

1986

Martha A. Totzke v. Henry A. Totzke : Brief of Respondent

Utah Supreme Court

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STATE COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF

UTAH
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DUCKET NO. 860206 IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARTHA A. TOTZKE,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

HENRY A. TOTZKE,

Defendant and
Appellant.

:

:

:

:

:

:

Case No. 860279

Category No. 13b

860206-CA

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE PRESIDING.

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FILED

SEP 16 1986

Supreme Court, Utah

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARTHA A. TOTZKE,	:	
Plaintiff and	:	
Respondent,	:	
vs.	:	Case No. 860279
	:	Category No. 13b
HENRY A. TOTZKE,	:	
Defendant and	:	
Appellant.	:	

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARTHA A. TOTZKE,	:	
Plaintiff and	:	
Respondent,	:	
vs.	:	Case No. 860279
	:	Category No. 13b
HENRY A. TOTZKE,	:	
Defendant and	:	
Appellant,	:	

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARTHA A. TOTZKE

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
RESPONDENT PROPERTY INHERITED BY HER SEPARATE FROM
THE MARITAL ASSET DIVISION.

II

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
RESPONDENT CHILD SUPPORT OF \$600.00 PER MONTH.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Dr. and Mrs. Totzke were married on
January 27, 1962. (R-71) They had four children.

The two oldest were emancipated and attending school at the University of Utah. (R-71) The youngest was residing with Mrs. Tutzke and the other child was residing with Dr. Tutzke. This custody arrangement was by agreement of the parties. (R-72)

At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Tutzke was going to school at LSU. She concluded her education at the University of Tampa in 1963 with a BS in education. Her education was paid for by her father. (R-72, 73)

Dr. Tutzke was in his first two years of residency at Tampa General in pathology. In 1963, the Tutzkes moved to Houston where Dr. Tutzke finished his last two years of residency and Mrs. Tutzke taught school. (R-73) When Dr. Tutzke completed his residency, the parties moved to Ogden where he went into practice. The parties' first child was born shortly thereafter in 1966. (R-73)

Since the birth of their first child and up to the time of the parties' separation, Mrs. Tutzke had been exclusively a housewife and homemaker. Dr. Tutzke was continuously employed as a pathologist. (R-74)

At the time of the divorce trial, Mrs. Tutzke

was working for Ogden Food Service at Park City Resort as a supervisor/cashier earning \$6.00 per hour. She had no specific desire to return to teaching, but even if she were to do so, it would require recertification in the State of Utah. (R-76)

Dr. Totske was employed as a pathologist at McKay-Dee Hospital with an annual gross salary of \$140,000.00. (R-77)

Between 1980 and 1984, the parties had additional dividends and interest income averaging \$45,000.00 per year which were produced from property inherited by Mrs. Totske from her father. For those same years, the parties also received approximately \$12,000.00 per year from other investment properties they had purchased. (R-77)

At trial, Mrs. Totske testified concerning the assets listed in her Trial Outline and Settlement Proposal. (R-75) At the time of their separation, the Totskes each had an automobile which was paid for. Dr. Totske retained all of the large items of furniture, all of which were valued for the Court. (R-28, 78-80) Other assets, referred to as marital assets, were those items actually purchased or obtained through the efforts of the parties during

the marriage as distinguished from property inherited by either of the parties. (R-29, 30, 80-85)

Mrs. Tutzke acknowledged that during the course of the marriage, her husband inherited \$50,000.00 which was used for marital purposes.

(R-85) She testified concerning property she inherited from her father which was specifically listed in her Trial Outline. (R-31, 85-86)

Mrs. Tutzke originally inherited the property when her father died in 1966. It was initially placed in a ten year trust and administered by the Homer National Bank. (R-86) During that ten year period, the parties received modest dividends of \$3,000.00 to \$5,000.00 per year, all of which were used for marital purposes. (R-86)

In 1976, the property was removed from the trust and transferred to Mrs. Tutzke. Beginning in 1976, the income and dividends produced by the inherited property substantially increased. (R-86) From 1980 to 1984, those inherited assets alone produced \$225,000.00, all of which was used to acquire additional marital assets or provide for marital needs. (R-87)

Mrs. Tutzke testified that in 1985 the income

produced by her inherited property was approximately \$30,000.00. It was anticipated to be less for 1986 because of the diminished value of the leases in timber. (R-88) Dr. Totzke agreed that the income produced from the timber property in Arkansas and Louisiana would be less in the foreseeable future than it had been in the past. (R-162)

Mrs. Totzke was willing to waive alimony on the basis that she would be entitled to receive the income-producing property inherited by her and a cash settlement to equalize the proposed distribution of the marital assets. (R-89) The testimony of Mrs. Totzke concerning child support was in the context of what was referred to as the Uniform Child Support Schedule. (R-33, 87, 88)

While not outlining her actual monthly needs in arriving at a suggested child support figure, Mrs. Totzke relied on the probable difference of her income compared to her husband's and the Uniform Child Support Schedule. (R-109-111)

Dr. Totzke acknowledged that Mrs. Totzke would have similar monthly expenses to support herself and Chris as those that he had itemized and listed in his Exhibits 3 and 4. (R-170, 171)

ARGUMENT

I

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING RESPONDENT PROPERTY INHERITED BY HER SEPARATE FROM THE MARITAL ASSET DIVISION.

After listening to the evidence, hearing the arguments of counsel, and considering the matter while under advisement, Judge Hyde concluded in his Memorandum Decision:

"The major dispute between the parties appears to be the distribution of the property. Plaintiff inherited considerable property from her parents. The defendant takes the position that all property is joint and requests disposition accordingly. Plaintiff takes the position that the inherited property is separate and not part of the marital assets. I hold that the inherited property that is still easily identifiable is not a marital asset and does belong to the plaintiff as her separate property. The evidence shows that the defendant did inherit \$50,000.00 which was absorbed into the marital relationship, however, the income from the plaintiff's property would be over \$200,000.00 that was also absorbed into the marital relationship and no doubt has accounted for an increase in the marital assets.

Each of the parties has submitted a proposed distribution. The defendant's proposal basically gives the plaintiff what she inherited, plus approximately \$80,000.00 in other properties, and he takes the balance which includes the family home.

The requested division by plaintiff strikes me as basically being very fair. Her requested division is made so as to not disturb the defendant any more than necessary. This is an instance where alimony

could easily be asked and probably be awarded. She makes \$6.00 per hour; he makes some \$140,000.00 per year. She makes no claim to his business and no request for alimony. The defendant argues that plaintiff's proposed request for distribution creates a real injustice for him. It appears to me that she has made every effort to make the division so as to not disturb the defendant's business or living arrangements. I must comment that it is much more equitable than his proposal which, in effect, would have given her her inherited property, no alimony, no support, while he would take basically the marital assets and have no claim against his business corporation.

I accept and adopt the plaintiff's proposed distribution set out on the Trial Outline on Page 8, with the exception that in the distribution to the defendant, it appears the CMA savings correct figure is \$53,000.00 rather than \$64,000.00." (R-20, 21)
(Emphasis added)

This is simply a case of a trial judge exercising appropriate discretion in making a property division which he believes to be fair and equitable and which should not be disturbed on appeal.

Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) was similar to this case. The parties had been married for thirty-one years. The plaintiff worked while the defendant attended and completed dental school. Defendant established a dentistry practice and plaintiff became a homemaker and housewife caring for their three children. Plaintiff received separate

property from her father which, in one year, produced income of nearly \$4,000.00. Plaintiff contributed from her separate funds to furnish a home and pay on a mortgage. The trial Court awarded two-thirds of the marital assets to plaintiff and defendant received one-third. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the property division and held that the division and distribution of marital property is a matter wherein the trial Court has been invested with broad discretion and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of such discretion. at 1382.

This Court has, on many occasions, referred to the trial Court's duty and discretion in the division of a marital estate. It has also set the standard for review on appeal.

It is the Court's duty to make a division of the property and income in a divorce proceeding so that the parties may readjust their lives to the new situation as well as possible. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).

"There is no fixed rule or formula for the distribution of a marital estate." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982).

A trial Court's apportionment of marital

property will not be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977).

The actions of the trial Court are indulged with a presumption of validity, and the burden is upon appellant to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974)

See also Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982); Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); and Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (1986).

Appellant contends that the trial Court abused its discretion by awarding Mrs. Totzke all of the property inherited from her father. There is considerable legal support that it is not inequitable to restore to one party that which was inherited during a marriage.

In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), there was no error in the District Court's refusal to award husband a share of the property the wife acquired as an inheritance during the marriage even though the husband had done some work on the

inherited property.

It is true that in Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), the Court said that the rule that each party recover the separate property brought into the marriage was not invariable, but it acknowledged that significant compensating factors in that case justified a substantial imbalance in the overall division of all the property and an invasion of the separate property concept. Specifically in Workman, the husband retained his entire pension and had no alimony obligations.

In the Totzke case, Judge Hyde concluded the division of assets was fair because of no request for alimony "where alimony could easily be asked and probably be awarded", and the division does "not disturb the defendant's business or living arrangements".

It is acknowledged that courts may consider inherited property as a marital asset if equity to the parties require that consideration or if joint marital efforts have been made to enhance the value or retain the inherited property. On the other hand, if the inherited property is still easily identifiable and has no enhancement value resulting

from the joint efforts, skills or funds of either spouse, it is not error to retain the inherited property as the separate property of the spouse who has inherited the same. See Templeton v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1983); Mothershed v. Mothershed, 701 P.2d 405 (Okla. 1985); Preston v. Preston, supra; Peterson v. Peterson, 484 P.2d 736 (Ida. 1971). See also Kruse v. Kruse, 586 P.2d 294 (Mont. 1978) and In Re Marriage of Merry, 689 P.2d 1250 (Mont. 1984) which are contrary to the Montana case of Vivian v. Vivian, 583 P.2d 1072 (Mont. 1978), cited by appellant.

All of the other cases cited by appellant had some rational basis for treating inherited property as a marital asset capable of joint distribution and are clearly distinguishable from this case.

In Mack v. Mack, 389 So.2d 1156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), the husband's inherited property contributed approximately 77% of the family's annual support for their standard of living while the husband's salary contributed only 23%. Mrs. Totzke's inherited property, even in the best years, only produced approximately 20% of the family's annual income.

In Rosson v. Rosson, 635 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1981), the husband utilized considerable efforts in enhancing the value of the wife's inherited property. He built an apartment complex on a piece of undeveloped land that was later sold. He built their joint residence on another lot. There was also a statute in Alaska specifically allowing the Court to invade separate property of either spouse when balancing the equities.

In Sheedy v. Sheedy, 623 P.2d 95 (Hawaii App. 1981), the inheritance to the wife was actually from the husband's father, preceding which, both parties had cared for the father in their home for one year after he suffered a stroke and was totally incapacitated. Hawaii also had a statute permitting a family court in divorce cases to distribute separate property so long as it was just and equitable.

McCain v. McCain, 549 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1976), also involved a state statute specifically allowing a trial court to divide inherited property. The husband had inherited the property in question in McCain which had been used for the marital home of the parties and their children and which was also

improved with money inherited by the wife.

The fifteen factors referred to in MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), for the Court to consider in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties were outlined by Dr. Totzke in his brief as he felt they applied to this situation. Some notable comments must be made of his comparison.

In factor number 8, under the present income of the parties, he claims she is expected to annually earn \$74,274.00. This is broken down by him on page 6 of appellant's brief as follows:

Works (\$6.00 x 2000 hours)	\$12,000.00
Property	45,000.00
Equaling payments	<u>17,272.00</u>
	\$74,272.00

Mrs. Totzke's inherited property is not expected to earn \$45,000.00 per year in the foreseeable future. Both parties indicated that the years between 1980 to 1984 were the peak years and future income would be lower. In 1985, for instance, it was approximately \$30,000.00 and anticipated less for 1986. (R-88) By this appeal, Dr. Totzke is attempting to take away the \$17,274.00 annual equaling payments he is required to make under the Decree. If he is successful, then Mrs. Totzke's

annual income would be closer to \$40,000.00 compared to his \$140,000.00.

In factor number 9 of the MacDonald analysis, it should be noted that the property inherited by Mrs. Tatzke and awarded to her in the divorce, retained its separate identity throughout the marriage, retained its value and produced the income it did without any marital effort whatsoever.

In factor number 14, Dr. Tatzke omitted the fact that his wife remained at home for approximately twenty years of their marriage and raised their children and provided all of the other homemaking needs. He was able to work in his profession, increase his skills and provide for his future; she sacrificed similar opportunities for herself by remaining at home.

Dr. Tatzke outlined his present standard of living and needs as referred to in factor number 15. He provided explanation and justification contending that he should be able to retain all of his income to provide for his needs without paying his wife any child support or property settlement equalizing payments. He did acknowledge, however, that his wife's needs and typical expenses would be equal to

his if there were sufficient income which she obviously did not have.

The bottom line is this: Judge Hyde made a fair and equitable decision. As he stated in his Memorandum Decision, this was a case where alimony could easily be asked and probably be awarded. By making the property division he did, Mrs. Tatzke was awarded no alimony and Dr. Tatzke's business and living arrangements were totally undisturbed. Mrs. Tatzke obtained the inherited property which still retained its separate identity. She made no claim on the several hundred thousand dollars income the inherited property produced during the marriage to acquire other assets or provide marital benefits. Of the marital assets, she was actually awarded 36% and Dr. Tatzke was awarded 64%. It was equalized by requiring him to pay her the balancing difference over a ten year period. This property division was clearly within the discretion of the trial Judge.

II

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING RESPONDENT CHILD SUPPORT OF \$600.00 PER MONTH.

It is acknowledged that Mrs. Tatzke did not offer any specific evidence of her own as to her

needs justifying a particular amount of child support. By cross-examination of Dr. Tetzke, however, he acknowledged that her living needs and needs of the child in her custody would be similar and equal to those specifically outlined by him. That was evidence upon which Judge Hyde could rely and which could easily justify the award of \$600.00 per month given even the most optimistic view of her income.

The child support statute, 78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was amended in 1984 to provide:

(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the Court shall use a uniform statewide assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which can be readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's earnings for taxes, work-related expenses, and living expenses. The assessment formula shall be established by the Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-3-21(3).

In connection with this statute and even before its enactment, Weber and Davis Counties had created and used what has come to be known as the Uniform Child Support Schedule. Whether right or wrong, the Judges of the Second District have rather

religiously followed that "Schedule" both for temporary and permanent child support orders. As a result, lawyers who practice in the Second District have come to rely on the "Schedule" for an estimate of appropriate child support since the formula, by statute, was supposed to take into account general work-related expenses and living needs of the parents. It was because of this reliance on the "Schedule" that this line of questioning occurred between Mrs. Totzke and her counsel:

"Q. Going to page nine, with respect to the child support, I have gone over with you, have I not, the child support schedule that is utilized in this accounting?

A. Yes.

Q. And we have taken your income based upon \$6.00 an hour at the full year's employment, as well as a \$45,000.00 a year average from your dividends, in arriving at an average gross monthly income; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that \$45,000.00 figure going to be realistic for the foreseeable future?

A. It will not, because we are not getting

leases, and the timber is rock-bottom. This year it was about \$30,000.00, and I suspect it will be less next year.

Q. So we're really at the top end of the spectrum at even suggesting that would be your income; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the difference in the gross monthly average income of your husband, we have arrived at the child support figure suggested in there, is that correct?

A. Yes." (R-87, 88)

The Page 9 referred to in this exchange was from Mrs. Totzke's Exhibit and provided as follows:

"CHILD SUPPORT AND CASH SETTLEMENT"

"Based upon the assumption that plaintiff continues to work full-time earning \$6.00 per hour and will continue to receive an average of \$45,000.00 per year from her inherited property, plaintiff would have an average gross monthly income of \$4,800.00.

Based upon defendant's average monthly gross income of nearly \$12,000.00, there is a \$7,200.00 gross monthly income disparity which, according to the Uniform Child Support Schedule, plaintiff would be entitled to child support over and above that which she owes to defendant of \$786.00 per month."
(R-33)

This also accounts for Judge Hyde's

Memorandum Decision comments:

"As to the child support, the figures here are not covered by our charts. There is a large discrepancy between the parties' monthly incomes, and the child living with the plaintiff should be entitled to the benefit of the defendant's substantial income. However, there are two children going to college. While they are technically emancipated, the parties both agree that they should go to college and they are being assisted in their college educations, which does constitute substantial expense. I hold that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of \$600.00 per month over and above what she would owe to the defendant as and for child support." (R-22)

Judge Hyde indicated the figures here were not covered by "our charts". That is because Dr. Totzke's annual gross income exceeded that which is listed as the highest income on the "Schedule". As referred to above, Mrs. Totzke's approach was to use the probable income disparity between them and then apply the "Schedule".

Respondent submits that reliance on the "Schedule" in this case, as well as most other divorces, is not misplaced. Dr. Totzke did not contradict the suggestion that his wife's needs and expenses for her and the child in her custody would be similar to his. He presented no evidence to show that the support schedule approach was not valid.

The whole divorce arena is usually surrounded with acrimony. The use of the child support formula

has provided some uniformity and predictability as to reasonable child support except for those unusual circumstances where other evidence would suggest a different approach. As a result, contested issues and bitterness relating to child support have been reduced considerably by reliance and use of the support schedule. Its use should not be discounted or eliminated so every litigant has to produce specific evidence of needs and expenses justifying child support.

A copy of the Uniform Child Support Schedule is contained in the Addendum.

CONCLUSION

Because of the length of the marriage, the respective incomes and income producing abilities of the parties, the plaintiff having spent approximately twenty years of the married life exclusively as a homemaker and housewife and because no alimony was awarded to the plaintiff, it was not error for the Court to award Mrs. Totzke all of the property inherited by her from her father as her separate property, nor was it error for the Court to award her

child support of \$600.00 per month.

DATED this 18th day of September, 1986.

Respectfully submitted,


FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON



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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to Richard W. Campbell, Attorney for Appellant, 2485 Grant Avenue #200, Ogden, UT 84401, on this 18th day of September, 1986.



BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Respondent

ADDENDUM

UNIFORM CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE
(Amount To Be Paid Per Child)

Gross Monthly Income (4.3 Weeks)	Total Number of Children							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0 - 473	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
474 - 562	56	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
563 - 651	67	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
652 - 741	76	57	50	50	50	50	50	50
742 - 830	85	64	51	50	50	50	50	50
831 - 919	96	71	57	50	50	50	50	50
920 - 1008	105	80	63	53	50	50	50	50
1009 - 1098	115	87	69	57	50	50	50	50
1099 - 1187	125	94	75	62	54	50	50	50
1188 - 1276	135	101	81	68	57	50	50	50
1277 - 1366	144	109	87	73	62	54	50	50
1367 - 1455	154	116	92	77	66	57	51	50
1456 - 1544	164	123	98	82	70	62	55	50
1545 - 1633	173	130	104	87	75	66	57	53
1634 - 1723	184	138	110	91	78	69	61	55
1724 - 1812	193	145	116	97	83	73	64	59
1813 - 1901	202	152	122	102	87	76	68	61
1902 - 1991	213	159	129	106	91	80	71	64
1992 - 2080	222	167	133	111	95	83	74	67
2081 - 2169	232	174	139	116	99	87	77	70
2170 - 2258	242	181	145	121	104	91	81	73
2259 - 2348	252	188	151	126	108	95	84	76
2349 - 2437	261	197	157	131	112	98	87	78
2438 - 2526	271	204	163	136	116	102	90	82
2527 - 2616	281	211	168	140	121	105	94	84
2617 - 2705	290	218	174	145	124	109	97	88
2706 - 2794	301	226	180	150	129	112	99	90
2795 - 2883	310	233	186	156	133	116	103	94
2884 - 2973	319	240	192	160	137	121	106	96
2974 - 3062	330	247	198	165	142	124	110	99

RANGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3063-3150	339	258	203	169	148	128	112	102
3152-3240	348	265	209	174	152	132	115	104
3241-3329	358	273	213	179	156	135	118	107
3330-3418	368	280	221	184	160	139	121	110
3419-3507	377	287	227	189	165	143	125	113
3509-3597	387	295	233	194	169	146	128	116
3598-3686	397	302	239	198	173	150	131	119
3687-3775	407	310	244	203	177	154	134	122
3776-3864	416	317	250	208	181	157	138	125
3865-3953	426	324	256	213	186	161	141	128
3954-4042	436	332	262	218	190	165	144	131
4043-4131	446	339	268	223	194	168	147	134
4132-4220	455	347	274	228	198	172	150	137
4221-4309	465	354	279	233	203	176	154	140
4310-4398	475	362	285	237	207	179	157	142
4399-4487	485	369	291	242	211	183	160	145
4488-4576	494	376	297	247	215	187	163	148
4577-4665	504	384	303	252	220	190	166	151
4666-4754	514	391	309	257	224	194	170	154
4755-4843	523	399	315	262	228	198	173	157
4844-4932	533	406	320	267	232	202	176	160
4933-5021	543	413	326	271	237	205	179	163
5022-5110	553	421	332	276	241	209	183	166
5111-5200	562	428	338	281	245	213	186	169
5201-5289	572	436	344	286	249	216	189	172
5290-5378	582	443	350	291	254	220	192	175
5379-5467	592	450	355	296	258	224	195	177
5468-5556	601	458	361	301	262	227	199	180
5557-5645	611	465	367	305	266	231	202	183
5646-5734	621	473	373	310	270	235	205	186
5735-5823	630	480	379	315	275	238	208	189
5824-5912	640	487	385	320	279	242	211	192
5913-6001	650	495	391	325	283	246	215	195
6002-6090	660	502	396	330	287	249	218	198
6091-6179	669	510	402	335	292	253	221	201
6180-6268	679	517	408	340	296	257	224	204
6269-6357	689	524	414	344	300	260	227	207
6358-6446	699	532	420	349	304	264	231	210
6447-6535	708	539	426	354	309	268	234	212
6536-6624	718	547	431	359	313	271	237	215
6625-6713	728	554	437	364	317	275	240	218
6714-6802	737	562	443	369	321	279	244	221
6803-6891	747	569	449	374	326	282	247	224
6892-6980	757	576	455	378	330	286	250	227
6981-7069	767	584	461	383	334	290	253	230
7070-7158	776	591	467	388	338	293	256	233
7159-7247	786	599	472	393	343	297	260	236
7248-7336	796	606	478	398	347	301	263	239
7337-7425	806	613	484	403	351	304	266	242
7426-7514	815	621	490	408	355	308	269	245
7515-7603	825	628	496	412	360	312	272	247
7604-7692	835	636	502	417	364	316	276	250
7693-7781	844	643	507	422	368	319	279	253
7782-7870	854	650	513	427	372	323	282	256
7871-7959	864	658	519	432	376	327	285	259
7960-8048	874	665	525	437	381	330	289	262
8049-8137	883	673	531	442	385	334	292	265
8138-8226	893	680	537	447	389	338	295	268
8227-8315	903	687	543	451	393	341	298	271
8316-8404	913	695	548	456	398	345	301	274
8405-8493	922	702	554	461	402	349	305	277
8494-8582	932	710	560	466	406	352	308	280
8583-8671	942	717	566	471	410	356	311	283
8672-8760	951	725	572	476	415	360	314	285
8761-8849	961	732	578	481	419	363	317	288
8850-8938	971	739	583	485	423	367	321	291
8939-9027	981	747	589	490	427	371	324	294
9028-9116	990	754	595	495	432	374	327	297
9117-9205	1000	762	601	500	436	378	330	300
9206-9294	1010	769	607	505	440	382	334	303
9295-9383	1020	776	613	510	444	385	337	306
9384-9472	1029	784	619	515	449	389	340	309
9473-9561	1039	791	624	520	453	393	343	312
9562-9650	1049	799	630	524	457	396	346	315
9651-9739	1058	806	636	529	461	400	350	318
9740-9828	1068	813	642	534	466	404	353	320
9829-9917	1078	821	648	539	470	407	356	323