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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH *

۲.

Plaintiff / Appellee *

*

vs. Appellate Case No. 20080576-CA

*

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, JR. Priority 1

Defendant / Appellant *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS APPEAL IS FROM A DENIAL OF MOTIONS AND ALFORD GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCE IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. THE HONORABLE CLINTS. JUDKINS PRESIDED OVER THE CASE.

APPELLANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON.

APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT

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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

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Plaintiff / Appellee

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VS.

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ATTELLANT REQUESTS ORAL AROUMENT

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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff / Appellee

*

vs. * Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA

*

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, JR
Defendant / Appella

Defendant / Appellant

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from the District Court's wrongfully accepting the defendant's plea, the denial of the defendant's withdrawal of his plea, the failure of the court to allow the defendant time to make restitution and the length of his sentence.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED. Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. See *State v. Pena*, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994)

ISSUE II. DID THE STATE FAIL TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. Standard of Review for the trial court's ruling regarding substantial compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. *See Willet v. Barnes*, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); *State v. Hoff*, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991).

ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. *Standard of Review:* The Court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to prison.. "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." *State v. Nuttall,* 861 P.2d 454, 4546 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

U.C.A. THEFT BY DECEPTION 76-6-405

- (1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
- (2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.

Rule 11 Pleas

- (a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
- (b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
- (c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.

- (d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
- (e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
- (e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
 - (e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
- (e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
- (e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
- (e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction:
- (e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may

be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

- (e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
- (e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
- (e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.

Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

- (f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
- (g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
- (h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
- (h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.

- (i)(1)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
- (i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
- (i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
- (j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
- (k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
- (l) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.

(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005; Amended January 14, 2008, Effective January 1, 2008.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition

The appellant was charged by way of information with eleven counts of Theft by Deception. R. 001. He entered an *Alford* type guilty plea on May 14, 2007. R. 031. The State set forth the factual basis to support the charges. R. 104. The plea was a conditional plea in which the defendant would be able to withdraw his guilty plea upon the payment of restitution and the charges would be dismissed. R. 031.

The defendant was serving a sentence at the Utah State Prison when he entered his plea and was unable to be released from the Department of Correction's custody in order for him to access the funds in which to make restitution. Prior to the defendants sentencing counsel made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion R. 107. The trial court denied the motions. R. 107. The defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2008. R. 086. The court sentenced the defendant to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison on all eleven counts. He ordered that counts 1 through 3 to run consecutive to counts 4 through 7 and counts 8 through 11 will run consecutively to those charges. R. 086,

B. Statement of Facts

- 1. On the eleven dates alleged in the information in Cache County, State of Utah, a Mr. Richard Waters transferred money to the defendant totaling \$1,300,000.00 dollars, R. 106 P. 3. These monies were transferred for a specific purpose. These monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn acknowledged that he received these amounts, R. 104 P. 8.
- demands that the defendant give the monies back and the defendant was not able to return the money because of his incarceration. R. 104 P.8.

 The State proffered certain facts that if the case were to proceed to trial, they would show these funds were used inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn, thereby exercising unauthorized control over the funds. R. 104 P.8. The money was given to Mr. Dunn for a business venture and some other things. R. 104 P. 9. In support of the elements of the case, the State indicated they would present, bank records, to show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose it was given. R. 104 P. 9.
- Mr. Dunn did not agree with the facts set forth by the State in support of the guilty plea. R. 104 P.9. He plead guilty on a *Alford* type basis in an attempt to get out of jail. The defendant was on probation in Salt Lake

 County when the demand for the money was made. R. 104 P.9. Before he could access the funds, his probation was revoked and was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. R. 104 P. 9.

- 4. Mr. Dunn plead guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception, all second degree felonies. He plead guilty on the basis the Court would release him on his own recognizance pending sentencing and the State of Utah would write a letter to the Board of Pardons asking for his release. R. 36. The defendant agreed to deposit \$1,300,000.00 into the Trust account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas and being released from the Utah State Prison. R. 36.
- 5. He further agreed to turn his passport over to his attorney and not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from his probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case. R. 36.
- 6. Mr. Dunn agreed to deposit \$1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and being released from the Utah State Prison. The money was to be paid to Richard Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to him during the years 2004 and 2005. The State agreed once it had reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has received the \$1,300,000.00 in legal funds, they would stipulate to withdrawing his plea to the eleven counts and dismiss the charges against him. R. 36 The written plea agreement did not set forth the factual basis for the pleas. It made reference to the facts the prosecutor would state in open court during the plea hearing. R. 32.

- 7. On August 20, 2007, a status conference was held in the First District Court. Mr. Dunn had not been released from the Utah State Prison and the mattered was continued until November, 19th 2007. The court date was changed to November 26, 2007. R. 50. The defendant failed to appear for court on November 26, 2007 and a warrant for \$20,000.00 dollars was issued on December 4, 2007. R. 55.
- 8. On January 14, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing and a motion was made to continue the sentencing for another sixty (60) days. The defendant was sure he could access the money and pay Mr. Waters within that time. The court continued sentencing until February 11, 2008. R. 106 P. 4. The defendant is in custody of the Department of Corrections at the Utah State Prison.
- 9. On February 25, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing. His attorney made a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty pleas. R. 107 P.2. He also asks the Court for additional time for the defendant to read his pre-sentence report. The court denies all motions and requests. R. 107 P. 4. The court sentences the defendant to serve, One to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison on each of the counts. He was ordered to pay a fine on each count of \$1,500.00 and pay restitution in the amount of \$1,149,175.00. plus interest. The court ran counts one through three consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and counts eight through eleven consecutively.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The defendant/appellant alleges on appeal he should have been given more time to get the funds sought for by the State in behalf of Mr. Richard Waters.

Because of his confinement in the Utah State Prison he was never given the opportunity to access the funds transferred to him and return them to Mr. Waters.

He further alleges that the State failed to set forth a proper factual basis to support the *alford* pleas that he entered and that the court did not strictly comply with Rule 11. The plea affidavit did not contain the elements of the crime and the court did not explain them to the defendant.

He further alleges that his guilty pleas that the court should have allowed his guilty plea be withdraw.

Finally, the defendant asserts that the courts imposition of consecutive sentences was cruel and unusual punishment.

ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED

Mr. Dunn, the appellant entered into an unusual plea agreement with the State of Utah. He entered *Alford* pleas to the Eleven counts of Theft by Deception against him. The only consideration he received in return was the State agreed to allow him to withdraw his plea upon the payment of full

restitution. The State did not dismiss any of the Counts or reduce their severity.

The defendant in essence entered in a contract with the State if Utah and the Court to repay the restitution owing to Mr. Waters. The defendant was unable to perform on the contract. Mr. Waters continued incarceration at the Utah State Prison prohibited him from obtaining access to the funds to re-pay them to Mr. Waters, thus it was impossible for him to perform on the contract.

In *State v. Stringham*, 17 P.3d 1153 (Utah) suggests that an agreement just between the State and the defendant is just an executory agreement until the Court signs off on the agreement. Once the Court has accepted a defendant's guilty plea the agreement is analogous to a contract and legally binding agreement has been reached. Mr. Dunn could not perform on the contract because of his continued incarceration and the prohibitions place on him in his very short stay in a half-way house setting.

The essential elements of contract formation were present here. *See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas*, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) (indicating that the essential elements of a contract include "offer and acceptance, competent parties, and consideration") The offer from the State was that if the defendant will plead guilty to all eleven Second Degree Felonies and make restitution the State will allow the defendant to withdraw his plea and dismiss the charges. This defendant was

not able to make the restitution because he could not access the funds while incarcerated at Utah State Prison and released shortly to a half-way house. Thus, it was impossible for him to perform on the contract. Once the Court realized the contemplated plea-bargain was impossible for him to perform, he should have allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea and allow him to exercise his right to a trial. The defendant attempted, prior to sentencing to withdraw his plea but the court denied his request. See Addendum D.

Wherefore, the appellant requests the court to allow him withdraw his plea or extend the timeframe so he can transfer the money back to Mr. Waters.

ISSUE II. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. THE COURT SHOULD NEVER ACCEPTED THE PLEA. THE COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11.

The Trial Court erred when they accepted the defendant's plea to theft by deception. In setting forth a factual basis for the plea the State failure to proffer evidence of all the elements of the crime.

- (1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
- (2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by

statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.

In *State v. Wallace*, 2006 UT App 262 the court held to commit theft by deception, a party must exercise control over another's property by means of a deception. The trial judge did not bind the defendant over on the charge because the State failed to show any deception on the part of the defendant. The Utah Court of appeals affirmed his decision.

In the current case Mr. Waters gave the defendant some money. See Addendum C. Mr. Dunn did not deceive Mr. Waters into giving him the money. When Mr. Waters asked for the money back, Mr. Dunn was not able to return the money because he was incarcerated. The essential element of deception on the part of the defendant is absent based upon the facts tendered by the State.

Mr. Dunn entered an *Alford* plea to the charges because he did not agree to the facts set forth by the State. He plead guilty in order to gain his freedom and gain access to the funds and transfer them back to Mr. Waters. The court should never have accepted the Alford plea.

Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution

that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, see, e. g., Griffin v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 110, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380, (1968); Bruce v. United States, supra, at 342, 379 F.2d at 119 (1967); Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969); and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. See, e. g., People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308-309, 206 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1965); State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 563, 63 S.E. 169, 171 (1908). See also Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33, 36 (CA10 1952).

To satisfy due process rights and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court must adequately ensure, by way of colloquy with the defendant, that he understands all rights waived and retained under Rule 11(e) *Bluemel v. State*, 134 P.3d. 185 (2006). Moreover, to ensure a defendant's due process rights, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts must strictly comply with the elements of Rule 11(e) See *State v. Gibbons*, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). A court's strict compliance with Rule 11 requires the trial court to establish (1) that "the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary," and (2) that "the defendant knowingly waived

his constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." *State v. Abeyta*, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, in applying the Rule 11(e) strict compliance analysis, the factual elements of the charges against a defendant must be explained so that the defendant understands and admits each element of each offense. *Gibbons* at 1313.

The plea affidavit did not contain a recitation of the facts the State would rely upon or the elements of the offense(s) to which the Defendant was pleading guilty, nor did the Court review the elements of the offense during the plea colloquy. The failure to advise the Defendant of the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty was error. It was also error to fail to advise the Defendant that he had a time-limited right to withdraw his plea of guilty in violation of Rule 11(e)(7).

Rule 11 (e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;

In the Federal courts, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 expressly provides that a court "shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." *North Carolina v.*

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct 160 (1970). In the Alford case the state had the investigating police officer testify under oath as to the evidence the State would rely on if the case were to go to trial. The State had the officer testify as to all the elements of the crime to substantiate the guilty plea. In Mr. Dunn's case the State set forth some facts, but did not allege these facts in sufficient detail as satisfy all the elements of the alleged offense. (see facts above).

It would have been wise for the State to have either Mr. Waters testify or the investigating officer testify as to his investigation of the actions of Mr. Dunn. This may have created a sufficient record the Mr. Dunn somehow committed the crimes with which he was charged. Absent such a record the Court can only speculate whether or not a factual basis exists for the plea. The State definitely did not set forth the element of deception as required under the statue. Therefore the appellant asks this court to set aside his plea.

ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Houk*, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, *State v.*

Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when "the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990)(citations and quotations omitted.) Furthermore, an appellate court can only find an abuse of discretion 'if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive sentence.

The Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception Second Degree Felonies. The decision of the Trial court to run them consecutive constitutes an abuse of discretion..

In *State v. Galli*, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court outlined four mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The Court reversed the trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court's reasoning was sound and should be applied in this case to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In *Galli*, the Supreme Court found that the trial courts abused their discretion. "The record shows

that Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may no have given adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances." *Id.* at 938.

In *Galli* there were four mitigating factors that the trial courts failed to consider that caused them to abuse their discretion. All of the four factors can be applied favorably to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was that Galli had not inflicted physical injuries on his victims. *Id.* Galli had used a gun, but it was a pellet gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury. *Id.* In the case at bar, the Defendant pled guilty to property crimes.

The second factor in *Galli* was that his criminal history did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences. *Id.* In the case at bar, the Defendant does not have a lengthy criminal record for violence but does have a history of writing bad checks and fraud.

The third factor was that Galli had voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibilities for his crimes. "The record suggests that he has expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself." *Id.* In the case of the bar, the Defendant stated in the sentencing hearing that he came up with idea of the plea bargain so that he could return the money to Mr. Waters. R.107 P 6.

The fourth and final *Galli* factor was that consecutive sentences were not in accord with *Galli*'s rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed

that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. *Id.*

The trial court did not consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs.

In the sentence given by the trial court there is no mention that the defendant could benefit from counseling for theft. R. 107.

The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in *Galli*. The trial court failed to consider these factors, and therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison on consecutive counts. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand this case back to the trial court so he can be re-sentenced.

CONCLUSION

The defendant would like to transfer the funds back to Mr. Waters but he is unable to do so while in custody of the Department of Corrections. He is unable to perform his part of the bargain and requests that court grant him additional time to do so or allow him to withdraw his plea.

The trial court did not strictly follow Rule 11. There was not a sufficient factual basis given to support the plea. Furthermore, the elements

of the crime were not contained in the plea agreement and he was never informed of his rights to withdraw his plea.

The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences on the defendant. The Court should have looked at the defendant's rehabilative needs. For these reasons the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand his case back to the trial court to either allow his plea to be set aside, given more time to perform on the contract or to be re-sentenced.

DATED this $q^{4/4}$ day of February, 2009.

DAVID M PERRY
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the Appellate Brief, postage prepaid, to the office of the Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140833, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0833 on this ______ day of February, 2009.

Jollyhan

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT postage prepaid to the Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814

DATED this 9 day of February, 2009.

ADDENDUM A

FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

: MINUTES

Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

VS.

Case No: 071100069 FS

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,

: Judge:

CLINT S. JUDKINS

Defendant.

: Date: February 25, 2008

PRESENT

Clerk: lindac

Prosecutor: BAIRD, TONY C

Defendant

Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M

DEFENDANT INFORMATION

Date of birth: January 19, 1968

Video

CHARGES

1. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty 2. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

3. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

4. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

5. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

6. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

7. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty 8. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

9. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

10. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

11. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

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Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah

State Prison.

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.

To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

Charges 1 through 3 will run consecutive to charges 4 through 7, and charges 8 through 11 will run consecutive to those charges.

SENTENCE FINE

Charge # 1 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70

Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 1 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 3 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.00

Due: \$1300.00

Charge # 4 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.30

Charge # 5 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 6 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 7 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500 00

Charge # 8 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70 Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 9 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70

Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 10 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70

Due: \$1500.00

Charge # 11 Fine: \$1500.00

Suspended: \$0.00 Surcharge: \$702.70

Due: \$1500.00

Total Fine: \$16500

Total Suspended: \$0

Total Surcharge: \$7729.7 Total Principal Due: \$16500

Plus Interest

Restitution Amount: \$1149175.00 Plus Interest

Dated this ZX day of F3B

CLINT S. JUDKINS

District Court Judge

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff, vs.

LARRY D. DUNN,

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Case No. 071100069

Judge: Clint S. Judkins

I, <u>Larry D. Dunn</u>, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:

Waiver of Preliminary Hearing

I understand that I am waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing is a procedure to determine probable cause and to inform an accused of the charges against him or her. Competent evidence which shows probable cause that the charged crime was committed and that the defendant committed it is sufficient to hold an accused to answer. The evidence does not have to be sufficient for a conviction at trial.

I understand that at a preliminary hearing, an accused has the right to be represented by counsel. If an accused cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him or her.

I understand, that an accused may call and compel witnesses to testify on his or her behalf, and confront and cross examine any witnesses the State may call to testify. I understand that an accused may testify on his or her behalf, or remain silent and say nothing. In order to proceed with my plea today, I waive my preliminary hearing.

Notification of Charges

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:

Punishment

Min/Max and/or

Crime & Statutory Provision Degree Minimum Mandatory

A. Theft by Deception (Eleven Counts) 2nd Felony 1-15 yrs Prison

\$10,000 Fine + 85% surcharge

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest).

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) will are as stated in the criminal information filed in this case. *See* Information on file in this case.

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): The facts are those stated by the prosecutor in open court during the plea hearing.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might alter, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.

I have not waived my right to counsel. I am represented by David Perry.

I certify that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) ple; (s).

My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences or my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

Jury Tr:al. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).

Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.

Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony (f those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.

Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.

Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.

I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.

Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).

I know and understand that by pleading guilty or no contest, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional right as explained above.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea

Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.

I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.

Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime hat I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and

provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

- A. I agree to plead guilty to the eleven counts of Theft by Deception as charged in the Information in the present case, each a second degree felony.
- B. If not already in the possession of my probation/parole officer, I agree to turn my passport(s) over to my attorney, David Perry, until this case is concluded. I further agree not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from my probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case.
- C. I agree to deposit \$1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of my defense attorney, David Perry, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and being released from the Utah State Prison. This money will be paid to Richard Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to me during the years of 2004 and 2005 (as outlined in the State's discovery). These monies are the subject of the eleven counts in the present case.
- D. The State agrees that upon me entering guilty pleas to the eleven counts discussed above, it will stipulate to an own recognisance release for a period of 90 days. Furthermore, the State well write a letter to the basel of fundors Rec his release.

 E. The State further agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has

E. The State further agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has received the \$1,300,000.00 in legal funds, it will stipulate to me withdrawing my pleas to the eleven counts and the present case will be dismissed.

Trial Judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

I am $\frac{30}{1}$ Years of age. I have attended school through the ______ grade. I can read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I

understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty (or no contest). I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this ______ Day of ________, 20 07 .

Larry D. Dunn

Certificate of Defense Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for	, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statemen	nt or that I have read it to him/her; I
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/s	she fully understand the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent.	To the best of my knowledge and
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the eleme	nts of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are co	prrectly state; and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the	defendant in the foregoing affidavit,
are accurate an 1 true.	
—- A	TTORNEY FOR WEFENDANT
	TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

David Perry

Bar No.: _____

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for the	ne State of Utan in the case against
	, defendant. I have reviewed this
Statement of Defendant and find that the f	actual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and	d correct. No improper inducements, threats, or
coercion to encourage a plea has been offe	ered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully
contained in the Statement and in the attac	thed Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the
record before the Court. There is reasonal	ble cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of defendant for the	e offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered
and that the acceptance of the plea(s) wou	PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
	Tony C. Baird
	Bar No.:

Order

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

It IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this 1 Day of MA, 2007.

STRICT COURT JUDGE

ADDENDUM C

1	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
2	CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH	
3	STATE OF UTAH,	
4	Plaintiff,)	
5	vs.) Case No. 071100069	
. 6) Transcript of Videotape. LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,)	
7	Defendant.)	
8		
9	Transcript of Entry of Plea.	
10	Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. First District Court Courthouse	
11	Logan, Utah May 11, 2007	
12	* * *	
13	APPEARANCES:	
14	For the Plaintiff: TONY C. BAIRD Deputy County Attorney	
15	Deputy County Accorney	
16	For the Defendant: DAVID M. PERRY Attorney at Law	
17	Accorney at baw	
18		
19		
20		
21	RODNEY M. FELSHAW	
22	Registered Professional Reporter First District Court	
23		
24	COPY -	
25		

THE COURT: Let's take the case of State of Utah versus Larry Douglas Dunn. This is the time set for a pretrial conference. Mr. Perry, obviously your negotiations have been successful. Will you verbalize for me your arrangement, please.

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2.2

MR. PERRY: Your Honor, we prepared a written plea agreement. In that agreement it sets forth all of the terms. The court has the copy. What basically Mr. Dunn is going to plead guilty to is the 11 counts. He's going to waive his right to a preliminary hearing and plead guilty to the 11 counts. The state will then release him on his own recognizance. We'll waive our right to be sentenced within 90 days, or within 45 days. And we'll set sentencing in 90 days.

During that 90 day time frame Mr. Dunn, if he has a passport, will turn it over to me or his probation or parole officer. He agrees to deposit \$1.3 million in my trust account. And this money will be paid to the victim Richard Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005. And they are the monies subject to the 11 counts in the present case.

The state agrees that upon entering the guilty pleas to the 11 counts they will stipulate to his own recognizance for a period of 90 days. The state further agrees that once it

has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in 1 legal funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing 2 3 his pleas to the 11 counts and the present case will be 4 dismissed. 5 They've also agreed that if he has any problems with -he had a parole date last week. The Board should release him 6 7 based upon this agreement. The state has also agreed to 8 write a letter to the Board recommending that he be released 9 for this time period so he can get these monies together. 10 THE COURT: So it's anticipated that with this agreement he will be released from the Utah State Prison? 11 12 MR. BAIRD: Yeah. We'll ask the court to make sure 1.3 that there's an OR release in this case, his own recognizance 14 release. 15 THE COURT: What is he in prison for now? 16 A bad check, I think, a bad check MR. BAIRD: 17 offense. 18 THE COURT: Out of which court? 19 MR. BAIRD: Salt Lake. 20 MR. PERRY: Third District.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you understand and realize that if the court approves this thing here today and I release you on your own recognizance on this case, I don't have any control over whatever that other case is down at the prison?

21

22

2.3

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THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. I'm still on parole
    until 2027.
                         But you understand that?
              THE COURT:
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes.
              THE COURT: The state is comfortable that he will be
    released and can follow through on this arrangement that has
    been made.
 8
        Mr. Dunn, you've been incarcerated, but have you consumed
 9
    any alcohol or drugs before coming in here today?
10
              THE DEFENDANT: Not drugs, but I take medications.
    And they're nonpsychotropic.
11
12
              THE COURT: Those medications that you are taking do
13
    not affect your ability to make a reasoned decision right
    now; is that correct?
14
15
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             They don't.
16
              THE COURT: Do you feel you've had ample opportunity
17
    to discuss this matter with your attorney, Mr. Perry?
18
              THE DEFENDANT: Very much so.
              THE COURT: Do you feel that you understand what is
19
20
    going on here today?
             THE DEFENDANT: Very well, yes.
21
22
              THE COURT: Has anyone promised you or threatened
23
    you with anything to get you to plead guilty to these 11
    counts other than as set forth in this document or
24
25
    represented to the court by your attorney?
```

1 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: You understand that any recommendation made to me as to what sentence you should receive would be a 3 recommendation only and I may or may not accept the 4 5 recommendation, do you understand that? 6 THE DEFENDANT: After I've done X, Y and Z you still would have the authority to not dismiss the case? 7 THE COURT: That's correct. I'm inclined to do 9 that, but you need to understand that these are all 10 recommendations, everything that has been said. I can see no 11 reason at this point in time -- I understand that this is a 12 result of much negotiation, et cetera, that has gone on and the court in all probability would follow through on that. 13 But you need to understand that I have the last word and if I 14 15 get additional information I may do something different. You 16 understand that? 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 18 THE COURT: Very well. Has the defendant waived his 19 preliminary hearing? 20 MR. PERRY: No, Your Honor. 21 MR. BAIRD: No. He needs to do that. 22 THE COURT: You understand that this statement of 23 defendant sets forth the rights you have as relates to a 24 preliminary hearing?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT: And the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ascertain whether or not the state can show that there's probable cause to believe that the offenses you were charged with were committed and you were the person who committed those. This sets forth those rights. By signing this document you give up your right to that preliminary hearing, you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: This document does appear to bear your signature. You signed this before it was submitted to me; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Immediately, right now.

THE COURT: Very well. The counts that I understand you will be pleading guilty to are all second degree felonies. They appear to all be theft by deception. I'll read count one. Theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-405. The information alleges that the defendant did, on or about May 18th, 2004, obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another by deception with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. The value of the property or services was or exceeded \$5000. Or the property was stolen from the person of another.

Count two is exactly the same as the first, except the date there is July 16th, 2004. Count three is the same as

count two, including the date. As is count four and count 1 2 five is the same. Count six is the same as those previously 3 described except the date there is July 26th, 2004. Count seven is also the same, theft by deception. The date there 4 is January 20th of 2005. Count eight is the same as 5 previously set forth, except the date is January 21st, 2005. 6 7 Count nine is the same, except the date is January -- excuse me, July 23rd, 2005. Count ten is theft by deception as 8 9 previously described, with the date being August 8th, 2005. 10 And count 11 is, again, theft by deception, the same as previously described, except the date is January 6th, 2006. 11 12 To those 11 counts, Mr. Dunn, how do you plead? THE DEFENDANT: Can I make a suggestion? 13 14 THE COURT: Go ahead. THE DEFENDANT: What's the date on the first one? 15 THE COURT: The date on the first one is May 18th, 16 17 2004. 18 THE DEFENDANT: You might want to have me plead quilty -- you said the first one, have me just do the second 19 20 I was incarcerated then. It's just a matter of dates. 21 I was incarcerated at that time. I'm pleading guilty to all 22 of them, but --23 MR. BAIRD: It's on or about. 24 THE DEFENDANT: I still plead guilty.

THE COURT: All right. To those 11 counts how do

25

you plead?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: Mr. Baird, give us the factual basis for the 11 counts.

MR. BAIRD: On the dates -- on or about the dates alleged in the information, from a source here in Cache County, state of Utah, Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies from here to accounts under the control of Mr. Dunn. Each one of these transfers was in excess of \$5,000.

Mr. Waters, if called to testify, would testify that these monies were transferred for a specific purpose. And that these monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn acknowledged that he received these amounts.

That subsequently, some several months later, Mr. Waters demanded that the defendant give the monies back and the defendant has not returned those funds. The state would present evidence that these funds were used inconsistently -- inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn for. Thus Mr. Dunn exercised unauthorized control over the funds. Along with the other elements, those are the facts that we would prove.

THE COURT: When you indicate to us, Mr. Baird, that the money was used for other purposes than what was originally designated by Mr. Waters, apparently that was for the purpose of depriving Mr. Waters of the benefit of that

money; is that correct? Is that what you're maintaining?

1.3

MR. BAIRD: When the money was used inconsistent for the purpose for which Mr. Waters gave it to Mr. Dunn, and then subsequently not returning the money, refusing to return it, it shows an intent to permanently deprive -- there were several demands made. Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of these facts, but this is the evidence we would present, that the money was given to him for, among other things, a business venture and some other things. But in any event the monies -- the state would present evidence, bank records, to show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose for which it was given to him.

THE COURT: And that Mr. Waters was deprived of the money?

MR. BAIRD: Yes. He's never received the money back.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you've heard the facts as related to us by Mr. Baird. Are you pleading guilty because you committed the offenses as he described them?

MR. PERRY: I don't think he would agree to that.

Maybe we might have to do it on an Alford basis. He's pleading guilty to get out of jail. The reason he couldn't get the money back once the demand was made was his probation officer -- his probation got violated down in Salt Lake

County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to access

the money.

1.0

2.3

MR. BAIRD: We would agree to an Alford type plea.

I understand Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of the representations that the state has made. Nonetheless, that's the evidence we would present. We would present bank records and whatnot to show that the money was used inconsistently.

I think Mr. Dunn realizes that there's some give and take here. He understands that this is in his best interest to do this, to make this arrangement. So I think for purposes of resolving it and looking at the likelihood of conviction and weighing all those sorts of things, I think that he believes that this is in his best interest. At least I think so from our conversations. Is that right, Mr. Dunn, you believe this is in your best interest?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, the court can't accept a guilty plea to something unless somebody committed the offense and you're telling me you didn't commit the offense. But there's an exception to that and that exception is what we call an Alford type plea. That is where, after consultation with your attorney, you have determined that it is in your best interest to accept the plea bargain that the state has proposed because you think if you went to trial your chances of being convicted are such that you're better off to take this plea. Is that what you're telling me here

in this case?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept the plea, designating it as an Alford type plea. But I need to assure you that in doing that, if you don't follow through on this arrangement and it becomes necessary for this court to pass sentence, you are sentenced the same as if you admitted you performed the acts. The court will accept it as a guilty plea, you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept and designate it as an Alford type plea. I will sign the order containing the statement of defendant and incorporate that into the record. Pursuant to your agreement, the court will authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance pursuant to the terms and conditions in the statement of defendant.

Counsel, how are we going to review this? How do you want to handle that?

MR. PERRY: Set it for a sentencing date in 90 days, I guess.

THE COURT: Set it for sentencing, is that what you want to do? I guess there's no need for a PSI in this case.

Who is going to report back to the court if he's performed all of the obligations?

MR. BAIRD: We will. I guess, frankly, what we probably ought to do, because otherwise he'll have to be referred to AP&P for a statement and that sort of thing. I would suggest that we set it for a status hearing 90 days out, 90 days from this coming Monday. And then at that time we'll know whether everything has been fulfilled. If not, I guess set it for sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question?

THE COURT: Ask your attorney and he can bring it to my attention.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

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MR. PERRY: His question was if he has the money sooner than 90 days can we come back before the court and have this dismissed. My answer was I'm sure the state wouldn't oppose a dismissal if the money is returned.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, we handle routine matters every Monday. If you get this thing taken care of before that, notify your attorney. Mr. Perry knows how to put it on the next Monday's calendar.

All right. We'll schedule it for the 20th of August at ten. The court will designate that as a status conference.

I'll expect the parties to come prepared at that time to represent to me whether or not -- in as much as we don't have AP&P or someone monitoring it, the attorneys will have to be prepared to come and tell me what the status of the case is

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that day.
 1
        All right. Have we covered all of the bases?
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             MR. PERRY: I did say this earlier on the record,
 3
 4
    but, Mr. Dunn, are you willing to waive your right to be
 5
    sentenced within 45 days?
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              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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              THE COURT: I appreciate that Mr. Perry. Anything
    else that we should take care of?
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 9
             MR. PERRY: Nothing that I have.
              THE COURT: Mr. Baird, have we covered everything in
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11
    this matter?
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             MR. BAIRD: I believe so, yes.
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              THE COURT: Very well.
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              THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess.
15
         (Hearing concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for the State of Utah. That a full, true and correct transcription of the hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the pages numbered 2 to 13, inclusive. I further certify that the original transcript was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache County, Logan, Utah. Dated this 5th day of September, 2008. Rodney M. Felshaw C.S.R.

ADDENDUM D

1	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
2	CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH	
3	STATE OF UTAH,	
4	Plaintiff,)	
5	vs.) Case No. 071100069	
6) Transcript of Videotape. LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,)	
7	Defendant.)	
8		
9	Transcript of Sentencing Hearing.	
10	Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. First District Court Courthouse	
11	Logan, Utah February 25, 2008	
12	* * *	
13	APPEARANCES:	
L 4	For the Plaintiff: TONY C. BAIRD Deputy County Attorney	
15	Deputy County Accorney	
16	For the Defendant: DAVID M. PERRY Attorney at Law	
17	necorney at Law	
18		
L 9		
20		
21	RODNEY M. FELSHAW Registered Professional Reporter	
22	First District Court	
23		
24	COPY	
25		

THE COURT: Let's take State versus Larry Douglas 1 Dunn. Mr. Perry, I show that this is the time set for 2 3 sentencing on 11 counts, all theft by deception, all second 4 degree felonies. Any reason why sentence should not be 5 passed at this time? 6 MR. PERRY: Your Honor, I think this is a case that 7 we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to see if he's 8 competent to proceed. I'll file the petition and ask the court to stay sentencing until the state can look at him and 9 10 see if he understood what he was doing when he entered his 11 plea or not. 12 THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask for an attorney that would 13 vigorously defend me? I deserve that whether I'm guilty or 14 not. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state on Mr. 16 Perry's motion? 17 MR. BAIRD: May we approach? 18 THE COURT: Come forward. 19 (Sidebar, not recorded.) 20 THE COURT: The court has had an opportunity to 21 visit with counsel at the bench. Mr. Perry, anything further? 22 23 MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn needs a few minutes to read the 24 presentence report. I haven't talked to him since he was 25 here last.

THE COURT: You've had ample opportunity to visit with him. It's time to proceed.

MR. PERRY: I make a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas that he entered.

THE COURT: The motion will need to be made in writing. You can do that at a later time.

MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing at this time because in order for him to -- once he's sentenced he's not able to withdraw his plea. So we'd like to make a motion prior to sentencing to see if the plea can be withdrawn. I want to supplement that by having him examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he was competent at the time he entered his plea.

THE COURT: Mr. Baird, the court has heard your comments at the bench, but I'll hear what you have to say on the record.

MR. BAIRD: We oppose that. We'd like to go ahead with sentencing today. If counsel wants to file a motion at a later time, we'll respond to it then.

THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Perry?

MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing today because we've made -- we want to make a petition to determine whether he's competent to proceed. Once we make that petition, Your Honor, as you well know that stays all proceedings. So we can't proceed with anything further until

that issue is resolved, unless you want to have a hearing to see whether the petition is valid. That still stays all proceedings.

I make that petition at this time in behalf of Mr. Dunn to stay all proceedings so that we can determine whether he was competent at the time he entered his plea and whether his plea should be withdrawn or not.

THE COURT: Mr. Perry, this matter has been pending for I'm not sure how long. The court finds that your motions are untimely. I'll allow you to file those in writing if you so desire, but the court will proceed with sentencing today. Anything else you'd like to place on the record?

MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where he was hopeful that he could get out of prison and get over to the Isle Mann where he's indicated he has the one point three million dollars to pay Mr. Waters. He was unable to get out of prison and get access to these funds in order to pay the restitution to Mr. Waters.

Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get access to this money, he has not had the benefit of the bargain that was entered into in this case. That being that once he paid the 1.3 million the state would stipulate to him being able to withdraw his plea and the charges be dismissed. Because of his inability to have access to this money that's in the Isle Mann, an off shore trust, because of his

incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution.

Had he been able to make restitution we wouldn't be

proceeding with sentencing today and the charges would be

dismissed.

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Mr. Dunn is confident that he has that money there. He believes the money is there. He just needs to be able to access the money and then Mr. Waters can be made whole. By sentencing him to prison it will delay that. And plus it will -- he may be in prison a long time. He pled straight up to the charges with the understanding that he thought he would be able to get out of prison and get the money. The state wrote a letter and tried to help him in that matter.

Because of different factors he's been unable to -- he was released to a halfway house, but they would not allow him telephone access or any type of pass to be able to access this money. Therefore he's still in prison. I believe he has a Board date, or maybe not.

THE DEFENDANT: I went to the Board.

MR. PERRY: You went to the Board and don't have a
date?

THE DEFENDANT: The Board said I needed to figure out this second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you about yet. Then go back and tell them what happened.

They're pending right now posing you a question, but I haven't even spoken to my attorney.

THE COURT: Anything further?

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MR. PERRY: Anything you want to say to the Judge?
This is the time for sentencing, Mr. Dunn.

THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state?

MR. BAIRD: I think the report done by the AP&P agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent. I thought he did a great job of explaining what Mr. Dunn is all about. Mr. Dunn is a complete fraud and he continues to try to -- even today it's continually a fraud. He's unlike many defendants, or any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted. I think Mr. Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate. I ask the court to sentence the defendant to prison. I'll submit it.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT: I came up with this idea. I asked originally for a pow wow to all get together so the prosecution could see that Richard was all on board and understanding. The prosecution saw that. Mr. Baird listened to Richard, what he said. Everything that I've said is exactly one line linear after the next.

I said that this deal had to be done before May 8th. The prison did not transport me on -- was it the 5th? The Friday beforehand I had court here and for no reason at all the prison didn't transport me. Your assistant sent it in, maybe this lady here sent it in, but I wasn't transported.

The deal needed to be done before May 8th is what the Board said and then I would be released on May 8th last year. It wasn't done before May 8th. I came actually on Friday, a week after -- four days after I was to be released. So now I lost that May 8th Board date. I even said to you on that date, and it's on the video or the transcript, I said I could be another three to six months before I get released.

I come back and meet with you and I was still cheery. I said to you I've seen the Board, they told me I'd be released July 31st, but it's now August 20th. Clearly something is arrears.

I went back and my captain, Hughes, who doesn't like inmates, threatened me saying if I'm not telling the truth I'd go to max. He took me at my word and called the Board. The Board lost my file. They said that they misplaced it. They misplaced it during the summer time, whatever happened. They said we'll get right on it. It wasn't done. I finally wrote to Deputy Warden Bouseo and asked for his help. And I contacted Officer Valdez, our caseworker. They called the Board and a Ms. Cheryl, and I don't know if that's Ms. Cheryl Hansen or not, but a Ms. Cheryl said, oh, my gosh, and I heard, it was on the speaker phone, this deal isn't done yet. If I can find a Board member it will be done by this afternoon. And the next day I had my Board date for the 13th.

Now, the next mess up -- I haven't done anything wrong yet. Everybody keeps saying I'm such a bad person, but I never get to perform. My dad gets involved because I had to have another angiogram. I don't know if he got involved with Mr. Baird, but I got emails in my pocket that these gentlemen brought up, that my dad sent around saying junior needs to be watched, make sure he's taking his blood, everything for the angiogram.

I got sent to a halfway house which I never asked to go. The Board actually, when I went to them, they didn't know I'd went to the halfway house. They said why did you ask to go there. I didn't ask to go there. At a halfway house it's like still being in prison, but you can get your own food and stuff like that.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, I have other matters that need to be taken care of.

THE DEFENDANT: But you need to knowing everything was mixed up.

THE COURT: Make your comments relevant to --

THE DEFENDANT: These are relevant. These are exactnesses. Now I get to the halfway house and they say I can't come to court unless I receive a fax from you in the morning time. I called every morning that morning and they faxed something down. My boss brings me up and I see you. I now have a \$20,000 bail. I come back. I don't run away.

They had seven men run away from the halfway house.

I'm trying to resolve this. If I go to prison right now Mr. Waters won't get his money. I've been in prison right now not because I've done another crime or something, but because of this.

His attorney, Mr. Brown, this is very important, these are exacts, went to my agent. They called the judge and said I'm a bad person, let's send him to prison on this stuff right here. So I've served two years on something I should never have done in the beginning. Richard and I should have sat down and got it worked out instead of him going to my parole agent. Now I'm here facing 11 felony twos. I gave you the opportunity to hang me if I didn't perform, but I've never performed.

Moreover, the court attorney, I haven't even seen this -what is this called? -- the PSI. I haven't even seen the PSI
yet. But PSI agent at the hearing -- the attorney at the
hearing, Manny Garcia, said this isn't even acceptable to the
court because Mr. Feltenberger lied to the Board and
misrepresented stuff that we've already defended before the
Board and that they threw out. So this actually isn't even
admissible in your court upon some law that they said.

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you have another 30 seconds. Finish it up.

THE DEFENDANT: So you want to resolve this and I

want to resolve this. I thought in the beginning when I met you you signed on this as being a good deal. Everybody keeps saying I'm such a bad guy. When do I get to perform? I've been incarcerated now for two years on something I didn't do, this right here. An Alford plea where I say I'm not guilty, but the other guy says I am, so we figure out a way to resolve it. If you want to resolve it — I don't need anybody to determine if I'm crazy. I invented this little plan here. So why are you sentencing me — to take it out of the Board's hands and sentencing me to probation for the same 90 days when I'm released from prison?

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THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Dunn, your 30 seconds is up. Anything further, Mr. Perry?

MR. PERRY: I just wonder if the court would continue this for like an hour setting to hear all of the facts?

THE COURT: No, counsel. This thing has gone on and on and talking about fairy tales. All of his life he's been able to dupe people into things like this.

THE DEFENDANT: Name one thing where I've messed up.

THE COURT: That's enough, Mr. Dunn. This court isn't going to be provoked any further. Counsel, if you have motions to file, file them. You could have filed those in the past and you didn't. Mr. Dunn has all of these big stories that he'd like everybody to believe. He's done that

1 all his life. This court won't be manipulated further. Mr. 2 Waters isn't going to get his money. He keeps trying to 3 dangle that as a carrot. If he had any money that he wanted 4 to give Mr. Waters he could have done that in the past. tried that and it didn't work. 6 Anything further? 7 MR. PERRY: Ask the court to at least run them 8 concurrent. 9 THE COURT: It will be ordered that the defendant on 10 the 11 counts serve not less than one nor more than 15 years 11 in the Utah State Penitentiary. On each count he's to pay a fine in the amount of \$1500. Pay restitution in the amount 12 13 of \$1,149,175, plus interest. The court will run counts one through three 14 15 consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and counts eight through 11 consecutively. Very well. That will 16 17 be the order of the court.

(Hearing concluded.)

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