-rated poor health among those with lowest levels of social trust compared on statewide basis); Sarah Wakefield & Blake Poland, Family, Friend or Foe? Critical Reflections on the Relevance and Role of Social Capital in Health Promotion and Community Development, 60 SOC. SCI. MED. 2819 (2005) (stating that it is important to be con-
social capital in Philadelphia, measured by questions similar to the ones I will use here, produced measurable health effects on citizens of the neighborhoods studied. They found that adults with high social capital were less likely to report fair or poor health (10% of the high social capital group compared to 23.7% of the low social capital group). On the other hand, adults with low social capital were nearly twice as likely to have been diagnosed with a mental health condition. They were also twice as likely to be under extreme stress as those with high social capital.

This project extends the work of those working on connections between social capital and crime and social capital and health to consider its effect on neighborhood-level divorce rates in the city of Chicago. In order to make the connection, data was gathered from several sources. First, I obtained a complete sample of all divorces in Chicago beginning in September of 2002 and ending in December of 2007. Second, the human capital data, described below, was obtained from the University of Michigan’s Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This data, used to measure social co-
hesion, was originally collected by the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) in 1994-95. 39

Figure 1 Social Cohesion by Census Tract

39 For a general discussion of the PHDCN and its relation to closed parochial schools, see Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and Education Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2010). This paper demonstrates the relationship between the closing of Catholic schools and a decrease in various social capital variables (social cohesion, physical disorder, and social disorder). The paper discussing the extension of the model to crime in Chicago is Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools and Broken Windows, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 10-04, SSRN abstract no. 1629904 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564254&download=yes. For this paper I have selected only one measure of social capital discussed in the papers with Garnett. While social and physical disorder are obviously connected to at least minor levels of crime such as vandalism and disorderly behavior (and may even be measuring it), their relationship to divorce is at best not obvious. On the other hand, social cohesion, at least on the extended family and friends level, does matter for marital quality. For two measures of how this works, consider that covenant marriages in Louisiana had more attendees than standard marriages. The covenant marriage couples were signaling their greater commitment to each other, and had, on average, the full support of their families. They so far are divorcing at a lower rate as well. BRINIG, supra note 1, at n.177. A study by Rose Kreider of interracial couples found that when black men were married to white women, the marriages were most successful when the wife saw her mother frequently (and when the husband was religious). Id. at 165 & n.102. I obtained similar results, for the other two social capital variables, social and physical disorder. The coefficients for social disorder were, as expected, significant and positive. Those for physical disorder were negative and significant. Apparently women, who largely file for divorce, are reluctant to do so as the neighborhood becomes less safe. The other values in both sets of equations performed as they did for social cohesion. Results are available upon request.
A third source of data, socioeconomic in nature, was obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses at the level of census tracts. To deal with what economists call an endogeneity problem, what is called an instrumental variable was used: whether or not a parochial school in the neighborhood closed before collection of the social cohesion data. That is, because divorce may well cause social disorder as well as being caused by it, we needed to identify some data that would be unlikely to itself be affected by lack of cohesion. For this reason, I include variables obtained from the Archdiocese of Chicago and the Official Catholic Directory on pastors and the closing of Catholic schools in the City of Chicago, 1984–2004. The idea is that while school closings precipitated by a lack of pastor connection might influence social capital in neighborhoods, neither socioeconomic changes nor social capital predict such things as the age of the pastor or whether he left his assignment sooner than the customary six years.

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40 For this I used software provided by Geolytics.
43 Much of the publicly available data came from THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY (for years 1984–2004), an annual publication that lists each school in each diocese and archdiocese, with parish information and the name of the pastor, as well as giving lists of all the members of religious orders with their year of ordination. THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY enabled us to know when each pastor arrived in, and left, a parish. It also provided information on parishes led by “administrators” who were not priests. For 2008, Sr. Paul gave us a copy of the Archdiocese of Chicago 2008 Directory. This also listed the religious sisters as well as phone numbers of the various convents and religious houses, which we called for people who we couldn’t identify. Other people, such as some of the lay principals, were tracked by using internet searches or the encyclopedic memory of Sr. Farley. Information on clergy abuse comes both from the official archdiocesan website, Priests with Substantiated Allegations of Sexual Misconduct with Minors, ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO, http://www.archchicago.org/pdf/ten_year_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (listing information from 1983-1993), and by a larger collection (including some unsubstantiated reports), Accused Priests Who Worked in the Archdiocese of Chicago, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG, http://www.bishop-accountability.org/il_chicago/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
We begin by showing a simple correlation of divorce and social cohesion, measured at the neighborhood level. The fact that the result is negative and statistically significant (and large as far as these things go) alerts us to the possibility of a connection between the two. Though there could be other explanations, like divorce causing the lack of social cohesion, or some other factor causing both results, the statistical significance indicates that they are related more than by chance.  

Table 4. Correlation between Census Tract Level Divorce Rate and Social Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Cohesion</th>
<th>Divorces per married couple in census tract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.117***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because one can only divorce if previously married, the number of married couples in the census tract was used to create a local divorce rate. Inclusion of both accounts not only for those available to divorce but also those who might be available for later relationships. They might include sources of advice about marriage and divorce and others who might influence the success of a marriage such as children and the elderly. Some socioeconomic variables known to be related to divorce:

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44 A zero coefficient would mean that there was essentially no relationship between the two sets of data. A coefficient of `1 would indicate that the relationships was exactly reciprocal, that is, that as one increased, the other would decrease by the same amount.
orce are racial proportions in the census tract (more divorces among African-Americans,\(^45\) and fewer among Hispanics\(^46\)), and unemployment (typically more divorces in periods of unemployment\(^47\)). Here are the descriptive statistics for the data used for this study.

**Table 5. Descriptive Statistics\(^{48}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 census</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.9980</td>
<td>.336392</td>
<td>.4114901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 census</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.9696</td>
<td>.275913</td>
<td>.3080762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 census</td>
<td>.0099</td>
<td>.3712</td>
<td>.118844</td>
<td>.0845804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>2.9248</td>
<td>4.1107</td>
<td>3.376081</td>
<td>.2727141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divorces</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>5.9167</td>
<td>6.02441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorces per married couple</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.2416</td>
<td>.015731</td>
<td>.0215330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 census</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{45}\) CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, *supra* note 12, at 12:
Hispanic men had the highest probability that their first marriages would last 10 years or more (75%)—higher than any other race and ethnic group and higher than Hispanic women. The probability of non-Hispanic black men’s and women’s first marriages remaining intact for at least 10 years was about 50%. This compares with probabilities of 64% for white men’s and women’s first marriages, 68% for Hispanic women’s first marriages, and 75% for Hispanic men’s first marriages remaining intact for at least 10 years.

*Id.*


\(^{48}\) The panel consisted of 186 observations X 6 years for each, or a total of 1,116. Each observation counted the divorces in a single year in the census tract. There were a total of 6,603 divorces in the city, 6,515 of which were in census tracts of interest.
Chicago may be the most residentially segregated city in the United States. While blacks currently make up about thirty-five percent of the population, they are heavily concentrated on the south and west sides of the city. Whites make up nearly twenty-eight percent but live largely on the north side, while Hispanics, now approaching thirty percent of the population, are scattered to the northwest and southwest sides of the city center. Unemployment ranged from very low in some census tracts to nearly ten times the 2000 national average of 4.0 percent. Social cohesion varied less, with both mean and median in the 3.3 range and a small standard deviation. While the total divorces varied considerably, this could be because there were fewer marriages (or people residing) in some census tracts. However, the divorces-per-married-couple, or divorce rate, still exhibits a wide variance (more than twice the rate for divorce per year).

Perhaps the most informative table in this paper follows as Table 6. This shows the results of sequential estimations (called a Two-Stage Least Squares Model) of social cohesion, measured in 1995, and the divorce rate (divorce per married couple) for partial year 2002 and complete years through 2007. It would not be surprising to see strong relationships between the socioeconomic variables and this local divorce rate since other studies typically find them. What interests us here, however, is the relationship between the divorce rate and social cohesion. If the social capital theory can be extended to include the neighborhood environment’s effects on people’s family-level relationships, the prediction would be a negative effect: the less social cohesion, the more divorce. That is just what we find in Table 6.

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50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
54 The median was 3.33.
Table 6. Divorce Rate in Chicago Census Tracts, 2002–2007
(Multiple Stage Regression)\textsuperscript{55}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>(.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Black in census tract, 2000</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Hispanic in census tract, 2000</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>-.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, 2000</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived social cohesion</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the predictive value of this equation is quite limited—it does not explain a large amount of divorce,\textsuperscript{56}—it is at least suggestive of two things. The first is that socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood do apparently have some influence on individual decision-making about marriage and divorce.\textsuperscript{57} The second is that social

\textsuperscript{55} The displayed coefficients are actually a function of three equations estimated simultaneously. The first predicts whether or not a Catholic school closed in the neighborhood in years between 1985 and 1993, as a function of the racial characteristics of the census tract (Black and Hispanic share of population, 1990 Census), some parish characteristics (whether or not the pastor was an administrator serving out of rotation, or there was a parish clergyman accused of abuse, and the length of time since the pastor’s ordination) and the poverty rate in the census tract. The second predicts perceived social cohesion in the neighborhood measured in 1994-95 as a function of the Catholic school closing, between 1985 and 1993 and the socio-demographic characteristics noted above, weighted by the number of neighborhood persons appearing in the survey sample. The third, visible, predicts the number of divorces as a function of racial characteristics in the census tract, 2000, the unemployment rate in 2000, perceived social cohesion as estimated above, population and the number married (both 2000). Not visible but included in the model are a series of year dummies that account for trends in the data.

\textsuperscript{56} R\textsuperscript{2} (adjusted) = .118, system R\textsuperscript{2} = .343. Perhaps the reason it does is not obvious. Marital distress is to a large extent the individual couple’s issue. Divorce has long been hypothesized to occur in the cases where spouses are badly matched. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1157 (1977). It also may occur when wives feel emotionally unsupported by their husbands or when they become economically independent, Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, supra note 3, at 937, or when they cannot have children or have children of the “wrong” sex, Sara Raley & Suzanne Bianchi, Sons, Daughters, and Family Processes: Does Gender of Children Matter? 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 401 (2006). Divorce can of course follow domestic violence, addiction, or serious illness, none of which are accounted for in the equation.

\textsuperscript{57} This can be seen from the table because the standardized coefficient (Beta) for perceived
cohesion, controlling for other general characteristics of a neighborhood, does have an effect on marital stability. This effect is more significant than the unemployment rate in the neighborhood. As expected, when unemployment increases, so does the divorce rate.

How much does this mean, in real terms? In Figure 3, I’ve charted the socio-economic variables and social cohesion using the minimum and maximum values of each, showing the effect of that single variable (obtained from the regression coefficients in Table 6 above) on the constant. Table 6 shows that yearly divorce rate, 2002–2007, will increase from .036 to .045, an increase of twenty percent, if the percentage Black moves from zero to 100 percent. Since there is always some amount of social cohesion (and it always helps reduce the divorce rate), moving from the low value to the high value decreases divorces from about .015 to about .007, a decrease of slightly more than fifty percent. This is certainly meaningful.58

58 Although it did here, divorce does not always run in the same direction as unemployment. As Bradford Wilcox noted in the National Review, “[D]ivorce is down (modestly) in the first full year of the Great Recession.” Wilcox stated that “a large minority of couples are developing a renewed appreciation for the social and economic support that marriage and families can provide.” Interview: Love in an Economic Downturn, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228896/love-economic-downturn/interview.
Social capital, the web of trust that means we belong to communities, here considered as social cohesion, or trust in one’s community, has an effect on marriages that may be surprising. However, if it is seen as another measure of belonging, or an indication of the support the spouses can receive from their community, it makes sense. Married couples belong to each other. As the song from the film “Shrek” says about the traveling sweetheart, “I’ll be so alone without you/Maybe you’ll be lonesome too, . . . [for] you belong to me.”

In some ways, parents also belong to their children. I believe Professor Hafen would be comfortable with thinking that they belong to the communities in which they live, so that when these communities lose cohesion, marriages lose valuable support and some increased number of them will dissolve.

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60 That is, parents’ marriages will affect their children. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9, 11 (1990) (“Children typically bear substantial psychological and economic costs for a decision in which they have no role.”); Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage “For the Sake of the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1435, 1440–42 (1992). In this sense, belonging is made explicit by, of all things, the property distribution provisions of the Marriage and Divorce Act, which allows courts to set aside some share of the marital property specifically to protect the children.

61 As Dean Hafen wrote some years ago, “In addition, the law’s ultimate goal in supporting family ties is the sustaining of ongoing relationships, not merely the crude determining of who is right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses.” Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 470 (1983).