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Engineering the Modern Administrative State: Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the New Deal Era

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Engineering the Modern Administrative State: Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the New Deal Era*

Daniel B. Rodriguez**

Barry R. Weingast***

Administrative constitutionalism in the United States has been characterized by tension and accommodation. The tension reflects the unsettled nature of our constitutional scheme, especially with regard to separation of powers, and also the concern with agency discretion and performance. Still and all, we have accommodated administrative constitutionalism in fundamental ways, through a constitutional jurisprudence that, in the main, accepts broad delegations of regulatory power to the bureaucracy and an administrative law that oversees agency actions under procedural and substantive guidelines. This was not always the case. In this Article, part one of a larger project, we revisit the critical New Deal period to look at the strategies the Congress and the Supreme Court used to resolve controversies over the emerging administrative state. We see the political and legal accommodation as a product of a (mostly) coherent interbranch dialogue, iterative and fueled by strategy. Having surmounted some important roadblocks in the first New Deal, this effort ultimately resulted in a scheme that enabled the federal government to accomplish their three critical objectives: to deploy national power to solve new economic problems, to create delegations appropriate to modern needs, and to craft novel administrative instruments to carry out legislative aims – all of

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which required a due amount of legal accommodation, given extant legal doctrine and the interests of the courts.

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INTRODUCTION

The long-standing issue of how the modern administrative state emerged from the *Sturm und Drang* of politics on the one hand and the complex architecture of traditional legal doctrine on the other remains a central question for public law scholarship.¹ Many of our

1. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, *TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940* (2014); 1 MORTON J. HORWITZ, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY*, at 216 (1st reprinted 1992); G. EDWARD WHITE, *THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL* 13-32 (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN, *RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION* (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, *WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS* (1998); Mark Tushnet, *Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court's Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory*, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565 (2011); Reuel E. Schiller, *The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law*, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Laura Kalman, *Law*,

leading legal historians have turned their great talents to this question.² Standard wisdom notwithstanding, we revisit this perennial topic in part because no consensus exists as to how to answer this question.³

The standard wisdom about the major legal controversies of the New Deal separates constitutional law issues from administrative law issues into two non-overlapping categories, like two silos that operate with complete independence. This separation in part reflects the notion that the foundation of administrative law is statutory, not constitutional; hence administrative law lies outside the constitutional domain. We argue that this separation is artificial and misleading.

This separation causes both constitutional law scholars and administrative law scholars to miss important aspects of the legal controversies from *Crowell v. Benson* (1932) through the New Deal – namely, the necessity of invention, of establishing a new, routine process for issuing sovereign commands via administration. As of January 1, 1930, this process did not exist. By WWII it was solidly

Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, *Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation*, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994).

2. In addition to sources cited in *supra* note 1, see LAURA KALMAN, *THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM* (1996); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, *THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT* (1995). Moreover, the primary and secondary questions in this vein appear with more or less prominence in books and articles that focus on contemporary legal doctrine. For example, Gillian Metzger's recent Harvard Foreword recurs to the New Deal period to articulate anew the case for a well-fortified consensus view of the durability of administrative constitutionalism. Gillian E. Metzger, *1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege*, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). Calling the administrative state "constitutionally obligatory," she notes that these legislative delegations of power to agencies "are here to stay." *Id.* at 72. To be sure, the modern literature does not want for full-throated critiques of the administrative state, looking with particular ire at the world wrought by the New Deal's accommodation to broad administrative power. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, *IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?* (2014); D.A. Candeub, *Tyranny and Administrative Law*, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (2017); Richard A. Epstein, *The Perilous Position of the Rule of Law and the Administrative State*, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2013). However, the constitutional objections have largely been resolved in favor of administrative constitutionalism, and there is little reason to believe that even the most vigorous contemporary attacks on the "dark state" will unwind this situation. See Adrian Vermeule, *Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State*, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 n.3 (2017) (comparing administrative state skepticism to "believing in UFOs or watching dystopian movies"); see also EDWARD L. RUBIN, *BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE* (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, *The Morality of Administrative Law*, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2018).

3. See *infra* text accompanying notes 26–42.

in place. Part of the question was how, if at all, the rule of law was to be extended to administrative regulation. We argue that a major part of the controversy between the Supreme Court and the New Deal was a negotiation, even if tacit, over this issue—the framework for extending constitutional rights of due process. The constitutional solution was the invention of procedural due process, which emerged from tacit negotiations between elected officials and the courts. Indeed, the solution emerged from an implicit political accommodation (or an “implicit contract,” to use law and economics terminology) whereby political officials retained control over the content of regulation while courts ensured that the administrative process met conditions of due process, which came to have a procedural basis.

We launch our argument with the “internalists,” the scholars who emphasize the doctrinal elements of these constitutional controversies, rather than the political considerations. We agree with their criticism of the standard wisdom, arguing that traditional externalist scholarship of the New Deal fails to account for the changing nature of the issues over the course of the New Deal. Put simply, the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are very different statutes, raising different issues and therefore prompting a different reaction by the courts. Instead of seeing *Jones & Laughlin Steel*⁴ as a capitulation, they argue that the issues had changed.

We nonetheless depart from the revisionists in three ways. They miss, first, the necessity for the New Deal to invent a new basis for administrative law that both the courts and elected officials qua New Dealers could accept. Second, the dialogic nature of the evolution of doctrine and legislative practice. Third, the deep connection between the constitutional settlements of the New Deal and administrative law.

To begin, our argument has five steps:

First, we focus on the *Crowell* decision in 1932.⁵ This case is one of the foundational stones in the administrative law edifice: regulatory agency rulings have the force of law, so long as an Article III court has the authority to oversee the regulatory process. A necessary condition for building the American administrative

4. NLRB v. *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

5. *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

state, this decision reveals how formless and inchoate administrative law was on the eve of the New Deal.

Second, early New Dealers explicitly ignored constitutional issues, to their detriment.⁶ The NIRA proved a dual failure with the Court. Proponents of the standard wisdom miss both aspects of this failure: (i) an absence of any attempt to adopt any of the constitutional prescriptions involved in prior regulatory legislation approved by courts, and (ii) the absence of any credible attempt to protect citizens from abuse of their rights by the National Recovery Administration.

Third, with respect to the early New Deal cases, notably *Schechter Poultry* (1935)⁷ and *Panama Refining* (1935),⁸ the standard wisdom fails to provide an adequate account of the Court's opinion. True, the Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional. But *Panama Refining* and especially *Schechter Poultry* did far more. They articulated a "how-to manual" of sorts—that is, a set of instructions for Congress to follow in order to ensure that administrative discretion would be properly cabined and channeled. These requirements were a quid pro quo for constitutional validity, even if this point was made tacitly, not explicitly.

Fourth, the NLRA became the absolutely pivotal event in the creation of administrative law during the New Deal. This act was not just another New Deal statute of the first-100-days ilk, but a regulatory statute unlike any before it. It became the model for administrative regulation based on procedural due process. Importantly from our perspective, the Act met the Court's prescriptions of the "how-to manual" by detailing a set of elaborate procedures for the agency to follow in order to implement public policy.

Fifth, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the NLRA in *Jones & Laughlin Steel* was not a capitulation, as the standard wisdom holds, but an affirmation. A comparison of the portions of *Schechter Poultry* ignored by the conventional explanation with Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in *Jones & Laughlin Steel* demonstrates that he is not articulating a new principle, as the "switch in time" standard wisdom holds. Chief Justice Hughes not only declares the NLRA

6. See *infra* text accompanying notes 145–47.

7. *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

8. *Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

constitutional, but he explains to Congress that they got it right; Hughes approves of the Act because it meets the strictures of the “how-to manual,” which he then repeats.⁹ We therefore see a dialogue between the Court and Congress. Congress writes legislation in the first 100 days without regard to constitutional issues, notably in NIRA. The Court not only rules this Act unconstitutional, but it develops at length the “how-to manual.” Congressional drafters of the next round of legislation work hard to structure the NLRA based on past precedent. When the Court issues *Schechter Poultry*, we see that the NLRA drafters anticipated most of the “how-to manual.” The Supreme Court then approves in *Jones & Laughlin Steel*.

The standard wisdom in constitutional law, dominant for eighty years, relies too heavily on President Franklin Roosevelt’s view, a view developed for political purposes and therefore one that we need to treat skeptically. The triumph of the New Deal did not result from the bulldozing of a defenseless Supreme Court by the lions. Instead, it was at once a political accommodation of the elected and judicial branches that to this day dominates how the nation evaluates regulatory decision-making. It is the model statute of procedural due process.

The political accommodation involved two constitutional aspects, one widely recognized, the other utterly unrecognized. The portion largely recognized involves the Commerce Clause. Per the standard story, the Court considerably relaxed the constraints imposed by the Commerce Clause on national government regulation in *Jones & Laughlin Steel*. Prior to that case, Commerce Clause jurisprudence was a mess. Different cases emphasized different tests, seeming to produce contradictory results. In *Jones & Laughlin Steel*, the Supreme Court clarified and systematized Commerce Clause doctrine, choosing the most permissive of the previous tests.

The second and largely unrecognized aspect of the political accommodation involved the Courts’ acceptance that administrative law would have a statutory, not constitutional basis. We see this basis in the “how-to manual,” in the Court’s acceptance of the NLRA in *Jones & Laughlin Steel*, and in the landmark

9. See *Jones & Laughlin Steel*, 301 U.S. at 31. See generally *infra* text accompanying notes 189–92.

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. In principle, the Court could have articulated a constitutional basis for administrative procedures, affording it a stronger hand in protecting citizen rights. But the Court chose not to do so. Leading administrative law scholars, including Adrian Vermeule in his important recent book, *Law's Abnegation*, interprets this choice of statutory basis as part of the courts' internally driven abnegation.¹⁰ Our argument suggests otherwise. This statutory basis for administrative law is a central component of the political accommodation on granting political officials the means to control regulatory policy while the courts enforce a system of procedural due process.

We focus here as well on the administrative law that emerged from the New Deal, this accompanying the Court's blockbuster constitutional decisions. The literature lacks a compelling and unified story that ties together the so-called New Deal revolution in federal power and administrative constitutionalism with the emergence of meaningful administrative law in the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, we have two more or less separate narratives, one focusing on the constitutional law struggles over the scope of the commerce power and the nondelegation doctrine, and the other focusing on the newly emerging administrative law, even though the two sets of events were unfolding simultaneously as part of a single political process.¹¹

The conventional constitutional law narrative takes us from the skepticism of pre-New Deal conservative Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the stark rejection of legislative delegation reflected in the NIRA and then to the remarkable events of 1936–37, where the Court appears to shift course suddenly, from a

10. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, *LAW'S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW'S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE* (2016).

11. We say "newly emerging" advisably, given what we know to be important elements of administrative law that happened before—in some respects, long before—the New Deal period. Jerry Mashaw's magisterial work on administrative regulation during the founding period is a useful and compelling antidote to the notion that administrative law was invented in the 1930s. JERRY MASHAW, *CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW* (2012). Still and all, we regard the 1930s as a seminal epoch in the development of both regulatory administration and administrative law. In this we agree with many administrative law scholars, perhaps beginning with Freund, continuing with Frankfurter, Landis, and other exponents of an expanded form of administrative regulation, and continuing to scholars of the present day. See HORWITZ, *supra* note 1.

stubborn rejection to an unequivocal embrace of New Deal regulatory power.¹²

The administrative law narrative is more opaque. Administrative agencies, emerging during the Progressive Era,¹³ grow in substance and in prominence in the 1930s. A long series of questions confronted the Supreme Court concerning the appropriate scope of agency power. This confrontation arose at multiple levels, including separation of powers, of fidelity to rules of fair agency procedure, and the scope of administrative agency power to find facts, apply law to facts, and interpret statutes. In many ways, the signal case in this emerging New Deal administrative law is *Crowell v. Benson* (1932)¹⁴ decided on the eve of the New Deal, where the Court took a major step in favor of administrative power.¹⁵ Other linchpins of the modern

12. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, *CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD.* 73 (1941) (concluding that “the outcome of the election of 1936” was important “in inducing the Justices . . . to restudy their position”); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, *THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY* 223 (1995) (explaining that the Court “beat[] a strategic retreat . . . largely in response to the Court-packing plan”); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, *THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT* 117 (6th ed. 2016) (stating that “it is hard to doubt that” FDR’s landslide victory in the 1936 presidential election and his court-packing scheme “played a part in the new tone of judicial decision that began to be sounded in the early months of” 1937); CARL B. SWISHER, *AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT* (1943); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, *THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* (1942); ACKERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 342–43 (suggesting that the Court in 1937 “eliminate[d] the risk of hostile Article Five amendment by unequivocally recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government”); Jack M. Balkin, *The Court Affirms the Social Contract, reprinted in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS* 11–12 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (citing the 1937 “switch” as an example of how courts “legitimate the changes” in “the nature of the social compact”); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, *Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?*, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010) (empirical analysis of Justice Roberts’s move leftward during the 1936 Term); Barry Friedman, *The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics*, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1057–58 (2000) [hereinafter Friedman, *Countermajoritarian*] (noting that the New Deal was a “time[] in history . . . when politics appeared to influence the Court, and may well have done so”); Friedman, *supra* note 1. For a good survey of some of the more recent literature, see Barry Cushman, *The Jurisprudence of the Hughes Court: The Recent Literature*, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1929 (2014). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, *WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS* 42 (1991) (“[A]ll lawyers recognize that the 1930s mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist national government.”).

13. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, *BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920*, at 126–31 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, *Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective*, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).

14. *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

15. See VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 25–29 (describing *Crowell* as a “sweeping attempt to mediate the conflict between law and the administrative state in general terms”).

administrative state include *Schechter Poultry v. United States*,¹⁶ *St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States*,¹⁷ *Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery*,¹⁸ and the *Morgan* cases.¹⁹ In all these cases, *Schechter Poultry* included, the Court put forth standards for agencies to follow to ensure fidelity to an emerging conception of the rule of law in the administrative law.²⁰ This era, beginning with the New Deal and continuing to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) just fourteen years later,²¹ defined for the years to come the acceptable nature and scope of administrative power under our American constitutional scheme.²²

Seldom do scholars focus on the ways that these two lines of precedent come together, and rare is the book or article that endeavors to connect the blockbuster constitutional law movements of the New Deal period—what scholars from Edward Corwin²³ to William Leuchtenburg²⁴ to Bruce Ackerman²⁵ call a “constitutional revolution”—with the birth of modern administrative law. Yet, understanding the connections between New Deal constitutionalism and administrative law are essential to a deeper and broader understanding for the ways in which the courts, Congress, and the President worked to develop a structure

16. *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

17. *St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States*, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).

18. *SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I)*, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).

19. These refer to four cases decided by the Supreme Court within a half-decade. See *Morgan v. United States (Morgan I)*, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); *Morgan v. United States (Morgan II)*, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); *United States v. Morgan (Morgan III)*, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); *United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV)*, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).

20. Cutting matters off at the time of the APA is, to be sure, somewhat arbitrary. While we do not focus closely on post-APA developments in this paper, we do note that some of the more significant steps toward a “fair procedure” model of administrative law are the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB*, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), and other cases related to the standards of significant evidence and the meaning of on-the-record proceedings. In the next part of this project, we will turn to these and other bellwether cases and illuminating steps in the development of post-New Deal administrative law.

21. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). On the origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, see George B. Shepherd, *Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics*, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).

22. As Ernst summarizes this development: “Administrators exercised great discretionary power but only if they treated individuals fairly and kept within limits imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 7.

23. See CORWIN, *supra* note 12, at 64.

24. See LEUCHTENBURG, *supra* note 2, at 213.

25. See ACKERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 352–53.

of regulatory administration suited to the difficult economic and social problems that would come to characterize modern industrial society. Putting these political episodes and doctrinal developments into two separate boxes, one for constitutional historians and scholars and the other for the intrepid group of administrative law scholars has been counterproductive. Instead, we need to integrate these two separate stories. We explain how politics and law factored in the emergence of a novel approach to regulatory administration. In its novelty, key constitutional controversies arose. And it was in the settling of these controversies, settlement which required both political and doctrinal interventions, that the modern administrative state was created.

Looking anew at this critical period in American legal development, we advance a thesis that navigates between the conventional externalist story and the internalist, court-centric story of public law's origins and impact during and after this era. The first story sees the ratification of broad congressional power under the Constitution as a concession to external political pressure—an idea captured memorably in the phrase “a switch in time saved nine.”²⁶ In this account, administrative power in the latter New Deal period and afterward was more or less inevitable; it followed in due course from the Court's caving in to political influence, a surrender that explains, too, the steady rise of administrative agency power and impact in the post-War period. This approach sees the epoch as a pitched battle between two views of American constitutionalism and administrative discretion and, thanks largely to the intervention of President Roosevelt and the defanging of the conservative resistance in the wake of these wave elections in 1932 and especially 1936, the winners enjoyed the spoils.²⁷ Needless to say, this story is abidingly zero-sum: Will the Court triumph in forestalling the New Deal? Or will FDR and his progressive vision of a society prevail?

26. The switch in the voting of one justice turned a 5-4 majority against the New Deal into a 5-4 majority in favor of the New Deal, thereby forestalling FDR's threat to pack the Supreme Court. The quotation is associated with Professor Thomas Reed Powell. On Powell's contemporaneous evaluation of the Court in this era, see John Braeman, *Thomas Reed Powell on the Roosevelt Court*, 5 CONST. COMMENT 143, 183 (1988).

27. For a contemporaneous, if somewhat breathless, depiction of this era that reflects a strong externalist perspective, see CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR., *LIONS UNDER THE THRONE: A STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES* (1947).

The other story, sometimes called revisionist, is of more recent origins and, while less influential, does provide a different account of the Court's decision making in the key constitutional cases. Richard Friedman²⁸ and Barry Cushman²⁹ propound a thesis that can fairly be seen as internalist,³⁰ that is, as insisting that the Court's decisions upholding in some circumstances federal authority under the Commerce Clause, then famously in the cases involving the NIRA striking down federal legislation as unconstitutional delegations of legislative power, and then finally upholding the linchpin statutes of the New Deal, can largely be explained on doctrinal terms. This is not to say that external political factors were deemed irrelevant, but rather that it is a vast oversimplification to view these decisions as unmoored from doctrine and as merely political. From a doctrinal perspective, not all New Deal cases were alike. This observation provides the key to understanding the emergence of the political accommodation.

By contrast, the story of administrative law's emergence is sketchier. Yet, here too an internalist/externalist dichotomy persists. For prominent administrative law scholars looking back at this period, including Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis, as well as contemporary legal scholars,³¹ the solutions to the difficult problems of administrative discretion lie in nuanced legal doctrine, building on, but not limited to, the fundamental architecture of the APA.³² Judicial review would be the answer to the discretion

28. See Friedman, *supra* note 1.

29. See CUSHMAN, *supra* note 1; Cushman, *Rethinking the New Deal Court*, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).

30. Following the description by Kalman, *supra* note 1, at 2165–66, which she attributes to Cushman. See CUSHMAN, *supra* note 1, at 3–7. The dueling accounts of the standard and revised stories have been described as “a divide that has long separated historians of the New Deal: internalists who emphasize gradual doctrinal evolution, and externalists who emphasize the causal power of dramatic political events.” Jeremy K. Kessler, *The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy*, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 728 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, *supra* note 1).

31. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, *The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role*, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12–18, 53–66 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld, *Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review*, 69 OHIO STATE L.J. 251 (2009).

32. This is the overarching theme of Professor Jaffe's classic treatise. LOUIS L. JAFFE, *JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION* (1965). Professor Davis's comprehensive, albeit eccentric, treatise also valorizes the capacity of judges to supervise administrative agencies, thereby properly channeling and limiting administrative discretion. See 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, *ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE* (2d ed. 1978); 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS,

conundrum; and this doctrine, viewed principally as judge-made,³³ would emerge as mechanisms to control and channel administrative power. The externalist perspective looks more skeptically at the avowed autonomy of law and legal doctrine.³⁴ It sees the answer to administrative discretion largely in political control and oversight.³⁵ Presaging the Supreme Court's opinions by four decades in seminal administrative law cases such as *Vermont Yankee*³⁶ and *State Farm*,³⁷ the *idée fixe* among externalists here is that agency discretion can be limited truly only by political interventions and structural limits.³⁸ Administrative law, in this account, is essentially politics by other means.³⁹

We find neither the internalist nor externalist accounts of constitutional and administrative law a satisfactory rendering of the complicated political and legal episodes of that key era.⁴⁰

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1979); see also KENNETH C. DAVIS, *ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES* (1976).

33. See John F. Duffy, *Administrative Law as Common Law in Judicial Review*, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998); Daniel B. Rodriguez, *Jaffe's Law: Reflections on a Generation of Administrative Law Scholarship*, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997).

34. For a skeptical view of the role and motivations of the courts in reviewing administrative agency decision-making, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, *WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION* (1988).

35. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, *Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking*, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999).

36. *Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council*, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

37. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

38. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, *The Statutory President*, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2005); Elena Kagan, *Presidential Administration*, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).

39. Lest we exaggerate this divide among what we are calling internalists and externalists in administrative law, a growing number of influential administrative law scholars are negotiating the political and legal elements of administrative law and looking at multiple mechanisms for controlling agencies. Some of the most important of this work is empirical in focus, and from this work we learn much about the actual structure and strategy of administrative agency performance. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, *Subdelegating Powers*, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, *The Lost World of Administrative Law*, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, *Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space*, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Anne Joseph O'Connell, *Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State*, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, *Agency Choice of Policymaking Form*, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004). A classic early statement of this reconciliation between more internalist and externalist views is Peter L. Strauss, *Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community*, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).

40. Not that we are the first to undertake this effort. Ackerman characterized his effort as an effort to drop "the old and tired debate" between internalist and externalist perspectives. ACKERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 343; see Kalman, *supra* note 1, at 2165-66.

Politics mattered, but so too did law and legal doctrine. We argue that Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court engineered the modern administrative state through a political accommodation in which each institution accomplished important objectives, albeit unsteadily and with the challenges emerging from legal constraints and the yin and yang of political and legal strategy. The success of regulatory administration in the New Deal and post-New Deal eras required deft legislative and presidential strategy. But it also required substantial legal innovation, that is, the development and application of new legal rules and guidelines that would thread the needle of endorsing broad, novel federal regulation while also ensuring that agencies would recognize and respect the rule of law. To be sure, administrative constitutionalism was not created from scratch during the New Deal; nor was administrative law largely an invention of the Hughes Court.⁴¹ However, the creation by Congress of new techniques for delegating administrative power along with new legal strategies to limit such power represented major advances. In just a few short years, we argue, the elements of modern administrative law emerged as a product of the mutual political accommodation engineered by Congress, the President, and the courts during the constitutional controversies.

Our project here is to fill two lacunae in the extensive literature, one concerning some key doctrinal developments in both constitutional law and administrative law, the other concerning a theoretical explanation—forged through the application of positive political theory⁴²—of the engineering of the administrative state.

In addition to Ernst, cited above, we note Mark Tushnet and Cass Sunstein as fellow travelers along this road to deconstructing the internalist/externalist debate and looking anew at the New Deal and the emergence of a new administrative constitutionalism. See Tushnet, *supra* note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, *Constitutionalism After the New Deal*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).

41. See MASHAW, *supra* note 11; Rabin, *supra* note 13.

42. See, e.g., Rui DeFigueroa, Tonja Jacobi & Barry R. Weingast, *The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (Donald A. Wittman & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, *The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Interpretation*, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Pablo T. Spiller, *A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law, or Regulatory Specificity*, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1996); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, *Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law*, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995); Daniel B. Rodriguez, *The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform*, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994); William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, *The Article I*,

In Part I, we set the table for our discussion of the New Deal struggle by focusing on the context – political and legal – which the Court faced as it considered key New Deal statutes, both in the first term of the Roosevelt administration – what is often labelled the “First New Deal” – and in cases beginning in the 1935 term. In Part II, we consider the Court’s constitutional analysis in two principal doctrinal areas – the nondelegation issue and the constitutionality of agency decision-making in the adjudicatory context.

The concluding Part III explains how our thesis provides a meaningful new perspective on this well-trod subject, a perspective which helps us to better understand the political accommodation that undergirds the engineering of the modern administrative state. We also preview later work on this general subject.

I. REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION AT THE CUSP OF THE NEW DEAL

A comprehensive survey of the economic, social, and political history of the early twentieth century as relevant context for the emergence of regulatory administration is well beyond the scope of this article. Historical exegeses on this period have usefully set the table and the terms of the debate.⁴³ What we can see clearly from the wide and deep historiography of the fifty years between the Progressive and New Deal eras is that our national political institutions, and especially Congress, worked deliberately, albeit with both successful and failed experiments, to craft appropriate administrative institutions to tackle the new and vexing problems that were arising in this rapidly changing nation. Fundamentally, the national government needed to expand its capacity to act effectively, and it needed to mobilize institutional strategies to carry out its developing objectives.⁴⁴ To understand the political accommodation with respect to New Deal regulatory administration, we need to understand a bit about the predicament

Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, *Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures*, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307 (1990); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, *Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies*, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).

43. See MORTON KELLER, *REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY* (1990); HORWITZ, *supra* note 1; JAMES WILLARD HURST, *LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY* (1982).

44. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, *ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937* (1991); Harry N. Scheiber, *Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910*, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 57 (1975).

in both politics and law, and about the strategies emerging to tackle both systematically and simultaneously.⁴⁵

In this Part, we frame the basic strategic issues facing Congress and the courts respectively. For Congress (and also the President), the question was how to construct a proper regulatory apparatus which would function to solve key problems in economic regulation. Solutions would lie in new administrative techniques – a new kind of bureaucracy. These strategies would build on key elements of the Progressive Era edifice, including the Interstate Commerce Act and its progeny, and also federal regulations in trade, food, and drugs. However, new problems called for imaginative new architecture. For the courts, the heart of the dilemma was how to reconcile these new regulatory innovations with constitutional doctrine, particularly with regard to the commerce power and separation of powers.

A. The Emerging Administrative State and the Legal Landscape

The burden of defining the scope and contours of federal regulatory administration fell squarely on the shoulders of Congress. Yet, key legislative decisions took place here, as before and after, in the shadow of judicial review. This insight is critical to any positive political theory of legislation; and, indeed, is common sense. Congress could push its agenda only so far as courts were willing to permit.

The story of how the Court accommodated congressional assertions of power under the Commerce Clause is well known; it is featured prominently in the constitutional law casebooks and treatises and is commonplace in the scholarly literature on emerging federal regulation in the period between the Progressive Era of the late 19th century and the conclusion of the New Deal. Less attended to are the two questions which are central to congressional choices about the regulatory instruments it designed

45. While our analysis in this section does not represent a deep dive into the considerable historiography on law, economic development, and governmental capacity – again, a task beyond the scope of this paper – we are conscious of the extraordinarily rich work of the most prominent legal historians who have valuably looked at the nexus between legal doctrine, legal theory, and economic conditions. See, e.g., J. WILLARD HURST, *LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES* (1959); 2 MORTON J. HORWITZ, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860* (reprt. 1992); HORWITZ, *supra* note 1; Scheiber, *supra* note 44.

to implement federal economic and social policy during this era — first, the limits, if any, on the scope of federal delegation of power; and, second, the bureaucracy’s power to make decisions in administrative adjudication. The Commerce Clause question is fundamentally different from these second two questions; the former implicates constitutional rules concerning federalism while the other concerns the Constitution’s separation of powers.

1. Delegation of power

Congress’s dilemma as it embarked on its task to regulate many parts of the economy in the pursuit of better market integration was how properly to structure legislative delegation. In one fundamental sense, that ship had sailed with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, for there Congress had given an independent agency, the new Interstate Commerce Commission, broad administrative authority to implement the charges of the Act. And while the federal courts may well have been, as James Ely, Jr., puts it, “dubious about an administrative body that was an uncertain fit in the constitutional system as traditionally understood,”⁴⁶ no serious challenge was raised to Congress’s authority to enact the statute under the Constitution. Indeed, the central question of the constitutionality of creating these so-called independent agencies would await 1935, when the Court decided *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, the Court did indeed grapple with matters of constitutional power in the three decades between the turn of the century and the New Deal. In *United States v. Grimaud*,⁴⁸ decided in 1911, the Court upheld the provisions of a federal statute which delegated certain powers to the United States Forest Service. This was not, said the Court, a delegation of legislative authority—a decision which would raise concerns under the Constitution’s separation of powers, but the acceptable exercise of administrative authority under the executive power in Article I.⁴⁹ As such, it was,

46. See James W. Ely, Jr., *The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act*, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).

47. *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

48. *United States v. Grimaud*, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

49. See *id.*

as in *Field v. Clark*⁵⁰ decided nearly two decades earlier, not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President.

The Court's most extensive treatment of the delegation issue came close to the New Deal era, when it decided *J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States*.⁵¹ The Court in 1928 considered the constitutionality of the Tariff Commission, an entity whose name is fairly self-explanatory in that it was created as part of a statute which accorded the President greater authority, acting through this commission, to levy tariffs in order to combat foreign powers' efforts to impose costs on American products. Significantly, the Commission was obliged to follow a series of administrative procedures, including a version of what would become "notice-and-comment rulemaking" in the APA enacted two decades later. In *Hampton*, the Court offers what to that time was the most comprehensive exegesis on the nature and scope of delegated legislative power. "*Delegata potestas non potest delegari*" (power may not be delegated), grandly declares the Court, noting that this maxim has force within the structure of our constitutional scheme of separation of powers.⁵² Legislative delegation of this sort is contemplated by our Constitutional system, for "Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation."⁵³ And it can do so "by vesting discretion in such officers."⁵⁴

Critically, however, Congress cannot delegate to an administrative agency the discretion to make laws.⁵⁵ The legislature must set out the appropriate standards, and the executive branch (here the Court accepting without much reasoning that the

50. *Field v. Clark*, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). In *Field*, the Court considered a delegation to the president to set tariffs under the McKinley Act. "That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President," said the Court, "is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." *Id.* at 692. However, this action by the President "was not the making of law," but rather empowered the executive branch to serve as a "mere agent" of Congress. *Id.* at 693.

51. *J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States*, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).

52. *Id.* at 405-06.

53. *Id.* at 406.

54. *Id.*

55. Earlier twentieth century cases in which the Court grappled with the question of proper constitutional delegation include *United States v. Grimaud*, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); *Union Bridge Co. v. United States*, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); and *Buttfield v. Stranahan*, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).

implementation of regulation is to be regarded as quintessentially an executive function under Article I) is limited to effectuating congressional purpose by executing these laws, a scheme of execution that is facilitated by a proper degree of discretion. The result turns on what the Court sees as basically a statutory fact, that is, that “this Act did not in any real sense invest the President with the power of legislation, because nothing involving the expediency or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President.”⁵⁶

Hampton is a strange animal. The Court’s acceptance of congressional action here does not turn in any real sense on a judgment about commerce power; nor does it really entail a firm elucidation of the separation of powers, that is, between what is a legislative versus an executive function. Rather, the Court waxes on about the extensive legislative guidance in the statute,⁵⁷ about its policy goals,⁵⁸ the rationale for delegation to the President and specifically to the Commission to effectuate these goals,⁵⁹ the vitality of the procedures embodied in the statute to guide the Commission’s discretion,⁶⁰ and, ultimately, its acceptance of the bargain struck by Congress to delegate significant regulatory authority to an administrative agency. *Hampton* reveals most clearly the Court’s judgment that the gravamen of the issue in these matters of regulatory choice of instruments and strategy is pragmatic and tethered to a vision of Congress as the play-caller or the composer – rather than, to mix up the metaphors a bit more, the quarterback or the orchestra conductor.⁶¹

So far as constitutional delegation is concerned, the Court’s approach was rather formalistic and even somewhat circular.

56. *Hampton*, 276 U.S. at 410.

57. *Id.* at 404–05.

58. *Id.* at 413 (“Congress declares that one of its motives in fixing the rates of duty is so to fix them that they shall encourage the industries of this country in the competition with producers in other countries in the sale of goods in this country . . .”).

59. *Id.* at 409 (“If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according to changing conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose . . .”).

60. *Id.* at 405 (“The Tariff Commission does not itself fix duties, but, before the President reaches a conclusion on the subject of investigation, the Tariff Commission must make an investigation, and in doing so must give notice to all parties interested and an opportunity to adduce evidence and to be heard.”).

61. See Chester F. Krizek, *Administrative Law – Delegation of Powers – Constitutional Law*, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 56 (1928).

That is, the matter of proper legislative delegation was considered through the lens of a constitutional ipse dixit: Did Congress delegate legislative power or simply authorize the executive branch to implement public policy through the use of Article I executive power? If the latter, the delegation was appropriate—and, moreover, the executive maintained significant power to supervise these executive officers. If the former, the delegation would be unconstitutional, as it would represent the surrendering of its core functions to a non-legislative entity.

What remained critically uncertain, however, is how much guidance must Congress give to those entities who were exercising regulatory power under the rubric of the statute.⁶² The formalism of the Court's "core functions" analysis obviated the need to consider this question carefully. And it would fall to the New Deal Court in the blockbuster trio of NIRA cases to resolve this question—a question necessary to answer in order for Congress to know how much flexibility it had in choosing the methods of regulatory structure and strategy.

2. Administrative agency decision-making

The relationship between courts and agencies in the years before the New Deal was, as legal historian Reuel Schiller notes, a "hodge-podge of different statutes and common law doctrines that could be used to challenge administrative actions."⁶³ In the main, administrative agency decision-making was cabined in important ways and what we have come to know as broad administrative discretion in agency fact-finding, to say nothing of rulemaking, was hardly known.⁶⁴ This was principally the result of the federal courts' rather strict demarcation of the line between what functions were properly for the federal courts and which functions could be delegated to agencies to adjudicate.

62. Adrian Vermeule gives a cogent summary of the dilemma arising out of the Court's effort to synthesize the delegation view in *Field*, *Grimaud*, and *Hampton*. "[T]he whole problem of delegation," he writes, "is to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis." VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 52. That is to say, how to ensure that the delegate acts "within the bounds of the statutory authorization" when that authorization is exceptionally broad or vague. *Id.* As Vermeule notes, in an understatement, "the dilemma continues." *Id.*

63. Schiller, *supra* note 1, at 407.

64. "In the early decades of the modern administrative state, agencies typically proceeded not through rulemaking but through case-by-case adjudication . . ." Sunstein & Vermeule, *supra* note 2, at 1933.

The Supreme Court's restrictions on agency rate-making authority, delineated just before the turn of the century in *Smyth v. Ames*,⁶⁵ was one key mechanism of limiting administrative power. At issue in this case was whether state rate-making regulation of intra-state railroad shipments could set rates at confiscatory levels, forcing railroads to raise long-haul rates to remain in business. States therefore had incentives to set confiscatory prices, forcing railroads to raise prices elsewhere in the system. Of course, if every state did that, the regulatory environment would be mess. *Smyth v. Ames* held that

a railroad company is entitled to exact such charges for transportation as will enable it, at all times, not only to pay operating expenses, but also to meet the interest regularly accruing upon all its outstanding obligations, and justify a dividend upon all its stock; and that to prohibit it from maintaining rates or charges for transportation adequate to *all* those ends will deprive it of its property without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws.⁶⁶

Further, "the company is entitled to ask . . . a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience."⁶⁷

The Court imposed additional restrictions in several other cases. For example, the Court's insistence in its 1920 decision in *Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough*⁶⁸ that, before any valuation decision was made in a rate-making proceeding, "the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts."⁶⁹

Through these doctrines, the Court maintained a strong grip on administrative agency power. Agency discretion would exist under the rubric of judicial oversight and, as noted in the earlier delegation cases, only as an outgrowth of executive power under a formalistic reading of Article I.

This crabbed role of administrative agency function and discretion became the *bête noire* of New Deal-era legal scholars

65. *Smyth v. Ames*, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).

66. *Id.* at 543.

67. *Id.* at 547.

68. *Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough*, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).

69. *Id.* at 289.

who championed a more robust role for the bureaucracy. In his magnum opus, *The Administrative Process*, James Landis noted the flawed syllogism at the heart of the court-centric view of regulatory administration.⁷⁰ “The insistence,” Landis writes, “that the administrative process . . . must be subject to judicial review is to be explained in part, I believe, by economic determinism. But the deeper answer lies in our traditional notions of ‘law’ as being rules administered and developed by courts.”⁷¹ Landis wrote in the midst of the New Deal reorientation of the relationship between agencies and courts; yet his focus included, especially, pre-New Deal cases in which (generally in the rate-making context) the courts rejected administrative agency fact-finding where such facts would determine the outcome in disputes, requiring *de novo* judicial review to ensure that the final legal decisions would accord with the rule of law as guaranteed by the courts *qua* courts. Landis saw, quite correctly, the success of New Deal administrative constitutionalism as requiring more discretion for agencies and thereby a more limited role for courts.⁷²

The connecting logic from legislative delegation to agency discretion in regard to fact-finding was the unsatisfactory and unstable distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. That is, the severe restrictions on agency decision-making were a reflection of a worldview in which agency actions were interstitial and in which the principal loci of power in the federal government was Congress in policymaking and courts in adjudication. New Deal progressives knew that the bright line was an unworkable one, however. For example, Landis notes J.L. Dickinson’s formulation in his 1927 treatise on administrative justice, quoting the long passage that begins with “[i]n truth the distinction between ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact’ really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction.”⁷³ From this instability, Landis insists that agency discretion in adjudicatory decision-making must be

70. JAMES M. LANDIS, *THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS* (1938).

71. *Id.* at 134–35. See the discussion in HORWITZ, *supra* note 1, at 222–25.

72. And also, independence from the President is a key—as Adrian Vermeule describes it, *the* key—element of Landis’s argument for emboldened agency governance. Vermeule, *supra* note 2, at 2467–70.

73. LANDIS, *supra* note 70, at 145 (quoting JOHN DICKINSON, *ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES* 55 (1927)).

broadened and, to the doctrinal point, must be unmoored from the narrow and formalistic approach characteristic of pre-New Deal administrative law.⁷⁴

The largely forgotten tussle over pre-New Deal agency adjudication reveals well the tensions that greeted New Deal reformers, in Congress and in the White House, as they grappled with solutions to growing problems of market integration, state capacity, and, of course, the Great Depression. Without a more robust scheme of agency adjudicatory authority, conflicts over the implementation of regulatory statutes would fall into the laps of courts, ill-suited by procedure (and perhaps also by temperament, given the times?) and limited by the impact they could hope to have through case-by-case dispute resolution. Greater use of rulemaking was the natural answer, to be sure; however, the legal foundation of the rulemaking revolution would await evolution in administrative structure, the enactment of the APA, and the constructive support of the federal courts in fashioning administrative law which facilitated this novel device for regulatory administration. In the first third of the twentieth century, the matter of agency authority through adjudication was critical and persistently complicated by old doctrines and separation of powers squeamishness. It would take bold actions by the Supreme Court, and a studied attention by a purposive Congress, to generate meaningful reform in the direction of more capacious administrative power.

74. Landis was not alone in this sentiment. Professor White describes Frankfurter's sense of the issues at stake in the controversial growth of regulatory administration and agency power. Like Landis, he saw these issues grounded in emergent views of separation of powers. Indeed, as White writes, "[The] reframing of essentialist separation of powers jurisprudence was crucial, Frankfurter believed, to the development of administrative law." WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 106. Legal historian William J. Novak highlights the career of Frank J. Goodnow and his work on administration, work which "laid the groundwork for the jurisprudential transition from nineteenth-century conceptions of the powers and duties of office-holders to modern administrative law." William J. Novak, *The Legal Origins of the Modern Administrative State*, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 249, 271 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002) (referring to FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911)). See also HORWITZ, *supra* note 1, at 224–25 (describing the influence of Goodnow on pre-New Deal administrative law).

B. Unanswered Questions in the pre-New Deal Period

As the regulatory bureaucracy came up to the New Deal, important new economic circumstances emerged. Congress faced a formidable challenge in creating mechanisms to address the new circumstances through administrative delegation. To fit under the commerce power of the Constitution's Article I, Congress needed to convince the Court that the regulation of certain activities within a state would ensure the protection of commerce's stream. There was, to be sure, support in the Court for this rationale, but the burden fell nonetheless on Congress to make the connection between its regulatory choices and the constitutional requisites. Further, the delegation issue under the Constitution looked fairly surmountable, as the Court had approved broad delegations, subject only to the condition that Congress not attempt to delegate its core lawmaking functions, thus going beyond what the Constitution's separation of powers requires. Yet, the Court had yet to face the circumstance of a delegation so broad that the fundamental policy choices were made by government officials outside of the four corners of Congress. At bottom, the Court had still not squarely addressed the question of what standards and guidelines in the statute were absolutely necessary to ensure that the agency to which Congress had delegated broad regulatory authority was acting within the scope of the Constitution. So, as Congress would learn painfully, this question of precisely what *ex ante* statutory guardrails are required was not yet answered as the Seventy-Third Congress embarked on its bold New Deal tasks.

Finally, the answer to the question of when and in what circumstances agencies could, in adjudication, find facts and reach determinations under the rubric of legislatively delegated authority was surprisingly elusive by 1932. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and other Progressive Era agencies enjoyed broad adjudicatory powers, including the power to set just and reasonable rates and to find that companies had engaged in unfair trade practices.⁷⁵ However, these decisions were ubiquitously reviewable by federal courts and, as

75. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, § 1(24), *repealed by* ICC Termination Act of 1995, 5 Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 837 ("For the transportation of persons or property in carrying out the orders and directions of the President, just and reasonable rates shall be fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]").

one case after another made clear, through de novo review. While such judicial oversight did not suffice to eradicate the worry of influential commentators, including Roscoe Pound⁷⁶ and, in an earlier era, the great Oxford don, Albert Venn Dicey, writing in the 1880s, that the bureaucracy would run amok,⁷⁷ administrative discretion was steadily becoming hard-wired into our governance firmament. The looming question, which would be addressed meaningfully in lodestar cases during the 1930s and 40s, was how to balance the need for ever greater discretion with the Constitution's demands for separation of powers and the rule of law.

One final note before turning next to the New Deal: We should be wary of just embracing the simple observation that the Court's reticence during the pre-New Deal period to put its rubber stamp on legislative delegation to agencies and to the expansion of administrative governance was the product of deep conservative impulse and agenda. True, judges and justices appointed by a long series of Republican presidents dominated the federal courts. And it is further true that prominent voices opposed the expanding bureaucracy. However, we should not overlook the fact that the acquiescence to, if not the exact endorsement of, national regulatory power is found in many instances in the legal doctrine of the period. Indeed, the federal courts had crossed a major bridge in declining to rule unconstitutional major instances of social and economic regulation, including the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act,⁷⁸ the Federal Trade Act,⁷⁹ the Railway Labor Act,⁸⁰ and others. Without doubt, the major expansion of the federal government's constitutional authority to regulate the economy would await the

76. On Dean Pound's perspectives on the administrative state, see the comprehensive discussion in ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 107–38. See also HORWITZ, *supra* note 1, at 218–19.

77. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915) (describing the tension between administrative agency decision-making and rule-of-law values).

78. See Theodore W. Ruger, *Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act* (1938), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, <https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/drug-and-cosmetic> (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (“Throughout its long history the FDCA has been relatively secure from serious constitutional challenge, primarily because the statute regulates only products that are ‘in interstate commerce’ and thus comfortably within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.”).

79. *Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC*, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).

80. *Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks*, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).

canonical cases of the New Deal era, some of which we will discuss in the next Part. But we should not exaggerate, with the hyperbole often accorded to the “four Horsemen” of the pre-New Deal Court, the conservatism of the Court’s approach to the bureaucracy in the period leading up to the New Deal. The evidence suggests that the story is considerably more complex and not reducible to a purely internalist or externalist explanation.

Nor should we neglect the fact, as we will discuss further in the remainder of this Article, that the judiciary has institutional interests that go beyond merely instantiating ideological preferences. Much of the Court’s reticence to go all in on bureaucratic discretion, including before, during, and after the New Deal, stems from the reluctance to abdicate power. This reluctance is independent of ideological commitments, and we see it manifest in relevant forms and fashions in the Court’s decisions involving regulatory agencies. Landis and Frankfurter well understood this and, more than others, saw the struggle as going beyond a left/right divide. They saw it as a conflict between two critical, and stubborn, institutions, each configured to check one another, and, in that, each invested in maintaining significant, durable institutional power. Indeed, the thesis of this Article is that both Congress and the courts worked deliberately and strategically, and ever conscious of the actions and motivations of one another, toward a political accommodation, one which would ensure that the modern administrative state would function meaningfully and efficaciously in order to address various new wicked problems, while also ensuring court supervision of agencies’ respect for citizen rights.

II. ACCOMMODATING THE EMERGING ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE NEW DEAL SYNTHESIS

“[T]he arc results from the law working itself pure. It is not that the law was overcome by external force. . . . The unfolding logic of deference in administrative state law represents, not a triumph of state force over reason, but a flowering of reason.”⁸¹

81. VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 24.

The conventional view sees the New Deal relationship between elected officials and the Supreme Court as a zero-sum game: the central question was, would the Supreme Court acquiesce or fight the New Deal? This approach divides the period into two parts: First, the Court slams Congress and the President by invalidating key pieces of the New Deal agenda. These bold judicial decisions put the new administrative state in peril.⁸² Less than two years later, with overwhelming support of the people manifest in the elections of 1936, an emboldened President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court. The Court, in response, retreated from its approach and proceeded in one case after another to uphold New Deal legislation against constitutional challenge.⁸³ With this retreat, the essence of modern regulatory administration is ensured, and, per the zero-sum assumption underlying this view, the war is won. In a similar vein, commentators see the Court's embrace of agency adjudicatory power in *Crowell* as a decisive victory for administrative power.⁸⁴ It vindicates Landis's view that agency decision-making must be freed from the shackles of pre-modern constitutionalism and of presidential politics.⁸⁵ New Deal decisions by the Hughes Court are key to both of these explanations; and, although the mechanisms are fundamentally distinct, they are key as well to the more internalist explanations.

The reality, we suggest, is a good deal more complicated. A thorough explanation requires more nuance than that provided by either of these black-and-white, zero-sum views. The externalist view is woefully undertheorized, lacking an explicit theory of

82. As Professor Bruce Ackerman views the matter, these decisions were the dying gasps of the "Old Court," and its "continued war on the liberal welfare state." ACKERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 337-38. Even among the externalists, this is an extreme view, one eliding the more complicated picture of commerce clause jurisprudence in the period between 1887 and 1935. As Kalman wryly observes, Ackerman, in this rendering "has proven even more externalist than the externalists." Kalman, *supra* note 1, at 2170.

83. See CUSHMAN, *supra* note 1.

84. But one which, on the face of the opinion, seemed to equivocate profoundly on the matter of administrative discretion, given the integral role it accorded to the judiciary in reviewing de novo jurisprudential and constitutional facts. Two prominent commentators at the time, both of which would do so much to advance the agenda of administrative constitutionalism, expressed grave concerns about *Crowell* at the time it was decided. As Schiller notes, "*Crowell v. Benson* became something of a *bête noire* [sic] for the proponents of prescriptive government." Schiller, *supra* note 1, at 411-12 (summarizing the views of Dickinson and Frankfurter).

85. See Vermeule, *supra* note 2, at 2466-70.

legislative-judicial relations,⁸⁶ and, moreover, cannot explain the contours of the judicial doctrine in the relevant cases.⁸⁷ And purely internalist explanations are wanting here, as elsewhere, in that they more or less ignore politics. How else are we to interpret the judicial skepticism first and the accommodation next? And how should we see the Court's developing administrative law in pre-APA cases in light of the conditions of emergent administrative government and of political strategy? These questions cannot be answered by either of the rigid internalist and externalist views.

That said, our claim is ultimately limited. We cannot reject whole cloth the assessment by generations of legal and political historians that the Court's move to the Left in this space was influenced by decisions made and threatened by President Roosevelt; nor do we reject the revisionist view associated with the important new scholarship of Barry Cushman, Richard Friedman, and Daniel Ernst that the Court was fashioning their approach

86. Although, to be fair, Barry Friedman's extensive elaboration of the Court's jurisprudence in an articulated theory of judicial fidelity to politics is theoretically sophisticated, if incomplete. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, *THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION* (2009). See generally Friedman, *Counter-majoritarianism*, *supra* note 12 (describing the flaws in the "externalist" account). Its incompleteness, which hopefully will become more clear as we discuss the Court-Congress dialogue in Section II.B, *infra*, is that it does not explain how the Court impacts congressional choices through strategic use of doctrine. While not here claiming that the PPT account is the only plausible theoretical model for explaining this dynamic relationship, it does highlight the importance of drawing a positive theoretical connection between what Congress and the Supreme Court have done and why they have done so. The political science literature on the relationship between law and politics, perhaps beginning with Corwin, has struggled with this challenge. See McNollgast, *The Political-Economy of Law*, in *LAW & ECONOMICS HANDBOOK VOL. 2*, at 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, *The Judiciary and the Role of Law*, in *OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY* 273 (B. Weingast & D. Wittman eds., 2006); Daniel B. Rodriguez, *The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform*, 72 *WASH. U. L.Q.* 1 (1994). And while this article is not the place to adumbrate the full value of a PPT account of the judicial-legislative dialogue, we feel confident in saying that a full picture of the mechanisms of legal change and adaptation requires attention to theory.

87. The most important empirical study of the "switch in time," using sophisticated analytical methods, is by Daniel E. Ho and Kevin M. Quinn. Ho & Quinn, *supra* note 12. They conclude that Justice Roberts switched his vote, in that he moved suddenly leftward during the October 1936 Term. While congruent with the "externalist" thesis, this dense empirical paper does not express any sympathy (or lack of sympathy, for that matter) for the underlying political influence story. That is to say, accepting the fact of Roberts's change in voting behavior is equally consistent with a view that indicates external influence as with the view that he was suddenly persuaded by arguments in this Term's cases. We discuss the implications of Ho & Quinn for our analysis below. See *infra* note 177.

around emerging doctrinal categories and considerations. Rather, our aim is to contextualize the two central elements of administrative law jurisprudence of this era—delegation, and the adjudicatory authority of agencies—around a perspective that sees both Congress and the judiciary as focused on implementing their own objectives through strategic choices and under conditions of constraint.

As we show, the interaction of the courts and elected officials in the New Deal was not zero sum, but positive sum: both sides had something to gain. And part of the acquiescence of the Supreme Court reflected the New Dealers' acceptance of the Court's conception of the requirements of due process, thereby maintaining the integrity of the judicial system and allowing the courts to police the government's regulatory system.

A. Legislative Ambitions and Strategies in the First New Deal

The New Deal began with a flourish as the newly-elected Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his inaugural address that he was "prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require."⁸⁸ He went on to say that "[t]hese measures, or such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption."⁸⁹

President Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress soon recognized that they needed to rely on the administrative state to help rescue the nation from the Great Depression.⁹⁰

The focus on the administrative state was borne of a steadily increasing confidence on the part of progressive scholars and public intellectuals that regulatory administration through a more imaginative use of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic power was

88. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933).

89. *Id.*

90. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES: AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION, 1920-1941 (1992); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1935-1936 (1960).

important, and perhaps even essential, to the successful implementation of public policy.⁹¹

The overwhelming vote of the American people for the Democratic Party in the 1932 election reflected a faith in the President and in Congress to establish instruments of governance appropriate to the conditions of economic and social life.⁹² These instruments emerged not only from political expediency, but also from a growing enthusiasm for the bureaucratic state and the utility of administrative agencies to implement legislative objectives and thereby steward the political near-consensus for an activist national government.⁹³ Early in the development of New Deal regulatory strategy, a number of key regulatory agencies emerged as the template of legislative delegation and administrative expertise, including the National Labor Relations Board,⁹⁴ the Securities & Exchange Commission,⁹⁵ and the Federal Communications Commission.⁹⁶ The essence of New Deal regulatory administration can be found in these three cornerstone agencies, and in the

91. Morton Horwitz summarizes the shift in focus and in strategy among liberal reformers: "As the Progressive disenchantment with the competence of courts to perform social engineering tasks combined with a loss of faith in the sensitivity of judges to questions of social justice, the effort to replace courts with administrative experts became more pronounced." HORWITZ, *supra* note 1, at 225.

92. On the significance of Roosevelt's election of 1932 to the expansion of the administrative state, see Metzger, *supra* note 2, at 52 ("FDR's election and enactment of the broad regulatory statutes of the New Deal thus was not a sudden move to administrative government, but it did represent a significant intensification."). See also Novak, *supra* note 74.

93. This faith had its origins to some degree in the experimentations and insights of the Progressive Era, where Congress and the President worked in tandem to establish a more coherent conception of expertise and governance through administrative mechanisms. We agree with Adrian Vermeule that the juxtaposition famously drawn between the so-called classical Constitution and the new regulatory state is naïve. "The classical Constitution of separated powers," writes Vermeule, "cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state." VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 46 (emphasis omitted). The seeds for twentieth century regulatory administration were indeed planted by our constitutional scheme of government. Still and all, the New Deal period is notable for its statutory innovations, and for its more fulsome grappling with the implications of expanding bureaucracies for the rule of law and the decision-making responsibilities and authorities of Congress and the President. It is through the New Deal and key judicial decisions that these issues began to be more systematically worked out.

94. See JAMES A. GROSS, *THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1933-1937* (1974).

95. See JOEL SELIGMAN, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET* (3d ed. 2003).

96. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32589, *THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 1* (2018).

regulatory apparatus they spawned. However, this strategic template did not come into the picture until a major legal snag was revealed and handled ultimately by the interaction of the Supreme Court with elected officials, negotiating a solution to the problem of the delegation of regulatory authority to bureaucratic agencies. The snag emerged with the implementation of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the regulatory structure developed in the legislative centerpiece of FDR's first hundred days, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).⁹⁷

When we look back at the controversy involving the NIRA, we need to understand the contours of presidential, congressional, and judicial interests and strategies. So far as President Roosevelt was concerned, we could plausibly view the NIRA as just a bold version of what presidents from Woodrow Wilson to the present had viewed as a strong executive implementing a Progressive vision of legislation and regulation. Before Landis's magnum opus on the administrative state in 1938,⁹⁸ influential Progressives, such as Felix Frankfurter, had already been explicating a muscular version of regulatory administration, molded by ambitious presidents and free from political turbulence.⁹⁹ Likewise, Congress was steadily expanding the scope of regulation through blockbuster statutes going back two decades before the New Deal.¹⁰⁰ Congress was a willing and critical ally in presidential tactics of expanding the national regulatory footprint. Indeed, Congress was anxious to craft novel regulatory strategies, as evidenced by its important efforts in the years just preceding the New Deal, including the statute that was the subject of the Court's *Crowell* decision, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).¹⁰¹ And it worked quickly in the first Hundred Days of the Roosevelt administration, a period labelled the "First New Deal."¹⁰²

97. See *infra* text accompanying notes 114–21 (describing NIRA).

98. See LANDIS, *supra* note 70.

99. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, *THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT* (1930); Tushnet, *supra* note 1, at 1568–76.

100. See *supra* Part I.

101. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (1927).

102. See KENNEDY, *supra* note 90, at 363–80.

B. Courts, Congress, and the Dialogue

What does the judiciary care about with regard to these evolving regulatory strategies? And how do they manifest their interests in their decisions? This question is critical for understanding the Supreme Court's actions in this period of study. Yet it gets remarkably little attention. Recalling the dichotomy in the traditional literature, either the courts are viewed as mere reactors to political influence—essentially following the election returns, as Mr. Dooley quipped—or they are viewed as autonomous oracles, developing and applying doctrine.¹⁰³

The Court implemented meaningful legal strategies in its consideration of these novel regulatory mechanisms enacted via statute or administrative order. And it is important to look, first, at what the Court does and says; and, next, at why the justices decide the way they do. Broadly speaking, we see the Supreme Court as engaging in a dialogue with the legislature. In this dialogue, as viewed through the lens of PPT, neither branch truly has the last word.¹⁰⁴ The dialogue is iterative and strategic and can be viewed, at least in a stylized sense, as a game involving two purposive actors, designing and implementing strategies in a system structured by certain rules and practices.¹⁰⁵

The judiciary's strategies, as we will see as we consider these cases in more detail in the next section, reflected important concerns at two levels: First, they evidenced caution in exercises of congressional and presidential power, especially bold new initiatives. And, second, the Court was skeptical about the exercise of administrative power by agencies, and it therefore created an

103. In this latter, internalist account, we could see the Justices as acting as faithful agents to the rule of law, and doing best to implement legal principles or we could see the Justices as acting in accordance with their own ideologies, and using their opinions as a fig leaf to mask their true motives. This debate between the so-called attitudinalist model of judicial behavior and what has been called the legal model continues to rage. *See generally* JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, *THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED* (2002). We say nothing here by way of interrogating these two models; whether or not it is one or the other is not critical to the internalist explanation, at least as we consider it here. That said, Cushman and others pushing internalist explanations seem to accept that judges are acting as faithful agents, within the scope of rule of law constraints.

104. *See* DeFiguerido et al., *supra* note 42; *see also* Brian A. Marks, *A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell*, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 843 (2012).

105. *See generally* WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, *AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY* (1973) (describing game theoretic account of Court-Congress relations).

approach that could be, and indeed was, viewed as intrusive and formalistic.

Viewed through this lens, we might see, as the conventional wisdom of the “switch in time” emphasizes, the Supreme Court as distrusting of administrative agency power and just standing at the ready to strike down the efforts of a collaboratively leftist president and Congress to expand regulatory power. Yet this simplistic confrontation view, originating with FDR for his own political purposes, does not jibe with the evidence. Rather, the Court was reasonably deferential to administrative agency power in the years leading up to the New Deal. As White notes, “on the whole, the Supreme Court had been relatively receptive to federal agencies in the years between the [1906] Hepburn Act and the early 1930s.”¹⁰⁶ The situation with respect to administrative agency adjudication was, to be sure, more complicated. But the notion that the Supreme Court acted decisively in the period preceding *Crowell* and after the Second New Deal to rubber stamp agency decision-making is seriously misleading.

The better assessment is that the dialogue between Congress, the Court, and administrative agencies continued apace in the years during and after the New Deal. No case was the last word, neither the lodestar cases upholding legislative delegations nor the cases deferring to administrative orders in adjudication. Rather, Congress took account of judicial directions about how best to create acceptable statutes; and courts maintained institutional power. As to the latter, it is important to see the judiciary as an institution with interests and objectives. Courts act with strategic purpose as do legislators, the President, and agencies.

Moreover, the Court saw agency decision-making, particularly within the realm of adjudication (noting that rulemaking on a broad scale was still a fairly rare phenomenon at the time of the New Deal), as potentially in tension with the work of the judiciary and, perhaps even more critically, in a manner that looked rather alien to judges. “Judges,” notes Daniel Ernst, “readily assumed that norms of due process that had been worked out in the courts ought

106. WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 108.

also to govern the ‘quasi-adjudication’ of administrative agencies, and they condemned administrators who violated these norms.”¹⁰⁷

That the Supreme Court cared deeply about these issues was manifest in how it reviewed cases involving agency adjudication, as we will explore more fully in Section D of this Part. And it is of a piece with what we observe with respect to judicial decision-making in a large swath of cases involving regulatory administration, including the prominent cases involving procedural due process in the 1970s and beyond¹⁰⁸ and in the “hard look” cases of a later period in administrative law. As a bridge to our discussion of concrete judicial doctrine and strategy in the remainder of the paper, we here pull back the lens to say some more about the motivations and objectives of the Court in carrying its review function.

First, judicial scrutiny of regulatory choices made by Congress through statute is very limited. Once federal authority to regulate under Article I is established, the courts have precious little basis to evaluate the techniques Congress employs to ensure that the bureaucracy will implement legislative objectives. Leaving aside the critical issue of whether or not Congress or the agency has violated the Constitution, the question of Congressional choice of regulatory instruments is essentially one of separation of powers. Has Congress intruded on a power reserved to another branch of government? In the context of the New Deal regulatory strategies of Congress, courts stood ready to protect the Constitution’s separation of powers through its responsibility to interpret the Constitution. So, one element of the Court-Congress dialogue—the Court’s protection of the separation of powers—emerges directly from our constitutional practice of judicial review.

Second, courts care about their own sphere of authority and practice, and they look hard at whether and to what extent a regulatory schema, in design or in practice, impinges on the rule of law. This incentive cannot easily be captured in either an internalist or externalist perspective. That is, the Court’s protection of the rule of law is related to a sense of institutional responsibility to protect

107. ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 2. Ernst summarizes the compromise thusly: “Administrators exercised great discretionary power but only if they treated individuals fairly and kept within limits imposed by Congress and the Constitution.” *Id.* at 7.

108. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., *ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY* (1990).

rule of law values, a view that perhaps predates the Constitution but is certainly embedded in our conception of judicial power and limited government. Moreover, it is part of a cogent, purposive strategy of the Court to ensure that its critical role in governance is protected. We should understand the Court's objectives as connected to rule of law fidelity in both of these senses and for both reasons described here. Of course, a major unanswered question in the first half of the twentieth century concerned how to extend the rule of law to the administrative state.

Third, and finally, the Congress-Court dialogue is carried out in an environment in which neither institution truly has the last word. The Court can rule on the matter of a statute's constitutionality and, if it holds that the statute violates the Constitution, Congress may take another bite at the policy apple by enacting a statute that cures these constitutional defects. And this effort is also subject to judicial scrutiny (to say nothing of judicial statutory interpretation). As we will explore in considerable detail below, Congress's efforts as the first New Deal transitioned to the second New Deal period (1935–1936) were designed to meet the Court's objections and therefore to overcome constitutional obstacles to Congress's regulatory program. In contrast to the view of classic externalist scholars who see the New Deal decisions as more or less a product of the Justices' ideologies, we see these key constitutional cases as part of an iterative dialogue, one involving three willful, strategically savvy institutions each concerned with not only the best interests of the nation but, as well, their own institutional interests and agendas.

C. Commerce Power and Delegation: Congress in a Bind

Faced with the Democratic Congress and President prepared to take bold steps to address the ills of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court would have to consider in the first years of the New Deal the question of whether congressional authority to regulate commerce in this way and the particular delegations of power to non-legislators was consistent with the Constitution.¹⁰⁹ The claim made by the opponents of the centerpiece New Deal legislation was

109. The best treatment of these constitutional conflicts roughly contemporaneous with these events is found in Robert L. Stern's *The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946*, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).

that this legislation lacked adequate standards of policy to guide administrative discretion and therefore risked that agencies would not adhere to the rule of law. It was out of this collision of strategies and interests that the showdown involving the constitutionality of the NIRA arises.

To understand the nature of this controversy, it is necessary to revisit the architecture of the NIRA; and, to do that, we must recur to the political landscape in which President Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress faced in focusing on this landmark piece of legislation. The ambition and novelty of the NIRA could hardly be overstated. Historian Barry Karl describes the act as “the result of a remarkable set of compromises” and views the legislative accomplishment in rather grand terms:

As a piece of legislation, it was a blend of planning positions that had been debated for two decades. As an administrative program, it met the political demands of presidential management of the economy and, more important, the traditional public-works politics of Congress and the states. Its importance as a historical event is that it was the first significant American attempt to meet the critical needs of the industrialized world of the thirties.¹¹⁰

At the same time, the process by which the NIRA was enacted was truncated, to say the least. Ira Katznelson notes that the NIRA “was almost entirely drafted, in detail, by the executive branch . . . [and] [was] passed virtually unchanged from the texts the president had sent to the Hill.”¹¹¹ Drafters of the statute, certainly under the pressure of FDR, were resistant to suggestions to be more cautious and methodical,¹¹² the result of which was a statute which was “[h]urriedly drafted and incautiously implemented”¹¹³ with “[p]oor attention to constitutional detail.”¹¹⁴

If the sole issue was whether and to what extent Congress had the power under the Constitution to regulate commercial activity through this statutory mechanism, one devoted to industrial recovery, the harried nature of the process would not be fatal. The question of commerce power, after all, is a binary one; that is,

110. BARRY D. KARL, *THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945*, at 116 (1983).

111. KATZNELSON, *supra* note 90, at 123–24.

112. See PETER IRONS, *THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS* 23–26 (1982).

113. ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 6.

114. CUSHMAN, *supra* note 1, at 38.

either Congress has the power to regulate commerce in this domain or it does not. In none of the key Commerce Clause cases before the New Deal did the Court's decision turn squarely on the regulatory technique Congress deployed to carry out its regulatory strategy. And, indeed, sometimes Congress employed an agency (the ICC most famously, and the Railway Labor Board later), and other times it relied on the executive branch to implement its objectives (as in antitrust). The fundamental question was one of legislative power, not instrument design.

Yet, the principal result of the NIRA's careless drafting was that its structure and procedure was, to understate the matter, underdeveloped, a result that would prove fatal in litigation. The NIRA contained very few standards to guide administrative decision-making. Nor was the NRA directed to follow administrative procedures of any serious sort in implementing its charge.¹¹⁵ The absence of suitable safeguards and procedures, and also a requirement of evidence, represented a failure of drafting and of sensible appreciation for politics and the need for a political accommodation.¹¹⁶ Put another way, the federal government lacked the state capacity to make this form of regulation work.

115. The problems with the NIRA went beyond poor drafting, but also included rather weak lawyering on behalf of this novel statute. As Cushman notes, "the lawyers defending the NIRA had virtually no strategy," and there appeared to be no real appreciation for the fact that this statute was enacted on a shaky constitutional basis. *Id.* For a valuable perspective from a leading New Dealer insider, see THOMAS EMERSON, *YOUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEW DEAL: AN INSIDER'S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 23-24* (1991). See generally PETER IRONS, *THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 23-24* (1982); RONEN SHAMIR, *MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 16* (1995). By contrast, opponents to this far-reaching legislation were well organized and strategic. See Metzger, *supra* note 2, at 53-57 (describing the efforts of the Liberty League and other organizations to mobilize against the New Deal); see also Metzger, *supra* note 2, at 65 ("[B]usiness and economic conservatives were critical in developing the New Deal attack on the modern national administrative state.").

116. These were problems as well with the Agricultural Adjustment Act. See generally MARIAN C. MCKENNA, *FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR 119* (2002) ("[T]he drafters [of the AAA] framed legislation that rested on vague constitutional theories and imprecise legal foundations."). On the juxtaposition between the AAA and the NIRA, the former salvaged by congressional action, approved by the courts, and the latter an abject failure, Skocpol and Finegold wrote:

Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act created an extraordinary opportunity to extend government intervention into the economy. But, at the beginning of the Depression, no properly *political* learning had been going on to lay the basis for the NRA. Such learning as was going on in the 1920s about how to plan for industry was happening within particular industries, with trade association leaders doing the learning. When the federal government withdrew from even nominal control of industry after World War I,

Moreover, the statute delegated extraordinary powers to executive officials. Ira Katznelson summarizes the unique political process that accompanied the New Deal statutes of the first hundred days:

[T]hese measures were characterized by immense powers delegated from the legislature to the executive branch that dramatically expanded the powers of federal agencies, many of which were new. . . . [T]he presidency . . . did gain extraordinary discretion under very broad and often not very well-specified emergency legislation.¹¹⁷

Ultimately, it was the combination of these problems that proved problematic. The powers delegated were broad, and arguably “legislative” in nature; as scholars would later summarize the nondelegation doctrine, focusing on pre-New Deal cases as well as the NIRA cases, Congress was seen as having delegated its “core functions” to government officials outside of Congress. And, to make matters worse, there were neither any “intelligible principles” to guide administrative decision-making nor any procedures to give us confidence that these officials would exercise power responsibly.

The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the NIRA first in *Panama Refining v. Ryan*.¹¹⁸ At issue here was the President’s power to approve and enforce codes of fair competition under Section 9(c) of the Act.¹¹⁹ Panama Refining challenged a code

it left the field clear to the giant corporations and to the trade associations, whose efforts Hoover simply encouraged and attempted to coordinate, instead of building up independent governmental apparatuses. Thus, when the Depression struck and the New Deal found itself committed to the sponsorship of industrial planning, there was only the “analogue of war” to draw on – an invocation of the emergency mobilization practices used during World War I.

Government’s job in depression was much more difficult than in war: not just exhorting maximum production from industry but stimulating recovery and allocating burdens in a time of scarcity.

KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, *STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL* 64 (1995).

117. KATZNELSON, *supra* note 90, at 124.

118. *Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

119. As the relevant provision of the Act stated:

The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.

applicable within the petroleum industry, one which was being used here to enforce bans on the sale of “hot oil,” that is, petroleum produced in excess of state quotas. The code did not require the President to make findings of fact before prosecuting businesses for violating its provisions. The Court struck down this provision on the grounds that it was tantamount to “uncontrolled legislative power” and thus represented an unconstitutional delegation under the Constitution.¹²⁰

Acknowledging that broad delegations to the President had been upheld in a number of decisions going back to the previous century, the Court viewed the delegation here as beyond the pale, given the absence of clearly delineated standards for the President to follow in implementing the statute and, as well, the absence of procedures, such as findings of fact, that the President would have to follow to carry out his regulatory responsibilities under Section 9(c).¹²¹ “The Congress,” writes Chief Justice Hughes for the Court, “manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly.”¹²²

The heart of the Court’s analysis came where it sought to balance its views about the unacceptable breadth of the delegation of power and the need for deference to congressional choices about administrative technique and expediency in regulation. The Court says:

Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed \$1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.

Id. at 406.

120. *Id.* at 432.

121. *Id.* at 430. The Court then draws its principal conclusion after this long litany of cases upholding delegation within proscribed limits:

Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that § 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.

Id.

122. *Id.* at 421.

The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the [L]egislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.¹²³

The second principal challenge to the NIRA came in 1935, in *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*,¹²⁴ a challenge to New York City's Live Poultry Code, a code enacted under the rubric of the NIRA. This case, unlike *Panama Refining*, represented a double-barreled legal attack on the constitutionality of the statute, one barrel concerning the scope of the legislative delegation and the other concerning the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause. As the Court held, the constitutional flaws in the relevant provisions of the Act stemmed from both sources. First, the NIRA was a hard sell under extant Commerce Clause doctrine. The case came up to the Court from a conviction of a local slaughterhouse operator, the Schechter Corporation, which had slaughtered poultry at its Brooklyn facility, then sold the poultry to local retailers for direct sale to consumers. There was no evidence of this chicken being sold in interstate commerce. This case was about as poor a vehicle with which to test the constitutionality of the statute as could be devised. A unanimous Court rejected the government's strained argument that the statute could be applied against this defendant.¹²⁵

Yet the fact that this constitutional challenge comes up in a case where the constitutional case for federal legislation was weak, did

123. *Id.*

124. *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

125. *Id.* at 499.

not spell the doom for the NIRA, since presumably there were other companies who did in fact engage in commerce across state lines.¹²⁶

The dagger in the NIRA came from the Court's unanimous holding in *Schechter Poultry* that the NIRA represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.¹²⁷

Here the absence of adequate standards and of intelligible principles which would guide agency conduct proved fatal. "In providing for codes," the Court announces, "the [NIRA] dispenses with this administrative procedure and with any administrative procedure of an analogous character."¹²⁸ The Court contrasts this statute with other regulatory statutes which had easily passed scrutiny, including the Federal Trade Commission. By contrast to these other statutes, Section 3 of NIRA "supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity."¹²⁹ It concludes that "[s]uch a sweeping delegation of legislative power finds no support in the decisions upon which the Government especially relies."¹³⁰ This view was reinforced in Justice Cardozo's remarkable concurring opinion, one in which he describes Section 3 of the NIRA as "delegation running riot."¹³¹

In the end, the poor statutory drafting and insufficient attention to constitutional principles as they had been considered in previous instances of regulation came back to haunt Congress and the President. The concerns that had been percolating among the judiciary, and in particular Chief Justice Hughes, about limitless administrative power overflowed in *Schechter Poultry*, as the Court unanimously looked with scorn at this haphazard statute and saw animate threats to the rule of law and the separation of powers.¹³²

126. Nor did this holding disturb in any meaningful way the state of the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, *THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, 1930-1941*, at 68 (2007); see also Cushman, *supra* note 11, at 1965 ("At the time, such an interpretation was thoroughly conventional."). Indeed, Stern suggests that the commerce clause holding was unnecessary. Stern, *supra* note 109, at 662.

127. *Schechter Poultry*, 295 U.S. at 542.

128. *Id.* at 533.

129. *Id.* at 541.

130. *Id.* at 539.

131. *Id.* at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). As Professor White observes, "if there was any doubt that the limits of a permissive Court stance toward congressional delegations had been reached with the *Panama Refining-Schechter* sequence, it disappeared with Cardozo's concurrence in *Schechter*." WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 111.

132. Professor Ernst tells the story of Justice Brandeis calling two of Roosevelt's main lawyers, Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, and proclaiming that "[t]he President has

The statute, declared Hughes, provided the NIRA with a “wide field of legislative possibilities” in which the agency could “roam at will.”¹³³ “Such a delegation of legislative power,” he wrote, “is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”¹³⁴

The Court faced one more case growing out of constitutional objections to the Democrats’ bold strategies with respect to the National Industrial Recovery Act. Congress had enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in 1935,¹³⁵ effectively taking the code for the industry written under NIRA and passing it as legislation. Delegation to write the code was therefore not an issue. The key issue confronting Congress was how to maintain decent wages for miners in the coal industry and also to provide a right to these miners to bargain collectively. In an important sense, this Act, and the corresponding Coal Code that emerged from the NRA after the statute’s enactment, was an incipient and unsuccessful bridge between the pro-labor strategies in the NIRA and the major effort to regulate labor relations in the Wagner Act, to be examined in depth below. As Stern notes in his extended discussion of the constitutional controversy, labor costs were more than 50 percent of the total cost of coal mine production, and so the regulation of wages was an important step in regulating commerce.¹³⁶ But was this enough to pass constitutional muster?¹³⁷

The Court considered the constitutional challenge in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*¹³⁸ The Court here, as in *Schechter Poultry*, evaluated both objections to the Act: first, that this effort to regulate intrastate activities—wages of workers—was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause and, second, that this statute represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court’s tone

been living in a fool’s paradise,” and warned that the administration’s future actions would have to be “considered most carefully in light of these decisions by a unanimous court.” ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 60.

133. *Schechter Poultry*, 295 U.S. at 538.

134. *Id.* at 537.

135. 15 U.S.C. § 801 (otherwise known as the “Guffey-Snyder” Act).

136. Stern, *supra* note 109, at 664.

137. Stern notes: “President Roosevelt requested Congress to pass the bill, despite admitted doubts as to whether the Supreme Court would uphold its constitutionality . . .” *Id.* at 667 (citing Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in 4 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297–98 (1938)).

138. *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936).

was abidingly negative; it appeared to like nothing about this statute. The Court equated mining with manufacturing and stressed the local character of the activities regulated. And none of the traditional exceptions to the otherwise prohibited device of regulating intrastate activities on the argument that they affect the channels and/or instrumentalities of commerce are applicable here. The regulation, as in *Schechter Poultry*, deals with a “purely local activity.”¹³⁹

Also fatal is the delegation of lawmaking power, and in particular, the delegation of power to private parties in the form of a National Bituminous Coal Commission. “[T]his,” says the Court, “is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”¹⁴⁰ This kind of delegation “undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property.”¹⁴¹

Conventional wisdom sees the flaws with the NIRA, as revealed in the decided cases, as stemming from the dissonance between legislative power and principles of legality. Public intellectuals, scholars, and even some of the Justices speaking in their extra-judicial capacities in the half century before the New Deal, emphasized this theme.¹⁴² Yet, the idea that these nondelegation doctrines follow more or less the line set out by A.V. Dicey in his critique of administrative discretion¹⁴³ is overly simplistic.¹⁴⁴

139. *Id.* at 304.

140. *Id.* at 311.

141. *Id.*

142. See ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 2 (“Americans’ belief that courts might deliver them from Tocqueville’s nightmare gave a distinctly legalistic cast to the administrative state they created after 1900.”); *id.* at 52 (noting Hughes speech in 1931 warning against “unscrupulous” administrators).

143. See generally DICEY, *supra* note 77. On the legalist tradition of which Dicey, Friedrich Hayek, and others sprung, see HORWITZ, *supra* note 1, at 225–30.

144. See LANDIS, *supra* note 70, at 50–51 (“A principle that runs through the many decisions on delegation of power, however, is that the grant of the power to adjudicate must be bound to a stated objective which the determination of claims must tend, and, further, that the grant of the power to regulate must specify not only the subject matter of regulation but also the end which regulation seeks to attain.”).

A more nuanced way to understand the Court's skepticism about delegation to agencies is to see that Congress had created a statute that did not provide the sort of standards which would channel administrative discretion in a direction which would best implement legislative objectives. Moreover, the statute gave the judiciary a basis to evaluate the soundness of administrative decision-making under relevant principles of statutory interpretation and administrative law. Not surprisingly, the Court emphasized the absence of administrative procedures, which could limit the discretion of agencies appropriately.¹⁴⁵

All was not lost, however, as the Court's opinions, especially in *Schechter Poultry*, were not abidingly negative as they are so commonly painted. Indeed, the Court went so far as to provide a template for Congress in solving these problems. It is critically important that we see the Court in these delegation cases as raising concerns that it was confident would be properly addressed and solved by Congress.¹⁴⁶ The Court in *Panama Refining* and *Schechter Poultry* issued what is essentially a how-to manual – a template for constitutional validity.¹⁴⁷

What were the minimal terms of this how-to manual, this quid pro quo? First, intelligible principles to guide administrative agency discretion, as the Justices made clear in these cases; and second, procedures which would ensure that agencies would keep within their lanes and would implement the objectives of the statute.

145. As an antidote to the view that the two lodestar cases represented a resuscitation of formalist separation of powers orthodoxy, White points to "a passage toward the end of the [*Panama Refining*] opinion that hinted that the simple attachment of a few procedural safeguards to congressional delegations might assuage the Court's constitutional concerns." WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 110 (citing *Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935)).

146. Cushman points to an interesting comment from the diary of Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior. He says that at a dinner party, Justice Owen Roberts, who had voted with the majority in *Panama Refining*, assured him "that he is entirely sympathetic with what we are trying to do in the oil matter and that he hoped we would pass a statute that would enable us to carry out our policy." Cushman, *supra* note 126, at 1936 (quoting HAROLD L. ICKES, *THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES* 273 (1953)).

147. As Cushman summarizes the impact of the 1935–36 cases, these decisions "did not erect insuperable obstacles to reform in these areas, but instead channeled congressional efforts into achieving those desired ends through means that were consistent with prevailing constitutional doctrine." *Id.* at 1964; see also Barry Cushman, *The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation*, 79 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 80 (1998) (describing that "the Hughes Court offered the Roosevelt administration a distinctive form of consultative relationship").

Likewise, these procedures are important to safeguard and facilitate judicial interests. Courts can steer agencies toward sound decision-making by requiring agencies to follow processes that are fair and efficient; judicial-like procedures meet these criteria, and it is no accident that courts embrace procedures that are familiar to the courtroom. This is a quintessential example of the political and legal accommodation so instrumental to the establishment and maintenance of the modern administrative state. Congress gets what it wants by establishing a schema of regulatory administration that passes constitutional muster; courts give their blessing to statutes delegating regulatory authority to an agency when those statutes contain suitable procedural safeguards.¹⁴⁸

D. Agency Adjudication and the Judicial Function

The critical role of the judicial function in the area of regulatory administration was a central theme of the Court's decision in *Crowell v. Benson*.¹⁴⁹ In *Crowell*, the Court considered whether an administrator could make findings of fact in disputes arising under the rubric of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) and, further, whether these findings would be final. Yes, answered the Court as to both questions, so long as the findings were supported by evidence and within the scope of the administrator's authority. Consistent with the political accommodation, Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court, "[t]o hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."¹⁵⁰

Equally consistent with the political accommodation, the Court insisted that this authority was subject to the requirement that all legal questions were to be determined by an Article III court

148. Commentators at the time understood that the Court was, as White puts it, "providing blueprints for the creation of new agencies." WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 113; see, e.g., Reuben Oppenheimer, *The Supreme Court and Administrative Law*, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1937) (noting, with special reference to the nondelegation cases, that "the quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative administrative tribunal has been recognized and approved as a permanent instrument of government").

149. *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

150. *Id.* at 46.

without any deference to administrators. Moreover, courts would make de novo factual determinations in matters involving jurisprudential and constitutional facts. They would do so because of the essential role of the federal courts in supervising administrative power. Further, agency decisions would be subject to judicial review by an Article III court, a requirement that would become well embedded in the structure of federal courts jurisprudence in the years to follow—indeed, would become a mainstay of the Hart-Wechsler synthesis as described by later generations of federal courts scholars.¹⁵¹

Crowell reflected an accommodation of philosophies and of interests. Tension about the expanding scope of administrative power was conspicuous in the period leading up to the New Deal,¹⁵² and even Hughes himself had expressed concern about the bureaucracy.¹⁵³ To be sure, Congress had enacted legislation, in addition to the LHWCA, authorizing administrators to make factual determinations—to put in rather more grandiose terms, to exercise administrative discretion and therefore to bear the weight of governmental power—and yet the Court had been tepid in embracing this new reality of governance. In its *Ben Avon* ruling in 1920,¹⁵⁴ the Court insisted that a federal court determine de novo whether or not a rate was confiscatory.¹⁵⁵ While vehemently criticized by New Deal architects, including Frankfurter,¹⁵⁶ *Ben Avon* remained good law by the time the Court considered the matter of administrative power twelve years later in *Crowell*.¹⁵⁷ In this light, *Crowell* was a resounding victory for the New Deal

151. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., *Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 939–40 (1988).

152. See, e.g., Tushnet, *supra* note 1, at 1593 (“The proliferation of agencies in the New Deal placed this accommodation under substantial pressure.”).

153. See ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 43–50, 52.

154. *Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough*, 253 U.S. 287, 290 (1920). For a full discussion of *Ben Avon* and its place in pre-New Deal struggles over the nature and scope of the administrative state, see Schiller, *supra* note 1, at 401–04.

155. For a full discussion of *Ben Avon* and its place in pre-New Deal struggles over the nature and scope of the administrative state, see Schiller, *supra* note 1, at 401–04.

156. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW* 464 (2d ed. 1935).

157. This was much to the chagrin of New Dealers. See Schiller, *supra* note 1, at 403 (“For progressive proponents of the administrative state, the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Ben Avon* was a nightmare come to life.”).

agency, seeking a balance between broad administrative discretion and judicial authority.

Considered as a product of its critical time, *Crowell* reveals a judicial accommodation of myriad interests, in particular, the interests of Congress in creating a scheme of administrative governance that was, as Hughes put it, “prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive,”¹⁵⁸ and the interests of the courts in maintaining an adequate judicial role. Beyond this, *Crowell* also acknowledges that the key role of administrative procedure and the establishment of proper guardrails to the exercise of bureaucratic power. These procedures are an essential part of the quid pro quo for the Court’s constitutional imprimatur on agency power. This would become clearer in the run-up to the enactment of the APA and in a number of blockbuster administrative law cases in the seven decades afterward, but it is important to see *Crowell* through that lens.

Chief Justice Hughes notes that the statute provides for notice and hearing, a hearing which is to be public, and, moreover, requires the administrator’s decision to be based upon the “record of the hearings and other proceedings” before him.¹⁵⁹ These procedures are characteristic of foundational regulatory statutes of the Progressive Era, and the Court noted precedent that deals with the responsibility of agency officials to base their decisions on evidence in the record.¹⁶⁰ Much is made in hindsight of the Court’s requirement that there be judicial review of any legal determinations,¹⁶¹ but this principle was shaky even as stated in the case. Yet, as Adrian Vermeule notes in his extended discussion of law’s abnegation in the decades following Hughes’s synthesis in *Crowell*, the requirement of judicial review would be tenuous without clarity about what approach courts were to take to examining jurisprudential and constitutional facts and, likewise,

158. *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).

159. *Id.* at 48 (quoting Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927 § 23(b), 44 Stat. 1424 (1927)).

160. *Id.* (citing *Chi. Junction Case v. United States*, 264 U.S. 258, 263 (1924), *United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co.*, 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924), and *Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.*, 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913)).

161. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, *Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 645 (2004); Fallon, *supra* note 151, at 916; David P. Currie, *Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940*, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 514 (1987); Gordon G. Young, *Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor*, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 848–49 (1986).

what deference courts would pay to administrative agency determinations.¹⁶² The key takeaway from *Crowell*, however, is that agencies must undertake their responsibilities consistent with administrative procedures, procedures which generate better decisions and which provide information that enables Congress and the President to carry out their oversight responsibilities and other strategic objectives.¹⁶³ As we show below, these uncertainties about proper scope of review, etc., would be settled as the evolving political accommodation became much clearer between 1935 with the passage of the NLRA and 1946 with the passage of the APA.

The Court had embraced administrative discretion in matters of agency adjudication where there are suitable procedures to guide such discretion and where the judiciary maintained a supervisory role. This was the message of *Crowell*, a message that would be reaffirmed later in the New Deal as the Court considered further matters involving the performance of administrative functions in the context of agency adjudication. This accommodation by the Court to judicial interests in maintaining a wide swath of supervisory power through de novo review and strictures on agency decision-making even in fact finding, went down skeptically with New Deal progressives. For Landis and Frankfurter especially, they saw the Court's decision as, at best, a very small step forward in the establishing of meaningful administrative discretion and, at worst, a betrayal of the ideals of the administrative state.¹⁶⁴

162. VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 29–31. Vermeule continues with an interesting analysis of what he calls the “collapse” of *Crowell*, noting the ways in which it has been at least thinned out, if not gutted, by a number of doctrinal developments in administrative law. *See id.* at 29–36. There is a weaker and stronger version of Vermeule's claim. The weaker version is to see the courts after *Crowell* as moving away, if not entirely abandoning its commitment to independent judicial review. The journey from *Crowell* to *Chevron* could be viewed as the rejiggering of agency/court relations so as to deemphasize the de novo character of judicial review in matters of factual findings and interpretation. A stronger version is that the seeds of *Crowell*'s collapse is in *Hughes*' opinion itself. It is difficult to assess this stronger claim without an exegesis of post-*Crowell* administrative law doctrine, and such an exegesis is beyond the scope of this article. Still and all, we would make a couple points relevant to this discussion.

163. *See* Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, *Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control*, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).

164. *See* LANDIS, *supra* note 70, at 134 (“The insistence that the administrative process in these phases must be subject to judicial review is to be explained in part, I believe, by economic determinism.”); *see also Crowell*, 285 U.S. at 94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

E. Resolving the Delegation Dilemma in the Second New Deal

The Second New Deal represents Congress and the President's attempt to secure the victories won with regard to national economic policy and power, and also to ensure that new regulatory instruments would pass constitutional muster. Famously, President Roosevelt railed against the Court and was resolved to press ahead with his agenda by bold means, including the appointment of justices sympathetic to the New Deal; he even threatened to pack the Court with justices who would outnumber those recalcitrant to his agenda. Just as the Republicans defended the Court for its decisions invalidating key parts of the Democrats' New Deal agenda,¹⁶⁵ the Democratic Party made clear that it would persist in enacting broad national legislation to carry out its policy objectives. As Senator Barkley said in a speech quoting Lincoln's first inaugural:

[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.¹⁶⁶

Within a short three-year period, much of the dust would have settled, and the Democrats' policy agenda would be secured against constitutional attack. The New Deal agency would triumph.

As we previewed our argument in the introduction, neither the externalist nor internalist views adequately capture the story of the Court's decisions in this critical era, although both are important factors in the equation. To us, a central difference between the

("[S]ince the advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able to bear heavy expenses, the purpose of the Act will be in part defeated.").

165. The Republican Party platform said The New Deal "has insisted on the passage of laws contrary to the Constitution" and "[t]he integrity and authority of the Supreme Court has been flouted." *Republican Party Platform of 1936*, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1936> (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).

166. Lincoln continued (in a Lockean line): "Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes." President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), <http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm>.

Court's approach in the first wave of delegation cases during the New Deal and the second wave, exemplified particularly by *Jones & Laughlin*, is that Congress enacted a statute that met objections and constitutional requirements, as articulated by the majority over the objections of the four horsemen. Although most constitutional law scholars seem not to have noticed, the majority opinion in *Panama Refining* and especially *Schechter Poultry* gave Congress an explicit and detailed roadmap for how to construct a scheme of administrative process that would satisfy its demands. And it was not a coincidence that these demands were particularly focused on the fidelity of agencies to administrative procedures that met both Congress's and the judiciary's strategic interests and needs.

1. Administrative politics and the origins of the NLRA

Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also known as the Wagner Act,¹⁶⁷ in 1935, in part to stem a rising tide of industrial violence of the 1930s. The NLRA was the final step in a series of efforts made in the wake of NIRA-inspired unrest to improve and make permanent a set of institutions to foster the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. The new bill drew on the failures of the previous incarnations of the law.¹⁶⁸

The NLRA succeeded where prior attempts had failed because it went beyond earlier legislation in five ways: (1) It defined a number of unfair labor practices that by nature interfered with the meaningful enjoyment of the organizing and bargaining rights created in the law, imposing clear and uncontestable constraints on employers; (2) it provided a Board-controlled process for election of union representatives, effectively constraining employees as well; (3) it provided the NLRB with the power and independence necessary for effective enforcement of those constraints upon both workers and their employers; (4) it cleared up lines of authority so the president could not intervene on an ad hoc basis; and the NLRB did not depend, as did its predecessors, on other organizations for enforcement; and (5) it created a regulatory process that the Supreme Court held constitutional and hence legally binding on employers. The last two accomplishments represent part of the

167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935).

168. *See id.*

basis for the development of administrative law that transforms the right of open access into a reality.

To summarize our argument: the NIRA asserted various labor rights to organize, but failed to create an effective set of either administrative structures or processes to enforce them:

- NIRA provided no clear mandate, command structure, or process to create rules and precedents with which to regulate union activity and labor-firm bargaining. For example, it failed to define adequately the type of acceptable organizations designed to represent union members and created no process or substance by which a firm could be found not in compliance with the law.
- Unclear lines of authority created bureaucratic and administrative problems: The law required that the NLB rely on the NRA and the Department of Justice for enforcement, each of which had their own priorities that conflicted with those of the NLRB.
- President Roosevelt intervened in ad hoc ways inconsistent with the NRA.
- The constitutional status of the law and hence NLB regulations remained uncertain, affording employers the ability to delay and resist NLRB authority.

In the face of this confusion, the absence of clear constitutionality, and the inability of the government to enforce the rules, employers resisted labor regulation at every turn. As noted, this disparity between promise and actuality in the context of the Depression generated unprecedented labor unrest.

The NLRA resolved each of these problems. It granted the NLRB a substantially clearer mandate and effective structure and process. The Act clarified lines of authority. It also gave the Board the direct ability to enforce its rulings without relying on other organizations, including subpoena powers. By making the NLRB the sole legal authority in its area, the Act also removed the ability of the president to intervene within the agency's jurisdiction. In stark contrast to the 1933 legislation, the Act was consciously designed to maximize the likelihood that the Supreme Court would find it constitutional. Finally, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the NLRA's constitutionality led to enforcement of the Act, employer compliance, and an end to violence associated with labor.

The NLRA was the culmination of several decades of legal innovation—innovation that is largely responsible for contemporary public law jurisprudence. Politics were an undeniable component of the eventual finding of New Deal laws as constitutional beginning in 1937. But the traditional account of the New Deal constitutional controversies over-emphasizes politics and under-emphasizes the role of the development of doctrine and the necessary inventions in the technology of administrative delegation. The standard wisdom is that after FDR threatened to pack the court, Justice Roberts made his famous “switch in time,” and the Justices acquiesced to his New Deal legislation. Although a caricature, this brief summary of the standard wisdom in constitutional law case books captures their essence.

We argue that a far more complex and interesting story hides in legal doctrine. The NLRA was a clear and direct attempt to respond to concerns about the New Deal’s constitutionality as articulated by the Court in the early New Deal cases. By doing so, Congress invented new structures and processes that the Court would hold in *Jones & Laughlin* as satisfying constitutional restrictions. We assert that Congress and the Court engaged in a dialogue concerning issues of delegation, political control, oversight, and the means of ensuring rights of due process. By trying new structures and processes and having them, at times, struck down and, at times, upheld, Congress and the Court jointly created a major expansion of administrative law.

2. To the Supreme Court

The NLRA drafters’ attention to the New Deal precedent and concerted effort to address the Court’s concerns paid off. In *Jones & Laughlin Steel v. NLRB*,¹⁶⁹ holding the Wagner Act constitutional, the Court acknowledged that Congress had fixed the delegation issue under the NIRA. After declaring that the *Schechter Poultry* case is “not controlling here,” the Court goes on to find that,

The Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform. There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The Board must receive evidence and make findings. The findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only

169. *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

when sustained by the court may the order be enforced. Upon that review all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary action in accordance with the well settled rules applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the enforcement of valid legislation.¹⁷⁰

Furthermore, the Court declared that the Act properly defines and delineates the scope of the Board's authority:

We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and invoked in this instance, is found in section 10(a) [29 U.S.C.A. 160(a)], which provides:

"Sec. 10(a). The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8 [section 158]) affecting commerce."

The critical words of this provision, prescribing the limits of the Board's authority in dealing with the labor practices, are "affecting commerce." The act specifically defines the "commerce" to which it refers (section 2(6), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(6)) . . .¹⁷¹

By contrast, the NIRA (1) delegated authority without sufficient definition of terms or limits on authority; (2) delegated regulatory authority to private groups; (3) paid little attention to legal decisions about existing legislation with which the New Deal legislation interacted; and (4) made few provisions to ensure respect for rights of due process. Therefore, the Court ruled it unconstitutional. However, the Wagner Act sought to remedy these defects; it (1) delegated authority with sufficient definitions of terms and limits on authority; (2) delegated authority to the National Labor Relations Board, a government administrative agency; (3) responded to concerns expressed by the Court in previous New Deal cases and modeled the administrative schema on an existing and established agency; and (4) ensured due process rights through delineating the processes through which the agency

170. *Id.* at 41, 47.

171. *Id.* at 30-31.

was to exercise its authority. It learned from the Court's previous decisions and when drafting the NLRA, Wagner and his writers placed the new agency comfortably within constitutional bounds.

3. *Jones and the interbranch dialogue*

Why did the Court seemingly move in a much more sympathetic direction toward the New Deal Congress's agenda in *Jones & Laughlin*? Barry Friedman sees this turn as a sharp one, viewing the Court in *Jones & Laughlin* as "flat out overturn[ing] the doctrines that it previously had used to strike down New Deal legislation, abdicating virtually all responsibility to patrol economic legislation for its consistency with the Constitution."¹⁷² For G. Edward White, this reflects mainly a shift from separation of powers to Commerce Clause concerns. But this still prompts the question of why.¹⁷³ In a somewhat similar vein, Barry Cushman points out the different doctrinal issues that were at play in these cases.¹⁷⁴ Cushman argues that the early laws were hastily written, often without justification; they were poorly crafted. Further, the quality of the people involved was low.¹⁷⁵ Both crafting and quality were much higher, he argues, for the drafting of the acts associated with the later New Deal cases, including the NLRA and the Social Security Act.¹⁷⁶

These suggestions point to externalist explanations for the difference.¹⁷⁷ A more compelling account is that Congress had

172. See FRIEDMAN, *supra* note 86, at 234.

173. See WHITE, *supra* note 1, at 111–13.

174. See CUSHMAN, *supra* note 1, at 37.

175. See *id.*

176. "The drafters of the Wagner Act, by contrast, framed its provisions with both eyes firmly fixed on contemporary constitutional doctrine." *Id.* at 38. Cushman says the same holds for the Social Security Act. *Id.*

177. Ho & Quinn, *supra* note 12, provide some of the most unique evidence about the externalist explanation. Taking January 1937 as a dividing point, they show that Justice Roberts's voting on cases before this dividing point is statistically different from his voting afterward. *Id.* at 72. As they observe, this pattern is what the traditional approach predicts — the essence of the switch in time that saved nine. Unfortunately, their analysis has an assumption wired in, which, while not undermining the empirics, affects the question of whether the externalist explanation is the most plausible: they assume that the cases reaching the Supreme Court are the same before and after January 1937. This assumption builds into the analysis the central element of the controversy: traditionalists see cases as New Deal cases, as if all were alike. Cushman contests this claim, as does Ernst, albeit more equivocally. And, indeed, that the cases are different is the essence of the internalist claim.

adapted by 1937 to the Court's directions about how best to configure a statute that would meet constitutional scrutiny.¹⁷⁸

As Katznelson surveys this dialogue between the Court and Congress, he remarks:

After the Hundred Days, congressional forms of dispute, debate, and decision survived and thrived. . . . In all, the central place of Congress was maintained. Even more, the crucial lawmaking role that it undertook offered a practical answer to critics who thought the days of legislative institutions had passed.¹⁷⁹

Congress learned well the lessons imparted by the Supreme Court in the NIRA cases. As a result, the blockbuster statutes enacted later in the New Deal, especially the NLRA and securities acts,¹⁸⁰ represented a new model of regulatory legislation. It synthesized the administrative and constitutional law and devised a means by which an agency focused on novel problems might accomplish a series of desired ends, including ending a century of violence surrounding labor organization that at times seemed unsolvable.¹⁸¹ These statutes represent a major innovation in regulatory administration in administrative law. What was so truly innovative in these statutes? Several key elements, each exemplars of the modern regulatory state¹⁸²:

Indeed, the main alternative hypothesis is the idea that the New Dealers adapted their legislation to the concerns of the Supreme Court, hence, as we and others argue, legislation was not the same across the New Deal. Furthermore, the chief moment dividing the two periods is the NLRA, producing the very court case of the *Ho* and *Quinn* dividing line, *Jones & Laughlin Steel* in 1937. Hence their method does not test whether the New Deal cases before the Supreme Court evolved in a way that made them more acceptable to a majority of the Court.

178. The connection between the Court's "how-to" analysis and the structure of the NLRA, SSA, and new AAA was noticed by commentators at the time. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, *supra* note 148; Stern, *supra* note 109.

179. KATZNELSON, *supra* note 90, at 125.

180. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, *Securities Law and the New Deal Justices*, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009); Barry Cushman, *The Securities Laws and the Mechanics of Legal Change*, 95 VA. L. REV. 927 (2009).

181. See Margaret Levi, Tania Melo, Barry R. Weingast & Frances Zlotnick, *Opening Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Business, Government, & the National Labor Relations Act*, in ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT 331 (Naomi Lamoreaux & John Wallis eds., 2017).

182. See, e.g., JAFFE, *supra* note 32, at 320–21 ("[A] delegation of power [to administrative agencies] implies some limit [and] the availability of judicial review is, in our system and under our tradition, the necessary premise of legal validity."); VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 43 (contending that "[t]he administrative state is entirely the product of the constitutional

- The legislation does not delegate the choice of policy goals to an agency. Instead, the legislation defines the policy goals of the agency; the agency is to implement policies chosen by Congress, not delegating authority to the private sector nor leaving to the agency the essential prerogatives to choose those goals;
- The legislation requires findings before making decisions, including the issuance of regulations;
- Related to this, agency decisions must be made on the basis of evidence;
- That the agency provide substantial evidence;
- The agency can appeal only to evidence presented as part of the proceeding;
- Standard procedures in circumstance in which an agency was developing a regulation includes (a) the announcement of a proposed regulation, with (b) an opportunity for interested persons to comment, and (c) an explanation of why this rule is appropriate;
- Other requirements arose in instances when an agency sought a formal proceeding.

The traditional administrative law instinct is to see these familiar requirements as emerging from the APA in 1946. However, these key elements of regulation were in fact hardwired directly into the later New Deal statutes; and they were reinforced in key, early Supreme Court decisions involving administrative decision-making.¹⁸³ The APA was not created out of whole cloth from nowhere; rather, it emerged from a developing body of

institutions of 1789” and that administrative agencies are constrained by “relevant constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments”); Thomas W. Merrill, *Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law*, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 939 (2011) (“American administrative law is grounded in a conception of the relationship between reviewing courts and agencies modeled on the relationship between appeals courts and trial courts in civil litigation.”).

183. See, e.g., *SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I)*, 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (holding that if an agency “action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law”).

administrative law and a new model of regulatory administration embodied in the NLRA and other later New Deal statutes.¹⁸⁴

F. Agencies, Adjudication, and Fidelity to Fair Procedure: The Seeds of the New Administrative Law

In *Crowell*,¹⁸⁵ the Supreme Court confirmed administrative agency power to find facts so long as these findings were supported by the weight of evidence. In doing so, the Court settled an important issue that had been in doubt after its decision in *Ben Avon*, that is, the agency's latitude to exercise discretion. To be sure, this power was not unqualified. In addition to requiring that the decision be based on sufficient evidence, the Court demanded that an Article III court exercise its supervisory role by deciding questions of law de novo.¹⁸⁶

The central lesson of *Crowell* was reinforced in cases decided later in the New Deal. The Court's opinion in *St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States* (1936),¹⁸⁷ made clear that agencies were to be given latitude under the rubric of the relevant statute to determine facts (and, here, to set rates) and, second, that courts were given the responsibility to make determinations about so-called constitutional facts. In addition, agencies should adhere to administrative procedures that ensured that agency decisions would be supported by evidence, and, so long as this happened, courts would give substantial weight to the agencies' findings.¹⁸⁸

St. Joseph Stock Yards is an important doctrinal statement and one which evinces the political accommodation that the Court was determined to implement as the New Deal emerged through a steady stream of legislation.¹⁸⁹ It elaborates on the principle so

184. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, *The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act*, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Shepherd, *supra* note 21.

185. *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).

186. See *id.* at 27; see also VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 23–30; Mark Tushnet, *The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State*, in *FEDERAL COURTS STORIES* (V. Jackson & J. Resnik eds., 2010); Richard Fallon, *Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988).

187. *St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States*, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).

188. *Id.* at 50–53.

189. In his extended discussion of the *St. Joseph Stock Yards* case, Mark Tushnet contrasts what he views as a formalistic approach to the judicial-agency relationship and the legal realism of Justice Louis Brandeis, as reflected in his concurring opinion here.

critical to the emerging administrative law that agency discretion must be carried out consistent with sound administrative procedures, procedures established by Congress and enforced by the courts. And, interestingly, the doctrinal statement goes a step further than *Crowell* in instructing courts to acknowledge agency expertise by giving significant weight to agency findings.

In a series of cases beginning in 1936 and continuing for another five years, the Court considered the performance of the bureaucracy in the context of agricultural ratemaking. The principal claim in the first of the four *Morgan* cases, argued in 1935 and decided in 1936, was that the Secretary of Agriculture failed to give the party a “full hearing.” The Court agreed that this full hearing must be before the Secretary, as he was the one with the final decision, or at least there needed to be adequate evidence that he had reviewed the evidence and the briefs.¹⁹⁰ This issue continued into the second *Morgan* case, decided in 1938. There, Chief Justice Hughes emphasized in oral argument and in the final opinion the essential role of adequate administrative procedure. A hearing within the meaning of administrative law required that parties have “a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.”¹⁹¹ Hughes’s opinion was a veritable brief in favor of maintaining “proper standards” in hearings in order to assure that the parties are treated fairly.

The *Morgan* cases, particularly the first two, reflect a Court concerned to maintain reasonable agency procedures. It bears the

See Tushnet, *supra* note 1, at 1598–1602 (“Hughes’s analysis . . . looked backward to a legal world in which, as Brandeis put it, ‘rigid rules’ governed in an on-or-off fashion . . .”). We do not see this in the same way. Hughes was negotiating an accommodation of interest both within his Court, a Court that had recently invalidated big chunks of the NIRA and the AAA, and one which had before it cases, such as the *Morgan* cases discussed at text accompanying notes 190–194, and was faced with another case involving the exercising of administrative power. Moreover, his extended discussion of the role and function of administrative agencies in a comprehensive statute that gave the agency elaborate procedures to follow in order to support an agency decision, was functional in a way that progressive advocates of the New Deal agency would recognize and appreciate. Hughes recognizes, as Tushnet puts it, “imperfections in agencies,” along with imperfections in courts. Tushnet, *supra* note 1, at 1602. In going a step further than in *Crowell* in acknowledging that a reviewing court would give weight to the agency’s view of the legal issues at stake—or, at the very least, the application of law to facts—Chief Justice Hughes was taking a more functional tack. What Tushnet views as formalism, we view as a scrupulous effort to recognize and implement an appropriate political accommodation.

190. *Morgan v. United States (Morgan I)*, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).

191. *Morgan v. United States (Morgan II)*, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).

strong imprint of a judiciary worried that procedural due process would not be met except if and insofar as agencies would follow the procedures spelled out in the statutes, with an interpretation that would implement this “fair play” notion of agency adjudication. As in *Crowell* and *St. Joseph Stockyards*, the Court was not dealing with New Deal administrative agencies. However, Chief Justice Hughes’s mention of “these multiplying agencies” made clear that he had firmly in mind the emerging functions of the New Deal bureaucracy.¹⁹² The Court was effective in preserving its own significant prerogatives, not only with respect to judicial review of agency findings of jurisdictional and constitutional fact but also ensuring that agencies were meeting, as Hughes put it, “those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process.”¹⁹³ The Court’s view of due process permeated throughout much of the national governmental policymaking process, not just agencies that would, a decade later, become subject to the APA. Ernst summarizes well the political accommodation underlying the Court’s approach when he writes: “Americans decided they could avoid Tocqueville’s nightmare if administration approximated the structure, procedures, and logic of the judiciary.”¹⁹⁴

These cases receive attention by administrative law scholars as important examples of the Court’s acceptance of administrative agency authority in adjudication and, with it, the steady displacement of the judiciary-centric, common law quality of administrative decision-making championed by Freund, Frankfurter, Landis, and others.¹⁹⁵ Yet, few see these cases as critical to New Deal constitutionalism or as part of an omnibus, purposive approach of the Supreme Court. We do see these cases as fitting into the general story of political and legal accommodation. Specifically, the Court was willing to permit agencies to function

192. *Id.* at 22.

193. *Id.* at 19.

194. ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 5. These decisions involving agency decision-making illustrate well the political accommodation accomplished by the Supreme Court during this critical New Deal period. As Professor Ernst describes it: “Judicializing administrative procedure also addressed the interests of two vitally interested groups. Lawyers found that expertise acquired in courts remained valuable in the new administrative state. Professional politicians realized that due process kept executives from using administrative decisions as their own form of individually targeted patronage.” *Id.* at 142.

195. *See generally* Vermeule, *supra* note 2.

with broad powers so long as Congress had placed sufficient bounds on the delegation, the agencies were acting consistent with the terms of legislative delegation, and the procedures provided by Congress were adequate to keep agencies within their proper lanes.¹⁹⁶ Hughes, writing for the Court in the *Morgan* cases, emphasized the importance of fair play; and in *Crowell* and *St. Joseph Stockyards*, he noted the value of expertise, exercised in accordance with procedures that were conspicuously court-like (“hearings,” “evidence”). Viewed against the background of the seminal early New Deal delegation cases, including *Panama Refining*, *Schechter Poultry*, and *Carter Coal*, these administrative adjudication decisions illustrate the Court’s embrace of congressional objectives, objectives which included widening the sphere of administrative power and discretion, so long as agencies had standards to guide their discretion and appropriate procedures to maintain fair process and fidelity to the rule of law. Equally, elected officials embraced the procedural standards advocated by the courts as part of the price of constitutional sanction of New Deal legislation.

The Court’s insistence on fair play and due process norms also animated its decision in *Chenery*,¹⁹⁷ decided in 1943. In *Chenery*, the Court considered an order of the SEC under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.¹⁹⁸ The Court read this statute, and the administrative process that it constructed, as requiring the agency to base its order on the grounds upon which the record discloses that the agency’s action was based.¹⁹⁹ This was required, announced Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the Court, by “the orderly functioning of the process of review.”²⁰⁰ The problem here was not at all with the nature and scope of the agency’s powers – as Frankfurter puts it, “we are not imposing any trammels on [the agency’s] powers” – but with the exercise of administrative

196. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, *Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform*, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 987 (1982) (“The principal concern of administrative law since the New Deal, in short, has been to develop surrogate safeguards for the original protection afforded by separation of powers and electoral accountability.”).

197. SEC v. *Chenery Corp.* (*Chenery I*), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).

198. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 5, 49 Stat. 803, *repealed by* Energy Policy Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 594.

199. *Chenery I*, 318 U.S. at 94–95.

200. *Id.* at 94.

discretion and, more to the point, by the agency's failure to engage in appropriate procedures.²⁰¹

In the second *Chenery* case, decided four years later, the Court went to some length to make clear that agencies' discretion and prerogative was to be safeguarded by the Court.²⁰² In a holding that would become blackletter administrative law, the Court said that the agency could proceed through an ad hoc (adjudicatory) decision rather than a general rule.²⁰³ And this judgment, Justice Murphy concluded in his opinion for the Court, "is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts."²⁰⁴ It is, in short, an example of a judgment that "justifies the use of the administrative process."²⁰⁵

In essence, the Court in *Crowell* and cases decided in the years afterward was providing a how-to manual for administrative agencies,²⁰⁶ this in parallel with its how-to manual for Congress to follow in establishing the appropriate delegation of administrative authority. Both elements are important, for they make clear what the Court expects from administrative governance, one focused carefully on choices made by Congress in statutory enactments and the other focused on Congress also, but in the context of agency decisions and the requirements they must meet to withstand scrutiny.

201. *Id.* at 95.

202. SEC v. *Chenery Corp.* (*Chenery II*), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

203. *Id.* at 199–200.

204. *Id.* at 209.

205. *Id.*

206. Professor Kevin Stack insists that *Chenery II* can best be understood as a decision whose linchpin—that is, the requirement that agencies engage in reasoned decision-making—is connected to the conditions for a suitable delegation under the Court's nondelegation doctrine. Kevin M. Stack, *The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery*, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 981–92 (2007) ("[T]he nondelegation doctrine provides a basis for courts to read the *Chenery* principle, at least as a default rule of statutory construction, into delegations of authority to act with the force of law."). We agree with Professor Vermeule that this stretches the analogy between a constitutional doctrine dealing with legislative power and an edict about fair and reasonable administrative power, an edict not grounded in constitutional rules. See VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 199. Nonetheless, the basic logic behind these two doctrines have this in common: they are designed to limit the scope of agency discretion and therefore navigate between a strong Progressive vision of agency independence on the one hand and a more circumscribed function for agencies on the other. In this respect, they illustrate well the political and legal accommodation reached during this key area in American regulatory history.

It is important, too, to see the way in which these holdings provided a doctrinal diving board of sorts for a vision of administrative agency deference, one that would take hold in the years following *Crowell*²⁰⁷ and after the enactment of the APA in 1946.²⁰⁸ In his analysis of the administrative state evolving after *Crowell*, Vermeule sees this as an inevitable part of the arc toward deference, one whose seeds were planted in *Crowell*'s unstable compromise between authority and restriction, between a robust role for agencies and a protective role of courts.²⁰⁹ In a chapter section labeled "The Collapse of *Crowell*," Vermeule notes the ways in which the Court's insistence on a strong judicial role, and the rest of what he calls the Hughes synthesis, has been abandoned.²¹⁰ While there is much wisdom in these claims, it is too forward-looking in that it takes a number of major post-New Deal developments, including the Court's major decisions in *Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council*²¹¹ a half century later and the expanded use of administrative rulemaking in the 1960s and thereafter, as evidence that the citadel was shaky at its origin. In contrast, viewed in the context of the problem needing to be solved in the New Deal period and the decade afterward, the cases beginning with *Crowell* and continuing through *St. Joseph Stockyards*, *Chenery*, the *Morgan* cases, the agency statutory interpretation cases including *Skidmore*,²¹² *Gray*,²¹³ and *Hearst*,²¹⁴ and even *Universal Camera*, decided five years after the enactment of the APA, are examples of a Court grappling with administrative

207. This period after 1937, with its settlement of the major conflicts over congressional and administrative power, and before the 1960s, when social regulation and new administrative governance came to the center of the stage, has been somewhat neglected by scholars. Important recent work that trains a studied spotlight on administrative constitutionalism and administrative law in this post-New Deal period includes JOANNA GRISINGER, *THE UNWIELDY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL* (2014); Reuel E. Schiller, *The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and Administration in Postwar America*, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 415 (2008). For broader historical analyses of the period, see, for example, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, *AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY* (2002); KALMAN, *supra* note 2.

208. See McNollgast, *supra* note 184.

209. VERMEULE, *supra* note 10, at 24–37.

210. *Id.* at 34.

211. *Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

212. *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

213. *Gray v. Powell*, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).

214. *NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc.*, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).

power and with the concern that agencies with wide decision-making discretion would result in poor, unfair administrative action. This synthesis emerging from *Crowell* was indeed influential, and, at least for a time, reflected well the balance struck by the Court in the area of regulatory administration.

To be sure, this balance would be tested in the years after the APA's enactment. The history of modern administrative law, defining modern to include the eighty years after the New Deal and this judicial imprimatur on administrative power, reveals this tension in a myriad of decisions and their consequences. In future work, we will examine these developments. Spoiler alert: much of this jurisprudence illustrates the continuing judicial-legislative dialogue and the importance of accommodating the interests and objectives of both branches.²¹⁵

The Court's holdings in these two clusters of constitutional cases, one involving nondelegation and the other involving the proper scope of agency adjudication, not only effectuate a political accommodation which ensures the viability and vitality of the New Deal administrative state, but they also presage decades of administrative law. The administrative law which emerges from the New Deal, and is reflected in lodestar cases such as *Crowell*, the *Morgan* cases, and *Chenery*, points to a new, important dialogue between the federal courts and administrative agencies. This dialogue carries forward the project of tethering the bureaucracy to the rule of law and to congressional policy, all the more so as circumstances changed over the post WWII era. The enactment of the APA, coming just a decade after Roosevelt's reelection and the Second New Deal, reveals this promise; and so, too, does a series of critically important early administrative law cases, such as *Skidmore v. Swift* and *Universal Camera*. We leave to future work a close examination of how these strands of administrative law grow out of this New Deal political accommodation.

G. An Accommodation of Interests

By way of summary, we have considered in context how and why Congress sought to meet its three key objectives, that is,

215. See generally GRISINGER, *supra* note 207; Sophia Z. Lee, *Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the Present*, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1733-44 (2019).

exercising broader national power to deal with the imperative of market integration, delegating policy implementation to regulatory agencies in order to carry out a legislative mission, and, finally, designing appropriate regulatory instruments to ensure that agencies would implement congressional policy choices that would stick.

We see a dialogue and bargaining between the Supreme Court and political officials over the technology of administration. The early New Deal legislation was hastily written and paid inadequate—indeed, in some cases, no—attention to designing agencies in a manner consistent with previous constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court. Consistent with both this view and the traditional scholarly view, the Supreme Court rejected many of these laws, including the flagship NIRA. But the Supreme Court further outlined not just the defects in the inadequate structure and process of the legislation, it also explained the structure and process necessary for regulatory laws to be constitutional. These cases led New Dealers to search for commonalities in the successful regulatory legislation delegating power to agencies.²¹⁶

216. There is a way to put this thesis in more conventionally PPT terms. The logic is as follows: The conventional approaches to these issues fails to make the key distinction between the coalition on the Court against the New Deal and the pivot. It may well be that the four horsemen on the Court were so abidingly hostile to the New Deal that no legislation delegating authority to agencies would satisfy them. In particular, despite the how-to aspects of the key anti-New Deal decisions, they would not support legislation reflecting those principles. But, as non-pivotal coalition members in a 5-4 environment, their views do not matter. Instead, the key is Roberts as the universally acknowledged swing voter. As swing voter, the critical decisions in *Panama Refining* and *Schechter Poultry* were likely to reflect his views.

This view implies that, were Congress to pass legislation consistent with the how-to strictures, a decisive majority of 5-4 (Hughes and Roberts plus the three dissenters in the anti-New Deal cases) would approve the legislation. This is exactly what happened in *Jones & Laughlin Steel*. The majority approving the NLRA in 1935 has generally been interpreted through the lens of the political story and its emphasis on the “switch in time.” Doubtless this account has important insights into the Supreme Court’s treatment of New Deal legislation beginning in January of 1937, especially with respect to the Commerce Clause, which the four horsemen took as a strict, binding constraint on congressional legislation. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this holds with respect to the decision about the NLRA, which follows the blueprint and hence the Court’s—read, pivotal coalition members, Justices Hughes and Roberts’s—implicit bargaining offer to accept legislation that followed the blueprint. As Cushman suggests, the issues before the Court, Justices Hughes and Roberts in particular, in 1937 in *Jones & Laughlin Steel* materially differed from those facing Roberts and the Court in 1935 in *Panama Refining* and *Schechter Poultry*. Cushman, *supra* note 1, at 37-38.

Recalling the standard narratives of constitutional law in this era, the traditional externalist account of the New Deal-era stresses Congress's interests (along with the President's) and sees the story as one of the Liberal Democratic agenda pushed by the President and Congress vanquishing their foes thanks to threats of court-packing and impactful carrots and sticks. So, naturally, this theory focuses on the Congress side of the ledger and sees the matter as one of conquest rather than accommodation. The externalist perspective also sees the constitutional controversy as a zero-sum game with only one winner: the recalcitrant Court or FDR and the New Deal. This assumption then structures the case-by-case analysis trying to read each new case, beginning with *Blaisdell*²¹⁷ and *Nebbia*,²¹⁸ as evidence for the Court's ultimate judgment. The internalist perspective dwells principally on the courts and sees the matter as one of the Supreme Court sticking to its doctrinal guns and crafting constitutional rules which first restrict and then later empower Congress to carry out its regulatory in the form designed by the political branches. Viewed in this light, the only real accommodation is Congress's to the courts, that is, the imperative that Congress have fidelity to legal doctrine, doctrine decided by judges more or less following The Law.

Revisionists, such as Cushman, Ernst, and White, point in a different direction, much of which is guided by the internalist direction: the nature of legislation and doctrine produced by the New Deal evolved in a manner sought by the courts.

By contrast to these narratives, and building on the revisionists' observations, we argue that Congress and the courts worked purposively to reach an accommodation of interests and of strategies, one which would ensure that Congress could implement its objectives consistent with the needs of this emerging national economy while likewise ensuring the judiciary's interests would be ensured. Significantly, both institutions achieved a major portion of their goals over the course of FDR's first term in initiating the accommodation (counting the *Jones & Laughlin Steel* in January of 1937 as technically still part of FDR's first term, which then ended in March of 1937). Congress succeeded in creating novel, workable regulatory instruments, ones that would enable its legislative

217. *Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell*, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

218. *Nebbia v. New York*, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

objectives to flourish. Moreover, they well understood that the processes of regulatory administration and the performance of agencies would be an iterative process and that strategies of oversight and control would be dynamic and remain so.

In our view, the constitutional controversy was not a zero-sum game, but positive sum. Led by the Supreme Court, the judiciary got what it wanted in two important respects: First, the justices succeeded in creating a template for proper delegation through a how-to manual of sorts. Our discussion above of the NIRA and NLRA cases examined this template in detail. And, second, the Justices were able to create a politically acceptable rubric for checking and balancing administrative and legislative power and also ensuring that judicial power and prerogative would be respected, this through the imaginative configuration of a new administrative law. Indeed, administrative law is the neglected part of this big story of the New Deal synthesis. The Court made clear in a number of cases during and soon after the New Deal that agency decision-making would need to follow guidelines of procedural regularity and rationality. True, the contours of these requirements would be worked out over the course of the next four decades of administrative law, culminating in key “hard look” era cases of the 1970s and 80s.²¹⁹ But the New Deal-era cases were critical in forging a scheme of delegation, regulatory discretion, and judicial control.

The success of the courts in fashioning the process and limits on the administrative process did not come at the expense of Congress and the President, as the zero-sum traditional externalist perspective holds. Instead, Congress—especially in drafting the NLRA—demonstrated that it could create a powerful new regulatory agency to achieve desired political ends in an administrative system allowing congressional, not judicial, determination of policy ends.

With respect to the commerce power under the Constitution, we see how the Court, in cases such as the railroad labor cases of the 1920s, created a doctrine which established the conditions under which Congress could press forward with key efforts to improve market integration and limit the states’ ability to

219. See generally EDLEY, *supra* note 108 (describing “hard look”-era cases).

balkanize commerce.²²⁰ In these developments, the Court acted as a partner with Congress to facilitate a measured response to a predicament of pre-New Deal federalism. At nearly the same time, however, the Court expressed consternation with how Congress was treating businesses affected by strong regulatory authority. In *Ben Avon*, the Court invoked a rationale that presaged the logic of its administrative adjudication decisions and, in particular, the Court's concern that fundamental fairness and a modicum of due process be maintained where agencies asserted power and affected private economic interest.²²¹ The point here is not to valorize these cases from the 1920s, but instead to see them through a positive political theory lens as efforts by the Court to empower Congress while also establishing limits on the tactics and techniques used by Congress to guide agency decision-making.

We see from the Court's approach to the Commerce Clause how Congress adapted in developing new regulatory legislation. And, likewise, we see how Congress developed regulatory structures and procedures to meet the Court's concerns with adjudicatory fairness and administrative discretion. Much of the dynamic work of both Congress and the courts during this era could be characterized as experimental; that is, Congress was trying out new strategies and the Court was developing new doctrines. Commerce Clause jurisprudence gets a spotlight in the New Deal and post-New Deal era as the Court decides lodestar cases establishing a structure that shapes and importantly broadens national power to deal with a specialized and increasingly integrated economy. From the heyday of the Progressive Era, and its creation of the first major national regulatory agencies, and through the initial depths of the Depression and up to the New Deal, the Court had been fashioning doctrine about regulation. Yet, constitutional law scholars too often neglect the doctrine in the modern constitutional canon, even though it is critically important in understanding these experiments and how the two branches shape the interests of each other.

We should not lose sight of the big picture. All three branches of the national government were working through difficult matters

220. This state holds in particular for railway labor legislation, including the National Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456, and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577.

221. See *Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough*, 253 U.S. 287, 290-91 (1920).

of constitutional theory. The issues were political, to be sure, but the struggle was not purely about politics. Legislators and judges, in order to develop structures and strategies that would take root, needed to figure out the proper place of regulatory administration in a scheme of constitutional government that insisted upon the separation of powers and worried about administrative discretion—in its rationale, its shape, and ultimately its impact on the well-being of individuals and industry. The fundamental challenge was how to square new technologies of governance with our embedded commitment to the rule of law and democracy. And the mounting of this challenge required a dynamic interaction between two critically important, and also willful, institutions of the national government.

We view these key political episodes, unfolding over the course of a dozen years or so, from the beginning of the New Deal and up to the enactment of the APA, as revealing a significant accommodation—a political accommodation—between these two branches of government. The trials and tribulations of Congress and the Court during this tough period of American regulatory history yielded an accommodation—in game theoretic terms, an equilibrium—that ensured that the New Deal agency and the modern administrative state would become more or less entrenched. Moreover, it would be, at least from the perspective of Congress and the courts, successful, meaning it allowed the Congress and the President to meet the demands of a complex, integrated economy, as they saw it, and also the demands of fairness and rationality in administrative agency decision-making and therefore one embodiment of the rule of law extended to cover agency policymaking.

CONCLUSION

“[T]he American administrative state has been neither Tocqueville’s nightmare nor Vedder’s Good Administration. Its twentieth-century creators did not let the risk of misgovernment keep them from expanding the state to make life better, and they were not fooled by a vision of apolitical expertise into thinking that government would control itself. Instead, working under the particular political and professional conditions of their day, they

imaginatively reworked the law they had to create the government they needed."²²²

The New Deal agency resulted from deliberate political strategy, negotiation, and accommodation between elected officials and the Supreme Court. It is the product of a complex process that involves key decisions by purposive legislators, a determined president, and attentive federal judges. Each of these players acted within and through a constitutional framework, including an architecture forged by text, by doctrine, and by institutions that enable and constrain political choice. Too, these officials were embedded in a legal structure, one which consists of barriers made by not only parchment, but by widely shared and understood legal norms and principles.

On FDR's election, neither the shape nor the foundation of the regulatory state was at all clear. This moment was the dawn of administrative law; the APA was many years away still, and its contents were hard to conceive in any meaningful detail in early 1933. The Great Depression and the failures of the laissez-faire capitalism to deal with myriad economic, health, and safety issues forced the president, members of Congress, and also the judiciary to confront a wide range of new regulatory problems for which no adequate administrative structures or principles existed. To be sure, administrative agencies existed—indeed, the quintessential federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was a half century old by the time of the New Deal, and the Federal Trade Commission was two decades old. However, the architecture of regulatory administration was fairly crude, and the existential dilemma of how best to cabin administrative discretion without sacrificing the advantages of the bureaucracy remained elusive. Moreover, the role and function of the courts remained in tension with the New Deal agency model. Administrative agencies were becoming a vital, and steadily enduring, feature of American political life. Yet, there were key issues that remained to be resolved. And the resolution of these issues would require participation—and, ultimately, collaboration—by all three branches of the federal government.

The New Deal agency did not emerge from the head of Zeus, and it did not gain traction through the unmediated efforts of legal

222. ERNST, *supra* note 1, at 146.

scholars who championed broad administrative agency discretion during the New Deal period. Rather, it was constructed by purposive governmental officials, each working to protect their own political interests and developing strategies which would ensure that their goals would be achievable. These efforts yielded a political accommodation that got important regulatory statutes first through Congress and then through the courts. This process was messy and turbulent. Some of the most important legislation of the famous first One Hundred Days—notably, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933²²³—cannot be viewed as anything but a wholly unsatisfactorily model foundation and constitutional administrative statute.²²⁴

Understanding this political accommodation during this key constitutional epoch requires that we understand both the shape of regulatory administration and the impact of law and legal doctrine. The New Deal constitutional controversies were not a zero-sum game in which, as has been insisted upon by many scholars, the Supreme Court caved in 1937 to political pressure. Instead, the New Deal's success reflected the invention of administrative law that satisfied the Supreme Court as to the constitutional requirements of due process while allowing adequate political and policy flexibility for elected officials. With this political accommodation, the elected branches retained control over policy; and the courts retained control over the requirements of due process and decision-making consistent with the rule of law. (For the purposes of our analysis here, we express no opinion about the benefits or costs of this judicial strategy). This political accommodation portends struggles in the post-new Deal period, struggles which ultimately define concretely the modern place of agencies and administrative discretion in a complex republic, a republic simultaneously committed to effective social and economic policy and to the rule of law.

223. The National Industrial Recovery Act was the most far reaching of the several initiatives crafted quickly by the 80th Congress in this First Hundred Days. Indeed, Roosevelt stated that “[h]istory will probably record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and far-reaching Legislation ever created by the American Congress.” NATHAN MILLER, *F.D.R.: AN INTIMATE HISTORY* 318 (1991).

224. See, e.g., KATZNELSON, *supra* note 90, at 8 (explaining that during the New Deal era, “[n]o decisions could be made that were not influenced by practical and moral compromise”).

We know that the story does not end with *Jones & Laughlin Steel* and, a decade later, the enactment of the APA. Agencies acted in important ways in the next several decades. Some of these actions reveal the ways in which administrative officials push the envelope of congressional choice. So, for example, James Landis expresses doubts by the beginning of the 1960s, manifest in his famous report to President Kennedy, about how agencies are functioning.²²⁵ Early public choice theory alerts us to the interest group-fueled wealth transfers and “budget maximizing” bureaus. Congress responds in large part to these actions by enacting more prolix statutes, statutes which create even more elaborate procedures to guide agency decision-making within their jurisdiction. But struggles persist about how best to negotiate among willful agencies, political brokers, and legal standards.²²⁶ The courts get into this struggle in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s under their APA authority to review informal rulemaking (by then the modal device for making regulatory policy). The focus shifts from the Supreme Court, which, save for a few key interventions (e.g., *Overton Park*,²²⁷ *State Farm*,²²⁸ *Vermont Yankee*,²²⁹ *Chevron*²³⁰), leaves the lion’s share of the matters governing administrative action to the lower federal courts. In later work, we will look at these developments, and also some of the leading scholarly works on the emergence and evolution of modern administrative law, arriving at a conclusion consistent with our basic thesis, and that is that Congress and the courts reach a political accommodation among competing interests.

225. See the extended discussion in THOMAS K. MCCRAW, *PROPHETS OF REGULATION* 206–08 (1984).

226. See generally Richard B. Stewart, *The Reformation of American Administrative Law*, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).

227. *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

228. *Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

229. *Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

230. *Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).