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Bill of Rights Nondelegation

Eli Nachmany*

Speculation about the “revival” of the nondelegation doctrine has reached a fever pitch. Although the Supreme Court apparently has not applied the nondelegation doctrine to declare a federal statute unconstitutional since 1935, the doctrine may be making a comeback. The common understanding is that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from “delegating” legislative power to the executive branch. While the nondelegation doctrine may appear to be about limiting Congress, its ultimate target is delegation. But if the nondelegation doctrine is about policing delegation, then the Court has been regularly—and rigorously—applying the doctrine in a different context: In litigation concerning various provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Court has enforced a nondelegation principle to constrain the delegation of unfettered discretion to the executive.

The uncovering of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the Court has been actively applying some form of nondelegation for many years. Recognizing a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine could have important implications for Bill of Rights jurisprudence writ large. Further, understanding the “Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine” as a coherent line of cases separate from what this Article calls the “Article I nondelegation doctrine” helps to clarify the connection that some have pointed out between the nondelegation principle and certain parts of the Bill of Rights. From the First and Second

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Amendments to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine prevents the delegation of unfettered discretion when enumerated rights are at stake.

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INTRODUCTION

The familiar conception of the nondelegation doctrine is something like the following: Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to the executive branch. In practice, if Congress passes a statute that would permit the executive to exercise legislative power in carrying out the law, a court applying the nondelegation doctrine would declare the offending statutory provision unconstitutional. Scholars and jurists disagree on whether the nondelegation doctrine is consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, serves constitutional values, or even exists. The debates rage on. But against the backdrop of serious scholarly and jurisprudential inquiry into the doctrine’s propriety, all would likely agree that the Supreme Court has signaled its openness in recent years to “reviving” the nondelegation doctrine.

1. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2098–99 (2004). To be sure, the nondelegation doctrine is not only about Congress and the Executive. The nondelegation doctrine also prohibits Congress from delegating legislative power to the judicial branch. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); see also Aaron Nielson, Erie as Nondelegation, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 239, 266 (2011) (noting the focus in the scholarly literature on delegations to the Executive as opposed to delegations to courts).


6. In Gundy v. United States, Justice Gorsuch dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold a sex offender registration statute that had been challenged on nondelegation grounds. The statute—known by the acronym SORNA (Sex Offender Registration and
“Reviving” is in scare quotes for a reason. The belief that application of the nondelegation doctrine constitutes a “revival” proceeds from the view that the Court has not applied it in nearly a century. The traditional understanding of the nondelegation doctrine is that it flows from the Vesting Clause of Article I of the Constitution, preventing Congress from delegating a vested legislative power. To that end, this Article will refer to this version of the nondelegation doctrine as the “Article I nondelegation doctrine.” And the traditional view is correct—the Court has not applied this version of the nondelegation doctrine to hold a statute unconstitutional since 1935. That year, the Court declared the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933—a centerpiece of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda—an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In 2000, Cass Sunstein wrote that “the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).” Over two decades later, one might say that the nondelegation doctrine still has not had another “good year.”

Yet the Court’s Bill of Rights jurisprudence indicates that the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well. In fact, the Court has regularly—and rigorously—applied a form of the nondelegation doctrine.

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7. For an example of the view that application of the nondelegation doctrine would constitute a revival, see, for example, Mike Rappaport, Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine, L. & LIBERTY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://lawliberty.org/reviving-the-nondelegation-doctrine.


doctrine to enforce various provisions of the Bill of Rights. This Article reveals the existence of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. In Bill of Rights litigation, the Court has developed something like a nondelegation doctrine to evaluate whether certain infringements on individual liberty are permissible. Here, the Court disfavors the delegation of discretion.

At bottom, the nondelegation doctrine is about policing delegation. The prohibition on Congress delegating legislative power to the executive is, in fact, a prohibition on Congress delegating to the executive the ability to exercise a kind of discretionary power pursuant to the executive’s own will. Importantly, the Article I nondelegation doctrine is not a substantive limit on Congress’s power; it is a procedural one. Suppose that Congress passes a law that significantly constrains individual liberty, but it sets forth detailed instructions for how the executive is to carry out the law. One might challenge the law on the grounds that Congress has exceeded its own legislative power, but a nondelegation objection would fail. So long as Congress has made the relevant policy choices, it has not delegated legislative power.

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine cuts a similar profile. The Supreme Court’s Bill of Rights jurisprudence has recognized procedural limits on delegation with respect to several amendments. The Court sees the Constitution as allocating power between branches of government, and when certain of the Bill of Rights amendments are at issue, discretion may not be delegated in a way that upsets that allocation. In First Amendment cases, for example, the Court has long taken the view that discretionary permitting regimes for speech are themselves censorious and thus unconstitutional. The Court feels similarly about the Second

11. This Article takes no position on whether the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution.

12. For example, one might challenge an economic regulatory statute on the ground that it exceeds Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States” — one of the substantive legislative powers that the Constitution vests in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Amendment, as its recent decision in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*—and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in the majority’s opinion—demonstrates. But the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is not only about permitting regimes for speech and guns. Fourth Amendment cases concerning the right’s particularity requirement have keyed in on the delegation from courts to the executive that occurs when judges approve warrants that permit police to exercise too much discretion. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment’s (and Fourteenth Amendment’s) void-for-vagueness doctrine—as the Supreme Court has applied it—has prohibited the legislature from delegating penal lawmaking discretion to the executive.

This Article rethinks the conventional wisdom on nondelegation. It reveals the existence of a nondelegation doctrine in a line of cases wholly separate from the Article I doctrine that dominates much of the scholarly literature on nondelegation. The connection between the nondelegation doctrine and discretion is well-known. And some have even drawn the parallel between the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the nondelegation doctrine. But this Article is the first piece of scholarship explicitly tying together—a coherent nondelegation doctrine for the Bill of Rights.

Some caveats are necessary. Most importantly, this Article does not take the position that the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine and the Article I nondelegation doctrine are perfectly analogous.

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14. *Id.* at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (describing New York’s “unusual discretionary licensing regime[]” for granting concealed-carry permits as unconstitutional).

15. *Id.* (describing the “open-ended discretion” that New York licensing officials enjoyed); see also *Id.* at 2123 (majority opinion) (contrasting New York’s regime with those of states in which “authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements” (emphasis added)).


Moreover, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine does not have anything to say about the executive’s inherent prosecutorial discretion, which does not come to the executive by way of delegation. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is not the only way that the Court enforces the various protections of the Bill of Rights; it is merely one of a few tools in the Court’s rights-protective toolbox. Nor does the “Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine” necessarily apply to each provision of the Bill of Rights. That said, the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases offer important insights about how the Court enforces the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and applies the nondelegation principle.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the Article I nondelegation doctrine’s history. Part II uncovers a separate Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine, tying together the relevant First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment cases into a coherent framework. Part III considers some potential applications of the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. Part IV then distinguishes the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine from the Article I nondelegation doctrine, while articulating other important caveats to the parallels drawn in this Article. Part IV also locates the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine within the broader framework of the protections of the Bill of Rights.

Certainly, the Article I nondelegation doctrine has only had “one good year” since 1935. But the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine has had plenty of good years. As this Article will reveal, the doctrine is firmly ensconced in the Court’s jurisprudence.

I. THE ARTICLE I NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

To understand the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine, one must understand how it is distinct from a wholly separate doctrine of nondelegation: the Article I nondelegation doctrine. This Part surveys the development of this doctrine in American constitutional law. When scholars and jurists speak of the “nondelegation doctrine,” often what they are talking about is the Article I nondelegation doctrine.21 To demonstrate the point, this Part locates the textual and structural sources of the Article I

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21. But see Benjamin Silver, Nondelegation in the States, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2022) (“State nondelegation law arises in a wide variety of contexts, not simply the legislature-to-agency contexts with which scholars and federal courts are most familiar.”).
nondelegation doctrine. From there, this Part surveys the doctrine’s development in the Supreme Court.

A. Locating the Constitutional Source of the Article I Nondelegation Doctrine

Various scholars and jurists take the position that Congress may not delegate any of its vested legislative powers—in whole or in part—to another branch of the federal government. Often, the purported textual sources of this principle of nondelegation are the Vesting Clause of Article I and the structure of the Constitution (thus, this Article refers to this version of the doctrine as the “Article I nondelegation doctrine”). In the interest of supporting the claim that the Article I nondelegation doctrine exists, nondelegation proponents must argue that the Constitution—properly understood—contains this principle. This section explores the argument that the Constitution contains a nondelegation doctrine in Article I.

1. Article I Nondelegation: An Argument from Text and Structure

The Constitution separates power. While the dividing lines of this separation are perhaps not entirely clean, the fact remains that the separation of powers is one of the core organizing principles—if not the central principle—of the Constitution’s framework. To that end, Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution lay out a structure of government in which (as a general matter) three different institutions respectively exercise three different sorts of power.

22. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); see also, e.g., Andrew Kent & Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and National Security Power, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 261–91 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (demonstrating tension between the defining role of the executive as law-executor and presidential power in the national security realm); Frederick Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, 29 YALE L.J. 369, 384 n.60 (1920) (“The pardoning power, like the veto, is a legislative power of negative nature, vested by the constitution in the chief executive . . . .”). One might also say that the Senate’s power to withhold consent to (and thereby block) certain of the president’s nominees for positions in the executive branch—a power housed in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2—is a sort of executive power reposed in (part of) the legislative branch.

23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 75 (James Madison) (Beneficent Classics 2016); see also Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–8 (2011) (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) (venerating the separation of powers as safeguarding individual liberty and the protections of the Bill of Rights).
In particular, Article I sets up the legislative branch, Article II sets up the executive branch, and Article III sets up the judicial branch.\(^\text{24}\)

Each Article begins with what is called a “Vesting Clause,” vesting power in the branch of government that the Article establishes. The three Articles begin similarly, but the first clause of Article I contains an important linguistic difference from the first clauses of Articles II and III. Compare the following three opening clauses:

- Article I: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”\(^\text{25}\)

- Article II: “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”\(^\text{26}\)

- Article III: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”\(^\text{27}\)

Unlike the Article II and III Vesting Clauses, Article I’s Vesting Clause begins with the word “All.” In this way, the Article I Vesting Clause does not vest in Congress a free-floating federal legislative power. Rather, it vests in Congress no more (and no less) than the legislative powers “herein granted.”

To some extent, the Article I Vesting Clause is a linguistic minefield of interpretation. Uncertainty about the meaning of various terms in the Article I Vesting Clause—including “legislative” powers,\(^\text{28}\) “herein granted,”\(^\text{29}\) and “vested”\(^\text{30}\)—has provided significant fodder for scholarly inquiry in recent years. This scholarship has introduced nuance into the task of interpreting the Article I Vesting Clause. Nevertheless, the classic understanding

\(^{24}\) See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.

\(^{25}\) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

\(^{26}\) U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

\(^{27}\) U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.


\(^{29}\) See, e.g., Richard Primus, Herin of “Herein Granted”: Why Article I’s Vesting Clause Does Not Support the Doctrine of Enumerated Powers, 35 CONST. COMMENT. 301, 302–03, 302 n.6 and accompanying text (2020); Coglianese, supra note 8.

of this constitutional provision begins from the following premise: Article I vests in Congress all of the legislative powers set forth in Article I of the Constitution. From there, proponents of the nondelegation doctrine argue that because the people have vested these legislative powers in Congress, the Constitution forbids Congress from delegating any of these powers to another branch. In other words, if the federal government is going to legislate pursuant to one of the legislative powers in Article I, Congress must be the one to do it. Congress cannot authorize another branch—and in practice, this often means the executive branch— to do so.

Earlier conceptions of the Article I nondelegation doctrine located the doctrine’s constitutional source in Article I’s Vesting Clause. But recent scholarship suggests that the source of the doctrine may be a combination of both the Vesting Clause and the general structure of the Constitution (or even just the latter). The two are related. The Constitution sets up a structure of government that vests different sorts of power in different branches—the executive power in the executive branch, the judicial power in the judicial branch, and a certain reservoir of legislative powers in the legislative branch. One might even say that “[i]f Congress could pass off its legislative power to the executive branch, the ‘[v]esting [c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution,’ would ‘make no sense.’”

The purpose of this Article is not to enter the Article I nondelegation debates; it takes no position on whether nondelegation proponents are correct that the Article I nondelegation doctrine comports with the original meaning of the Constitution. Scholars have spilled a significant amount of ink on the question, and this Article’s central insight does not rise or fall on the debate’s resolution.

34. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134–35 (second and third alternation in original) (quoting Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 30, at 340); cf. City of St. Louis v. Dep’t of Transp., 936 F.2d 1528, 1534 (8th Cir. 1991) (“No one claims, incidentally, that the delegation here was so broad as to violate Article I.”) (explicitly grounding the nondelegation doctrine in Article I).
35. See Mascott, supra note 3.
Rather, the point of this subpart is that one can conceivably recognize a version of the nondelegation doctrine in Article I’s Vesting Clause and the Constitution’s general structure. The traditional understanding of that doctrine, discussed further in section I.B, sets the stage for the uncovering of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

B. “One Good Year”: The Article I Nondelegation Doctrine in Practice

The Article I nondelegation doctrine is a doctrine of judicial review. It is also a doctrine that the Supreme Court has rarely used. Indeed, the Court has only declared a federal statute unconstitutional on Article I nondelegation grounds twice (both times in 1935). Granted, the Court recognized a nondelegation doctrine in Article I as early as 1825. But employment of the Article I nondelegation principle in the 1930s was one of the main catalysts for a dark period in the Court’s history—President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s proposal to “pack” the Court with Justices more sympathetic to his New Deal economic program. The history of President Roosevelt’s court-packing proposal potentially provides a concrete explanation for why the Court backed away from using the Article I nondelegation doctrine in the exercise of judicial review. In the wake of the court-packing proposal, the Court has continued to acknowledge the existence of the Article I nondelegation doctrine, but it has not since applied the doctrine to declare a federal statute unconstitutional. That said, recent developments suggest that the Article I nondelegation doctrine may be making a return.

1. Article I Nondelegation Before the New Deal

In the words of Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano, an examination of “the pre-New Deal tradition of [Article I] nondelegation jurisprudence . . . reveals that the constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power was frequently observed in theory but rarely enforced in practice.”36 This tradition began in the early 1800s, when the Marshall Court “heard the earliest cases challenging the unconstitutional delegation of

36. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 5, at 383.
For the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Court did not apply a particular rule of nondelegation.\textsuperscript{37} But in an 1825 case—\textit{Wayman v. Southard}\textsuperscript{39}—Chief Justice Marshall kicked off the Article I nondelegation doctrine’s development at the Court. In \textit{Wayman}, the Court stated an important principle of law: “It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”\textsuperscript{40} The next paragraph began: “The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”\textsuperscript{41} The underlying delegation of interest to the Court in \textit{Wayman} was a statutory provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave federal courts the power to regulate their own civil procedure.\textsuperscript{42} But the idea that certain delegations are okay and others are not okay was a constitutionally significant proposition—necessarily, its corollary was that courts had the power to declare certain laws unconstitutional for effectuating an impermissible delegation of “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”\textsuperscript{43} Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta in \textit{Wayman} seemed to establish the ground rules for the Article I nondelegation doctrine. Congress could, in some instances, delegate power to a coordinate branch of the federal government. The big question seemed to be where one drew the line between “those important subjects” and “those of less interest.”\textsuperscript{44} Gary Lawson has suggested that the test for delegations might simply be that “Congress must make whatever decisions are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{38} See Whittington & Iuliano, \textit{supra} note 5, at 392–94; Andrew J. Ziaja, \textit{Hot Oil and Hot Air: The Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the New Deal, a History}, 1813–1944, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 921, 925–28 (2008).
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Id. at 42–43.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Id. at 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} See id. at 43 (citing sections 7 and 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). We know these rules today as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Id. at 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Id. at 43.
\end{itemize}
important enough to the statutory scheme in question so that Congress must make them.” But perhaps this formulation is not exactly what Chief Justice Marshall was getting at. Rather, Wayman’s dicta may stand for the notion that certain congressional powers (like the power to regulate interstate commerce) are important—and nondelegable—while other powers (like the power to establish post offices) are “of less interest” and thus susceptible of delegation.

A little over a century later, the Court articulated an authoritative test for the Article I nondelegation doctrine. In *J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States*, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a congressional grant of tariff-adjusting power to the President. The Court upheld the statute against a nondelegation challenge, citing the fact that Congress had established a clear “policy and plan” for how the President was to carry out the law. Explaining its reasoning, the Court stated that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” *J.W. Hampton*’s rule represented a bit of a drift from the earlier, more muscular conceptions of the nondelegation doctrine. The intelligible-principle test was forgiving; it permitted some delegation so long as Congress prescribed a standard by which a court could measure the executive’s compliance with a given statute’s command.


48. See id. at 404.

49. See id. at 405, 410–11.

50. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).

51. In an important nondelegation article, Ben Silver has shown that “the ‘intelligible principle’ test . . . was crafted under the influence of state nondelegation law.” Silver, supra note 21, at 1260.
2. The Article I Nondelegation Doctrine Meets the New Deal and the Court-Packing Plan

If J.W. Hampton signaled a more permissive approach in the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence, that shift was not immediately felt. By the mid-1930s, America was in the throes of an economic depression. In response, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pushed Congress to enact his “New Deal” economic program. “One of the cornerstones of the New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA),” which gave the Roosevelt administration wide-ranging discretion to manage the economy as the United States grappled with financial calamity. For example, the NIRA authorized the Roosevelt administration to enact “codes of fair competition.” The Roosevelt administration proceeded to regulate with a heavy hand. In response, impacted businesses sought recourse in the federal courts, challenging the constitutionality of key aspects of the New Deal. These challenges would lead the Court to apply the Article I nondelegation doctrine.

Perhaps the most famous nondelegation case from this era is *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*. The case stemmed from the indictment of Jewish poultry slaughterhouse operators in New York for violations of the “Live Poultry Code”: a series of poultry regulations promulgated by the Roosevelt administration pursuant to the power conferred under the NIRA. The NIRA provided that after “one or more trade or industrial associations or groups” submitted an application to the President, he could “approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants.” And on April 13, 1934, President Roosevelt approved

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53. See id.
54. See Ziaja, supra note 38, at 942.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 943, 951 (describing businesses that brought suit against the federal government).
58. See id. at 520–21.
59. Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (quoted in Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521 n.4). The statute required that, before approval of the code or codes, the President find “(1)
a code of fair competition for the live poultry industry. The Code included labor provisions (minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements) and a trade-practice provision requiring the so-called “straight killing” of poultry.\(^{60}\)

The government charged the Jewish slaughterhouse operators with various violations of the Code.\(^{61}\) The slaughterhouse operators responded by challenging—on Article I nondelegation grounds—the underlying statutory grant of authority (from Congress) pursuant to which the President had approved the Code. The challenge succeeded. In declaring the code-making provision of the NIRA to be unconstitutional, the Court explained that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry.”\(^{62}\)

In *Schechter Poultry* and *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*,\(^{63}\) the Court articulated a robust version of the Article I nondelegation doctrine on the way to declaring significant parts of President Roosevelt’s New Deal unconstitutional.\(^{64}\) Unsurprisingly, President Roosevelt was not too pleased with these developments.\(^{65}\)

that such associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this title.” *id.*

60. *Schechter Poultry*, 295 U.S. at 525–28. As the Court noted, “[The ‘straight killing’] requirement was really one of ‘straight’ selling. The term ‘straight killing’ was defined in the code as ‘the practice of requiring persons purchasing poultry for resale to accept the run of any half coop, coop, or coops, as purchased by slaughterhouse operators, except for culls.’ The charges in the ten counts, respectively, were that the defendants in selling to retail dealers and butchers had permitted ‘selections of individual chickens taken from particular coops and half coops.’” *id.* at 527–28.


62. *id.* at 537–38 (emphasis added).

63. *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). The Court in *Schechter Poultry* cited *Panama Refining*, noting that the case had “recently [provided] occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of” whether a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine. *Schechter Poultry*, 295 U.S. at 529.

64. *See* Ziaja, *supra* note 38, at 924 (discussing the cases).

After the Court issued its rulings, America voted. In the 1936 election, a referendum on the New Deal, President Roosevelt and the Democrats won in a landslide. Emboldened by the electoral results, President Roosevelt took on the Court. Fed up with the Court’s obstruction of his domestic policy agenda, the President proposed a plan by which he would add new Justices to the bench and alter the composition of the Court. President Roosevelt’s proposal provided a real-world example of why the stakes for judicial review are so high. William Baude has described this as “the New Deal paradigm,” taking the view that “the argument for court reform is especially strong . . . when the Court is standing in the way of Congress, . . . [when] Congress wants to do things, and the [C]ourt won’t let them.” In one fireside chat in 1937, President Roosevelt opined that “[i]n the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasonable [constitutional] doubt has been cast aside. The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body.” In standing up for the constitutionality of his domestic policies, President Roosevelt launched a political attack on what Alexander Hamilton once described as “the weakest” of the three branches of government.

President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan did not come to fruition, perhaps because the Court caved in the face of the political pressure. No surprise—as one writer put it: “The Supreme Court needs a lot of fortitude to challenge one of the elected branches. And in truth, this Court didn’t have it.” Notably, “[a]fter President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court if it persisted in rendering such decisions, the Justices changed their tune, and

67. See FDR Fireside Chat, supra note 65.
69. See FDR Fireside Chat, supra note 65; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 724 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court in 1935 as “an activist, anti-New Deal Court bent on reducing the power of President Franklin Roosevelt”).
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
nondelegation challenges were thereafter uniformly rejected.” In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton had predicted that such a confrontation would end this way. As Hamilton put it, the judicial branch “can never attack with success either of the other two” branches, and “all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.”

The Court has not since used the Article I nondelegation doctrine to declare a federal statute unconstitutional. In particular, in the years immediately following 1937, the Court upheld several statutes against nondelegation challenges—including one that was “facially similar to [the] NIRA.” By 1944, when the Court decided *Yakus v. United States*, the Article I nondelegation doctrine was effectively a dead letter. To be sure, the nondelegation cases were far from the only reason that President Roosevelt sought to pack the Supreme Court with New Deal sympathizers. But this constitutional episode sheds some light on why the Court became skittish about robust application of the Article I nondelegation doctrine.

72. Merrill, *supra* note 1, at 2103; see also Meaghan Dunigan, *The Intelligible Principle: How It Briefly Lived, Why It Died, and Why It Desperately Needs Revival in Today’s Administrative State*, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 247, 259 (2017) (“Both *Panama Refining Co.* and *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry* provide meaningful insight into the intelligible principle. Unfortunately, this insight has largely been dismissed based on the notion that the Court struck down congressional delegation in the [1930s] solely because of the tension that existed between the Court and President Roosevelt. The fact that the Court has not invalidated a statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch since 1935 largely supports this assertion.”) (footnote omitted)); George Bunn, Kathleen Irwin & F. Kyra Sido, *No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?*, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 341, 342 (pointing to President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan as a catalyst for the mid-1930s shift in nondelegation jurisprudence).

73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).


76. *See Ziaja, supra* note 38, at 923 (“Scholars furthermore point to *Yakus v. United States* in 1944 as the doctrine’s effective end, but the doctrine lost its momentum several years earlier.”) (footnotes omitted)).


78. Earlier academic literature had predicted the possibility of political backlash to robust judicial review by the federal courts. *See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law*, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893) (suggesting that courts “not step into the shoes of the law-maker”).
3. The Decline (and Possible Return?) of the Article I Nondelegation Doctrine: From the Court Packing Plan to the Modern Day

In the years following World War II, the Court sought to articulate a consistent test for disposing of Article I nondelegation challenges. Returning to the pre-1930s regime, the Court recast its nondelegation jurisprudence as being about the application of J.W. Hampton’s “intelligible principle” test. But in practice, the “test” was no test at all. In 1974, Justice Marshall put it aptly when he described the Article I nondelegation doctrine as “surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era—for which the Court is fond of writing an obituary.” Some Justices resisted. Perhaps most famously, then-Justice Rehnquist called for the revival of the Article I nondelegation doctrine in a concurrence in what has come to be known as “The Benzene Case.” But overall, the nondelegation doctrine failed to gain the support of a majority of the Court.

In 2000, Sunstein suggested that over the years, the Article I nondelegation doctrine has morphed into a set of canons of statutory interpretation. In Sunstein’s telling, the doctrine has operated in practice—through the canons—as something of a background constraint on agency action. Given the principle that Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive branch, Sunstein opines that the nondelegation “canons impose important constraints on administrative authority, for agencies are not permitted to understand ambiguous provisions to give them

79. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (describing the “intelligible principle” test as driving the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence in Panama Refining and the years following).
82. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 316.
authority to venture in certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary.”

One especially important development occurred the next year in 2001, when the Court decided *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.* In that case, the Court — unsurprisingly — turned away an Article I nondelegation challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act. But in so doing, the Court clarified how a nondelegation challenge is supposed to work. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that “[i]n a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency.” To that end, “an agency [cannot] cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.” For that reason, litigants lodging Article I nondelegation challenges are challenging the underlying statute, not the executive action taken pursuant to the statute’s grant of authority.

Fast forward to the present: The Court may be about to revive the Article I nondelegation doctrine. In a 2019 case, *Gundy v. United States*, Justice Gorsuch called for the Court to bring back the doctrine. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined the dissent, and Justice Alito wrote in a concurrence that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.” Now, the Court has two new Justices — Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett — who might be sympathetic to the Article I nondelegation doctrine. That said, not all are convinced that the Court is about

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83. *Id.* at 330. In some ways, this observation bears striking similarity to the Court’s recent requirement of a clear statement from Congress before an agency can answer a so-called “major question.” See *West Virginia v. EPA*, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022) (discussing the “major questions doctrine”).

85. *See id.* at 474.
86. *Id.* at 472 (emphasis added).
87. *Id.*
89. *Id.* at 2131.
90. *Id.* (Alito, J., concurring).
to return to declaring statutes unconstitutional on Article I nondelegation grounds.\textsuperscript{92}

II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

Whatever the status of the Article I nondelegation doctrine, the Court has been applying the principles of nondelegation in a related area: Bill of Rights litigation. From the First and Second Amendments to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court has developed a robust jurisprudence that disfavors the delegation of unfettered discretion. To be sure, not all of the cases or lines of cases discussed in this Part are a \textit{perfect} analog to the traditional understanding of the Article I nondelegation doctrine. But the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases translate the Court’s abstract disapproval of delegation into consistently substantive action — in a way that the Article I nondelegation doctrine does not.

This Part reveals a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. It begins by laying out the various cases and lines of cases that come together to form a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. From there, this Part ties the cases together into a coherent doctrinal framework.

A. Laying out the Bill of Rights Nondelegation Doctrine

The Bill of Rights “spells out Americans’ rights in relation to their government.”\textsuperscript{93} These rights are often understood by reference to a particular, substantive guarantee: for example, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”;\textsuperscript{94} “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”;\textsuperscript{95} and “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”\textsuperscript{96}


\textsuperscript{94} U.S. CONST. amend. I.

\textsuperscript{95} U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

\textsuperscript{96} U.S. CONST. amend. V.
As one scholar has noted, “modern constitutional doctrine has incorporated (almost all of) the Bill of Rights against the states.”\textsuperscript{97} Today, federal constitutional review of state (and city and municipal) legislation and action is a core component of the Supreme Court’s docket.\textsuperscript{98} The Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the state governments has put the federal courts in the position of rights-guarantor whenever a state abridges the freedom of speech,\textsuperscript{99} searches someone’s home without a warrant,\textsuperscript{100} or effectuates an excessive forfeiture of someone’s assets.\textsuperscript{101} This doctrine of incorporation recognizes—through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—a set of rigorous individual liberty protections that are enforceable against state governments.

This section—and this Article—builds on the usual understanding of the Bill of Rights. This Article identifies a Bill of Rights “nondelegation doctrine,” revealing a coherent framework of cases in which the Supreme Court has constructed a doctrinal edifice of nondelegation around the Bill of Rights. In various cases concerning different Bill of Rights amendments, the Court has evinced hostility to the conferral—or delegation—of too much discretion to the executive to impair certain liberties that the Bill of Rights guarantees. In these cases, the Court has attacked the constitutionality of the underlying \textit{delegation} of discretion to violate an enumerated right (for example, the freedom of speech), as

\textsuperscript{97} Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, \textit{The Objects of the Constitution}, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1054 (2011).

\textsuperscript{98} October Term 2020 at the Supreme Court involved various of these sorts of challenges. See, e.g., Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (First Amendment challenge to state regime of disclosing names of charitable organizations’ donors); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (Fifth Amendment Takings Clause challenge to state regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property for union solicitation); Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (First Amendment challenge to public high school’s suspension of student from the cheerleading team because of off-campus speech); Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021) (Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless entry into man’s garage after he fled); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (First Amendment free exercise challenge to city’s refusal to contract with Catholic foster care agency unless it agreed to certify same-sex foster couples); Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021) (Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless removal of a man’s firearms from his home); Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (Fourth Amendment challenge to officer shooting a fleeing suspect).


\textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

\textsuperscript{101} See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
opposed to resting a finding of unconstitutionality solely on the impairment of the liberty itself. In a way, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine operates as a prophylactic, precluding grants of discretion to the executive when that discretion could be used in a way that infringes upon an individual liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Doctrinal developments with respect to four separate Bill of Rights amendments illustrate this phenomenon. Beginning with the First Amendment, the “Court has condemned licensing schemes that lodge broad discretion in a public official to permit [or not permit] speech-related activity.”102 Similarly, in a recent Second Amendment decision,103 the Court declared that a state’s discretionary permitting regime for concealed-carry licenses was unconstitutional.104 The Fourth Amendment also contains a rule of anti-delegation (or at least anti-discretion): various cases have given effect to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”105 Moreover, under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Amendment embodies a so-called “void for vagueness doctrine.” Here, a court will declare a penal statute to be unconstitutional if it does not “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”106 The vagueness doctrine is therefore “a safeguard against legislative delegation of excessive discretion to courts and


104. See id. at 2122–24.


to executive officials and agencies, especially the police.”\textsuperscript{107} Taken together, these cases stand for a broad principle: on the way to enforcing the Bill of Rights, the Court has prevented the delegation of unfettered discretion.

1. Discretionary Licensing Regimes and the First Amendment

In 1948, the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge (via the Fourteenth Amendment) to a local ordinance in Lockport, New York.\textsuperscript{108} Samuel Saia was a Jehovah’s Witness who wanted “to use sound equipment, mounted atop his car, to amplify lectures on religious subjects.”\textsuperscript{109} But Lockport law prohibited the use of sound equipment in this way, unless one had obtained permission from the town’s chief of police.\textsuperscript{110} The local ordinance set no standards for the police chief’s issuance of the permit—in other words, issuance of the permit was at the police chief’s unfettered discretion.\textsuperscript{111} Saia had previously obtained a permit for his use of the sound equipment.\textsuperscript{112} But once that permit expired, Saia applied for a new permit, and he was refused.\textsuperscript{113} The town grounded its refusal in the fact that some people had apparently complained about Saia.\textsuperscript{114} Saia “nevertheless used his equipment as planned on four occasions, but without a permit. He was tried in Police Court for violations of the ordinance.”\textsuperscript{115}

Saia challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.\textsuperscript{116} By a vote of 5-4 at the Supreme Court, he won.\textsuperscript{117} The Court held that the ordinance’s permitting regime was unconstitutional, “for it establish[ed] a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the


\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id.} at 559.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{See id.} at 558 n.1 (citing the local ordinance).

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{See id.} at 559.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Id.} at 558.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{See generally id.} (ruling 5-4 in Saia’s favor).
Fourteenth Amendment against State action.” 118 The Court’s main problem with the ordinance was that there were “no standards prescribed for the exercise of [the police chief’s] discretion.” 119 In the Lockport ordinance, “[t]he right to be heard [was] placed in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police. He [stood] athwart the channels of communication as an obstruction which [could] be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and lengthy appeal.” 120

The Court analogized the Lockport ordinance to a similar local ordinance that it had declared unconstitutional in Cantwell v. Connecticut. 121 The ordinance reviewed in Cantwell required that one obtain a license “in order to distribute religious literature.” 122 As the Court described the Cantwell ordinance in Saia: “What was religious was left to the discretion of a public official.” 123 The key takeaway from Saia was as follows: “When a city allows an official to ban [the use of loud-speakers] in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free communication of ideas.” 124 That suppression—as the Court saw it—is repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 125

Saia was just one of “a series of cases involving discretionary licensing schemes that were, or might have been, used to discriminate against certain speech because of its content.” 126 The emphasis on “might have been” is important. In Largent v. Texas, the Court explained that the very fact that “[d]issemination of ideas depends upon the approval of the distributor by the official . . . . is [itself]
administrative censorship in an extreme form” that violates the Constitution.\textsuperscript{127} The point of the First Amendment discretionary licensing cases is that the “lodg[ing of] broad discretion in a public official to permit speech-related activity” itself abridges speech.\textsuperscript{128} The constitutional problem is the licensing schemes’ “potential use as instruments for selectively suppressing some points of view.”\textsuperscript{129} That mere potential is enough to create a constitutional difficulty.

After \textit{Saia},\textsuperscript{130} the Supreme Court confronted a number of other discretionary licensing regimes that imperiled First (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights. In a pair of cases decided on the same day in early 1951—\textit{Niemotko v. Maryland}\textsuperscript{131} and \textit{Kunz v. New York}\textsuperscript{132}—the Court expanded upon its First Amendment discretionary permitting jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{133} The ordinances at issue in the cases had vested an unfettered discretion in local officials to deny permits, which the Court found unacceptable.\textsuperscript{134} In the words of the \textit{Kunz} Court, a state “cannot vest restraining control over the right to speak . . . in an administrative official where there are no
appropriate standards to guide his action.”

Over the next few decades, the Court continued to enforce this principle. In case after case, regardless of whether the laws were neutral with respect to the expressive activity’s message, “the Court was worried about the broad discretion they gave to government officials. The Court’s suspicion of such discretion arose, in large part, from its fear that officials would use their power to discriminate among speakers based upon the content of their speech.”

Instead of making litigants challenge these discretion-delegating schemes in an as-applied posture, the Court has permitted facial constitutional attacks. By 1988, the Court explained that its “cases have long held that when a licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially without the necessity of first applying for, and being denied, a license.”

This constitutional approach flows from “the time-tested knowledge

137. Williams, supra note 126, at 701.
138. Richard Fallon explains the difference between “as-applied” and “facial” challenges:

In an as-applied challenge, a party maintains that the Constitution forbids a statute’s application to his or her case. In contrast, a facial challenge asserts that a statute—or, more commonly, a provision of a multipart statute—exhibits a defect that renders it invalid as applied to all cases, even if a more narrowly (or occasionally a more broadly) framed provision could have prohibited the challenger’s conduct.


139. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755–56 (1988) (first citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 56; then citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); then citing Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151; then citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1938); and then citing Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956–57); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 246 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Licensing schemes subject to First Amendment scrutiny . . . have been invalidated when undue discretion has been vested in the licensor. Unbridled discretion with respect to the criteria used in deciding whether or not to grant a license is deemed to convert an otherwise valid law into an unconstitutional prior restraint. That rule reflects settled law with respect to licensing in the First Amendment context.” (first citing Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150–52; then citing Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757; then citing Staub, 355 U.S. 313; then citing Niemotko, 340 U.S. 268; then citing Kunz, 340 U.S. 290; and then citing Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948))).
that in the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship.”\textsuperscript{140} In the Court’s telling, it is “the mere existence of the licensor’s unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, [that] intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused.”\textsuperscript{141}

From these cases, a rule of nondelegation for the First Amendment emerges: A statute is unconstitutional if it delegates standardless discretion to a government official to permit or deny expressive activity.

2. “May Issue” Concealed Carry Permitting Regimes and the Second Amendment

The Court recently recognized something of a rule of nondelegation in a Second Amendment case, too. While this rule does not have anything close to the doctrinal pedigree of the First Amendment nondelegation principle discussed earlier in this section, it nevertheless contributes to this Article’s identification of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

In October Term 2021, the Supreme Court decided \textit{New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen}.\textsuperscript{142} The case concerned a New York state licensing regime for concealed-carry permits. To set the stage, New York law prohibited possession of a firearm without a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[140] \textit{Lakewood}, 486 U.S. at 757 (first citing \textit{Shuttlesworth}, 394 U.S. at 151; then citing \textit{Cox}, 379 U.S. 536; then citing \textit{Staub}, 355 U.S. at 321–22; then citing \textit{Kunz}, 340 U.S. at 294; then citing \textit{Niemotko}, 340 U.S. 268; and then citing \textit{Saia}, 334 U.S. 558).
\item[141] \textit{Id.} Perhaps in these sorts of cases, the Court is worried about what it describes as “the more covert forms of discrimination that may result when arbitrary discretion is vested in some governmental authority.” \textit{Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness}, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981). Susan Williams takes it a step further, arguing that “[t]he serious, present harm in . . . discretion lies . . . in the concept of chill, a concept more closely related to content discrimination from the speaker’s perspective.” Williams, \textit{supra} note 126, at 704; see also \textit{Joseph H. Munson Co.}, 467 U.S. at 964 n.12 (“By placing discretion in the hands of an official to grant or deny a license, such a statute creates a threat of censorship that by its very existence chills free speech.”) (first citing \textit{Thornhill}, 310 U.S. at 97; then citing \textit{Schneider v. New Jersey}, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); and then citing \textit{Lovell}, 303 U.S. at 451)). As Williams puts it, “Curing or avoiding chill requires changing the regulatory scheme so that speakers no longer feel threatened rather than changing the motives of government actors, who, by hypothesis, need not actually be discriminating.” Williams, \textit{supra} note 126, at 704.
\end{footnotes}
license.\textsuperscript{143} To obtain a license for carrying a firearm outside the home, an applicant had to prove that “proper cause” existed for the license’s issuance.\textsuperscript{144} As the Court noted, “[n]o New York statute defines ‘proper cause,’” although New York courts had interpreted the term to mean “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.”\textsuperscript{145} Unfortunately for applicants, judicial review of these licensing decisions was limited.\textsuperscript{146} New Yorkers Brandon Koch and Robert Nash had applied for unrestricted licenses to carry firearms, but licensing officials only issued them restricted permits.\textsuperscript{147}

Koch and Nash sued the relevant state officials, alleging violations of their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{148} Like Samuel Saia and many other litigants in the First Amendment cases discussed in section II.A.1, Koch and Nash won. The Court noted that it had “granted certiorari to decide whether New York’s denial of [Koch and Nash’s] license applications violated the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{149} But the Court ultimately determined that it was the state’s “proper-cause requirement” that violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Second Amendment liberty.\textsuperscript{150} The Court compared New York’s licensing scheme—“under which authorities have discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license[]”—to “the vast majority of States . . . where authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.”\textsuperscript{151} The contrast here was between “may-issue” and “shall-issue” regimes; in “may-issue” regimes, the legislatures give discretion to licensing officials to deny permits even if applicants meet the statutory criteria.

\textsuperscript{143} See id. at 2122.
\textsuperscript{144} See id. at 2123 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2006)).
\textsuperscript{145} Id. (quoting Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
\textsuperscript{146} See id.
\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 2125.
\textsuperscript{148} Id.
\textsuperscript{149} Id. (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{150} Id. at 2156.
\textsuperscript{151} Id. at 2123–24 (emphasis added).
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence specifically addressed the discretionary nature of “may-issue” licensing regimes. He noted that “[a]s the Court explain[ed], New York’s outlier may-issue regime is constitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended discretion to licensing officials and authorizes licenses only for those applicants who can show some special need apart from self-defense.” Echoing the themes of the First Amendment licensing cases, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that “the unchanneled discretion for licensing officials and the special-need requirement . . . in effect deny the right to carry handguns for self-defense to many ‘ordinary, law-abiding citizens.’” Here again, the very delegation of discretion constituted a denial of the enumerated right.

The *Bruen* Court also took issue with New York State’s declaration of the island of Manhattan as a “sensitive place” “where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens” consistent with the Second Amendment. Further, the Court concluded that the respondents in the case had “failed to meet their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause requirement” before deeming the requirement unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the discussion of discretion in *Bruen* provides further evidence for the existence of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

*Bruen*—or, at least, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in *Bruen*—continued the Court’s march of anti-delegation through the Bill of Rights. Like the First Amendment cases, *Bruen* stands for a nondelegation principle: legislatures may not delegate open-ended discretion to (executive) licensing officials to deny concealed-carry permits.

3. General Warrants and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment spells out its anti-delegation rule more explicitly than do the First and Second Amendments. After articulating an overarching prohibition on unreasonable government searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment provides that “no

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152. *See id.* at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
153. *Id.*
154. *Id.* (quoting *id.* at 2122 (majority opinion)) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
155. *Id.* at 2133–34 (majority opinion).
156. *Id.* at 2138.
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”157 The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement sets up a two-part test: the court must ask whether a warrant particularly describes (1) the place to be searched and (2) the persons or things to be seized. If the answer to either question is “no,” the warrant is “invalid.”158 And “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment does not, by its text, require that searches be supported by a warrant, ‘[the Supreme] Court has inferred that a [valid] warrant must generally be secured for a search to comply with the Fourth Amendment.”159

Remedies are tricky in Fourth Amendment cases. The ordinary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the application of the so-called “exclusionary rule,” under which evidence obtained in violation of one’s Fourth Amendment rights is inadmissible against that person at a criminal trial.160 But in recognition of “the substantial [social] costs” of excluding evidence, the Supreme Court has carved out numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule.161

One of these carve-outs is known as the “good-faith exception,” in which a court will not apply the exclusionary rule when an officer acts in “objectively reasonable reliance” on an invalid warrant.162 And while the Court has applied the good-faith exception

162. Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
notwithstanding a particularity violation, the exclusionary rule still undoubtedly applies when “a warrant [is] so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Thus, in light of the Court’s exception-laden exclusionary rule jurisprudence, the particularity requirement remains an important bulwark against judicial delegation of discretion to police. And when a warrant is insufficiently particular, the judge’s issuance of the warrant permits the police to fill up the details, on their own, as they see fit—a discretionary exercise of the police power that the Fourth Amendment disallows.

The Supreme Court has been clear about this principle: “The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Conformance to the particularity requirement requires that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Particularity in the application for the warrant is not enough. The warrant itself must provide the requisite particularity. To be sure, the “particularity requirement does not include the conditions precedent to execution of the warrant”—that is, anticipatory warrants (warrants with a


166. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988 n.5 (first citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); then citing United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77–78 (9th Cir. 1982); then citing United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982); then citing United States v. Klein, 565 F. 2d 183, 185 (1st Cir. 1977); then citing United States v. Gardner, 537 F.2d 861, 862 (6th Cir. 1976); and then citing United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268–69 (2d. Cir. 1970))


“triggering condition”) are constitutionally valid, even if the warrant does not itself specify the triggering condition.\textsuperscript{169}

The particularity requirement is rooted in the Framers’ abhorrence of the “general warrant.”\textsuperscript{170} Also known as “writs of assistance,” general warrants in the colonies gave British “customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws.”\textsuperscript{171} General warrants would authorize standardless searches and seizures, drawing the ire of the colonists.\textsuperscript{172} Moreover, officials used general warrants to harass dissenters.\textsuperscript{173} For this reason, the particularity requirement has a doctrinal connection to the First Amendment’s protections for speech and expression.\textsuperscript{174} In \textit{Stanford v. Texas}, the Court expounded on this connection when it explained that “the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain.”\textsuperscript{175} In fact, resistance against the practice of general warrants may have been the spark that ignited the revolutionary fire in colonial America.\textsuperscript{176}

The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a rule of nondelegation. Unlike the usual delegation scenario, the delegation in the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement is from a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006). \textit{But cf. The Supreme Court — Leading Cases}, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 161 (2006) (describing anticipatory warrants as constituting an “inherent delegation of discretion from an impartial magistrate to the officer executing the warrant”). Indeed, this carveout is similar to the Article I nondelegation doctrine’s understanding that “once Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the application of that rule depend on executive fact-finding.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{170} Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (first citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1886); then citing \textit{Marron}, 275 U.S. at 195–96; and then citing \textit{Stanford}, 379 U.S. at 476).
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Stanford}, 379 U.S. at 481.
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{See id.}
\item \textsuperscript{174} \textit{See id.} at 729 (“The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression. For the serious hazard of suppression of innocent expression inhered in the discretion confided in the officers authorized to exercise the power.”).
\item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{Stanford}, 379 U.S. at 485–86 (first citing Marcus, 367 U.S.; and then citing \textit{A Quantity of Books v. Kansas}, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)).
\item \textsuperscript{176} Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
\end{itemize}
judicial officer to an executive officer. True, one might conceive of the requirement of the warrant itself as a limitation on executive power. But whether the discretionary constitutional authority to issue the warrant is a freestanding element of the judicial power or a cabining of the executive power, the particularity requirement ensures that the judicial branch does not merely delegate the discretionary authority (to determine whether the warrant is particular enough) back to the executive.

The principle of nondelegation therefore holds up. A main problem with general warrants was that “they delegated to the officer the power to decide whom to search and for what to search.” At bottom, general warrants constituted a “delegation of discretion.” To rectify this issue, the Framers enshrined a requirement in the Fourth Amendment that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Court has viewed “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police” as being “at the core of the

177. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”). Courts have recognized the possibility of judicial delegations to the executive in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding a defendant’s challenge to his sentence when “the District Court impermissibly delegated its sentencing authority by allowing the Probation Department to determine whether he should undergo inpatient or outpatient drug treatment as a condition of supervised release”). The delegation can go the other way, too. See, e.g., Dave Yost & Benjamin M. Flowers, The First Step Act and the Pardon Power, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM (No. 42, Fall 2023), at 2 (contending that the First Step Act’s compassionate-release provisions unconstitutionally delegated the President’s pardon power to the judiciary).


180. Id.; cf. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 427 (2015) (describing police discretion as an evil against which the Fourth Amendment guards); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 412 (1974) (“Under the fourth amendment, even where the initial justification for a search was determined by a magistrate, executive discretion in its execution was to be curbed by the requirement of particularity of description in the warrant of the items subject to seizure.”).

181. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Fourth Amendment” and “basic to a free society.” General warrants countenance arbitrary police intrusion, eroding “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” because the police become the ones who get to fill out the substance of the warrant in practice through their searching. These warrants violate the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

4. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine and the Fifth Amendment

The Bill of Rights doctrine most familiar to the nondelegation discourse is the so-called “void-for-vagueness” doctrine. Various scholars and jurists have linked the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the Article I nondelegation doctrine. The two have some overlap, to be sure. But the better way to understand the vagueness doctrine is that it exists as a component part of a wholly different nondelegation doctrine: the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “any [s]tate” from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” In these clauses, the Supreme Court has found a rule of constitutional law applicable against the federal government via the Fifth Amendment and analogously applicable to the state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. That rule is as follows: “[T]he Government violates [the Constitution’s guarantee of due process] by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” The Court recently even applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine to

183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
a civil law when the consequence of the civil penalty in question was deportation. At bottom, “the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine requires the state to set forth clear guidance before it may punish private conduct.”

Like the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, the void-for-vagueness doctrine has a special connection to the First Amendment. Despite the traditional understanding that the vagueness doctrine is reserved for criminal laws, Justice Thomas noted in concurrence in Johnson v. United States that the Court had previously applied the vagueness doctrine to a non-penal law. The case he cited for this proposition was Keyishian v. Board of Regents, in which the Court held that multiple state laws were unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. But the decision was quite focused on the freedoms that the First Amendment guarantees. The state laws at issue would have authorized the removal of state education employees who uttered treasonous or seditious words. In making its declaration of unconstitutionality, the Keyishian Court cited NAACP v. Button, in which the Court had explained that “standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” Moreover, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court drew a connection between its vagueness holdings and its First Amendment licensing cases (discussed in section II.A.1). As Sunstein has written, specificity in the state’s prescriptions of rules

192. See id. at 593.
195. See id. at 113 n.22.
might be seen as “particularly important in the areas of criminal justice and freedom of speech[.]

The justifications for the vagueness doctrine are twofold. First, the vagueness doctrine guarantees that people will have “fair notice” of what conduct is proscribed. Second, and pertinent to this Article’s thesis, “the doctrine guards against arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.” This second justification—which itself informs the first justification—is undergirded by a kind of nondelegation rationale. Here, the Court’s concern has been that “[s]tatutory language of . . . a standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.” As Justice Kagan observed in a recent plurality opinion, “[T]he doctrine is a corollary of the separation of powers—requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch, define what conduct is

196. Sunstein, Rules, supra note 189, at 968. F. Andrew Hessick and Carissa Byrne Hessick would go a step further. They argue that there is an “incompatibility between the prevailing justification for modern nondelegation doctrine and the vagueness doctrine . . . .” F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 Va. L. Rev. 281, 286 (2021). In making this point, they posit that “treating criminal delegations no differently than other delegations” is a “fundamental problem”—as they put it, “criminal law delegations are different from other delegations. They are inconsistent with foundational criminal law doctrine, they present greater threats to the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine, and they are not supported by the ordinary arguments in favor of delegation. And so we should treat criminal law delegations differently.” Id. (emphasis omitted).


197. Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (“[P]erhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”).

198. Smith, 415 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165–69 (1972)); see also Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168 (“Another aspect of the ordinance’s vagueness appears when we focus, not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the . . . police.”).

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sanctionable and what is not.” 200 And when Congress (or a state legislature) has failed to do so, thereby delegating this awesome power to the executive and the courts under a broad grant of penal authority, the Court has not hesitated to declare the offending statutes unconstitutional.201

The Article I nondelegation parallels are evident. Dissenting in Gundy v. United States, Justice Gorsuch submitted that the Court sometimes uses the vagueness doctrine in place of the nondelegation doctrine to “rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power.”202 And dissenting in Sessions v. Dimaya, Justice Thomas hypothesized that “the vagueness doctrine is really a way to enforce the separation of powers—specifically, the doctrine of nondelegation.”203 To make this point, he pointed to the Court’s admonition in Grayned that “[a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters.”204 Justice Thomas noted that he locates the nondelegation principle, which he defined as the rule “that the Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating core legislative power to another branch[,]” “in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III—not in the Due Process Clause.”205 This view of the meaning of the nondelegation principle comports with the present scholarly discourse. Yet as this Article demonstrates, the rule that Justice Thomas describes is merely one kind of nondelegation

200. Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 1212; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 70 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t is in the ordinance’s delegation to the policeman of open-ended discretion . . . that the problem lies.”).

201. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 612 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We have become accustomed to using the Due Process Clauses to invalidate laws on the ground of ‘vagueness.’ The doctrine we have developed is quite sweeping . . . Using this framework, we have nullified a wide range of enactments.” (citation omitted)) (collecting cases).


203. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The idea that other aspects of law have “replaced” the nondelegation doctrine is not limited to vagueness. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Antideference: COVID, Climate, and the Rise of the Major Questions Canon, 108 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 174, 206 (2022) (“Instead of avoiding the difficulties of applying the nondelegation doctrine, the major questions canon achieves the same purpose sub rosa.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1295 (2008) (“[T]he [Administrative Procedure Act’s] procedural constraints on the exercise of delegated discretion have effectively replaced the nondelegation doctrine.”); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345 (“Narrow construction of criminal statutes, it is proclaimed, . . . constrains the discretion of law enforcement officials . . ..”).

204. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972)).

205. Id.
principle: the Article I nondelegation doctrine. The idea that the Due Process Clause prohibits the delegation of discretion to the executive, as part of the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine, is entirely consistent with Justice Thomas’s Dimaya dissent.

Scholars have expounded upon the parallels. A main observation has been that “[v]ague statutes have the effect of delegating lawmaking authority to the executive.”206 As Michael Mannheimer has written, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine operates as a type of nondelegation doctrine, bolstering the separation of powers by requiring that the lawmaking power be housed in the legislative branch.”207 A recent Note, entitled “Vagueness and Nondelegation,” makes the point succinctly: “The void-for-vagueness doctrine and the nondelegation doctrine share an intuitive connection: when Congress drafts vague statutes, it delegates lawmaking authority to courts and the executive.”208 Moreover, two attorneys have urged adoption of the void-for-vagueness standard—which they describe as requiring that criminal laws “(1) be clear enough to provide fair notice and (2) be

206. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1806 (2012). Justice Thomas cites this quotation in his Dimaya dissent. See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting). That said, then-professor (now Judge) Debra Livingston has taken the position that while “broad and overinclusive rules enhance police discretion, . . . a plethora of narrow rules may not meaningfully constrain it, since such rules may or may not be enforced.” Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 618 (1997).

207. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Vagueness as Impossibility, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (2020); see also Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1547, 1548-49 (describing the “underlying concern” in the vagueness cases not in explicit nondelegation terms, but as a belief that “discretion allows executive officials to make determinations about what should be punished, but such determinations should only be made by elected legislatures”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 107, at 1500 (“[C]entral to the rule of law is the principle that specificity in legal rules serves to constrain the discretion exercised by those charged with their enforcement. This principle has been constitutionalized by the courts, through the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as a safeguard against legislative delegation of excessive discretion to courts and to executive officials and agencies, especially the police.”).

208. Ogale, supra note 20, at 783. Ogale contends that “there are two vagueness doctrines”—what he calls “Rights-Based Vagueness” (exemplified by cases like Papachristou) and “Structure-Based Vagueness” (exemplified by cases like Dimaya). See id. at 786-87. In Ogale’s view, “To the extent that vagueness and nondelegation converge, it is in the context of Structure-Based Vagueness.” Id. at 787. But as this Article has shown, even the rights-based vagueness cases indicate concerns about delegation. See supra notes 198-200.
enacted by elected legislators to ensure democratic legitimacy” — in nondelegation cases “to police noncriminal delegations as well.” 209

B. Tying It All Together

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine emerges. Taken together, the cases discussed in section II.A stand for a coherent rule: several of the amendments in the Bill of Rights protect a right by allocating power between branches of government, and when such a right is at issue, discretion may not be delegated in a way that upsets that allocation. In the First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has prohibited legislatures from conferring open-ended discretion on executive officials to deny permits for expressive activity. 210 In Bruen—a Second Amendment case—the Court prohibited a state legislature from conferring this same sort of discretion on executive officials to deny concealed-carry permits. 211 Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement cases prevent judges from delegating discretion — via a warrant — to the executive about what to search and seize. 212 And in the Fifth Amendment (and Fourteenth Amendment) vagueness cases, the Court has required that the legislature—not the executive—make the relevant policy choices when crafting penal laws. 213

In the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases, the Court has focused on the branch of government that is supposed to exercise a particular discretionary power. If that branch of government delegates that discretion to another branch of government, the Court has declared the delegation itself—whether via statute or warrant—to be unconstitutional. This posture comports with one of the key insights of Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., a nondelegation case discussed earlier in this Article: 214 the proper way to make out a nondelegation challenge is by challenging the underlying delegation, not the action taken pursuant to that delegation. 215 The Court has articulated different, yet similar, rationales for why the mere existence of a delegation

209. Gaziano & Blevins, supra note 20, at 45.
210. See supra Section II.A.1.
211. See supra Section II.A.2.
212. See supra Section II.A.3.
213. See supra Section II.A.4.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 84–87.
impermissibly infringes upon individual liberty. For example, in the First Amendment cases, the Court has found that the “lodg[ing of] broad discretion in a public official to permit speech-related activity” itself abridges speech\(^\text{216}\) because the fact that “[d]issemination of ideas depends upon the approval of the distributor by the official . . . is [itself] administrative censorship in an extreme form.”\(^\text{217}\) Meanwhile, in the Fourth Amendment caselaw, the Court has explained that when people are “secure only in the discretion of police officers[,]” people cannot fully enjoy the security and privacy that the Fourth Amendment guarantees.\(^\text{218}\)

To that end, note what these cases are not primarily about. The issue in the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases is—at least primarily—the fact of delegation of discretion, not the underlying statute’s substantive limitation of the right in question or the executive action that violates the right. In the First Amendment cases, the Court has declared licensing regimes unconstitutional because they delegated discretion to the executive, not because the statutorily prescribed regime itself formally favored one viewpoint over another (a classic example of First Amendment-violative legislation). To be sure, \textit{Bruen} did look to the relationship between New York’s proper-cause standard and the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment.\(^\text{219}\) But Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in \textit{Bruen}, interpreted the majority opinion to say that “New York’s outlier may-issue regime is constitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended discretion to licensing officials and authorizes licenses only for those applicants who can show some special need apart from self-defense.”\(^\text{220}\) As Justice Kavanaugh put it, “[t]hose features of New York’s regime—the unchanneled discretion for licensing officials and the special-need requirement—in effect deny the right to carry handguns for self-defense to many ‘ordinary, law-abiding citizens.’”\(^\text{221}\) Similarly, the void-for-vagueness cases condemn the discretion that vague statutes lodge in the executive, without much inquiry into whether the police power of the state

\(^{216}\) Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97 (1972).
\(^{217}\) Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943).
\(^{220}\) Id. at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
\(^{221}\) Id. (quoting id. at 2122 (majority opinion)).
would permit the government to proscribe, for example, loitering on a street corner, if it should do so with the requisite specificity.

Also, the cases do not admit of a distinction between what administrative law calls “rulemaking” and “adjudication.” The divide between rulemaking and adjudication “is illustrated by [the Supreme] Court’s treatment of two related cases under the Due Process Clause”:222 Londoner v. City & County of Denver223 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization.224 Between Londoner and Bi-Metallic, the Court established “[a] foundational rule of due process in administrative law . . . that due process attaches to administrative adjudication, not rulemaking.”225 Describing legislative rulemaking, the Court in Bi-Metallic observed that “[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or in an assembly of the whole.”226 The distinction matters in the Article I nondelegation context, too. Enforcing Article I’s Vesting Clause against the backdrop of the Constitution’s structure, the Article I nondelegation cases have typically concerned the possibility of rules of conduct that apply “to more than a few people” — legislation by the executive. Yet courts in Bill of Rights cases appear to have no issue with exercising judicial review whether the delegated discretion manifests as rulemaking (e.g., the promulgation of criminal standards fleshing out a vague criminal statute) or adjudication (e.g., the denial of an individual license to an applicant for a speech permit).

Judicial review is a weighty undertaking.227 And perhaps the Article I nondelegation doctrine’s history shows that the Court is wary about exercising its power of judicial review to enforce the nondelegation principle. But the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases demonstrate that this wariness is not an absolute bar to the exercise

227. See supra Section I.B.2; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 144 (1987) ("From the time of John Marshall, the Court has said that the authority to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional is the most awesome responsibility that any court could possess, and the authority to do so must be exercised with extraordinary circumspection.").
of judicial review. Granted, the bulk of these cases are about state statutes (or state warrants). Nevertheless, the Court has employed the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine to engage in robust constitutional review on a regular basis.

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine trains its fire on the delegation of discretion when that delegation could lead to the infringement of an enumerated right. The doctrine enforces a rule about which branch of government must exercise a certain, discretionary power—and, equally as important when applying the nondelegation doctrine, which branch of government cannot be delegated that power. The Court has applied the doctrine when merely the potential exercise—by the wrong branch of government—of the discretionary power in question would violate the people’s constitutionally guaranteed rights of speech; keeping and bearing arms; security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects; or fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. The fact of the doctrine’s existence illuminates an anti-delegation principle across Bill of Rights cases.

III. SOME POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

The identification of a Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine could have significant consequences for Bill of Rights jurisprudence overall. For the purpose of illustrating the point, this Part touches upon three discrete scenarios in which the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine could have an impact. To be sure, this Part merely provides some examples; it does not intend to be an exhaustive summary of the doctrine’s potential applications, and this Article does not claim that the doctrine necessarily applies across the entirety of the Bill of Rights. As to the three applications discussed in this Part: First, the doctrine could provide a path forward for judicial scrutiny of certain misleadingly labeled “shall-issue” concealed carry permit jurisdictions in the wake of Bruen, even if they operate like shall-issue regimes. Second, the doctrine could supply a framework for understanding whether and how courts should defer to congressional judgments of what is “reasonable” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And third, the doctrine could solve what this Article calls the “Jarkesy

problem,” looking to a recent Fifth Circuit decision now before the Supreme Court—Jarkesy v. SEC—that attempted to square the Article I nondelegation doctrine with an issue of discretionary power to violate individuals’ jury trial rights.

A. Perhaps Misleadingly Labeled “Shall-Issue” Concealed Carry Permit Jurisdictions

In Bruen, the Court confronted a discretionary permitting regime for concealed-carry permits that clearly violated the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. With no standards by which the licensing authority was directed to determine “proper cause,” the permitting scheme delegated “open-ended discretion to licensing officials.” The Court separated the different concealed-carry permitting regimes of the U.S. states into three buckets. First, the Court found that 43 states were “shall issue” jurisdictions, meaning that “authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” Second, the Court explained that six states (including New York) and the District of Columbia operated “may issue” regimes, “under which authorities have discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license.” Third and finally, the Court noted that one state—Vermont—had “no permitting system for the concealed carry of handguns.” A reasonable inference to draw from Bruen is that the second category of jurisdictions is constitutionally dubious while the first and third categories are likely fine.

But not all of the 43 purportedly “shall-issue” regimes are the same, and even some of those states’ permitting schemes might violate the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. In the first footnote of Bruen, the Court explained that “[t]hree States—Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island—have discretionary

231. Id. at 2123 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 2123–24.
233. Id. at 2123 n.1.
criteria but appear to operate like ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions.”234
Recall the key insight of Whitman: in an Article I nondelegation challenge, the court evaluates the underlying statute.235 Under Whitman, the very fact of delegation cannot be cured by an executive’s narrowing interpretation of the discretion-delegating statute. Thus, the question for a court applying the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is not whether the regime “appear[s] to operate like [a] ‘shall issue’ jurisdiction,” but whether the underlying statute itself delegates unfettered discretion to the executive in a way that the doctrine prohibits.

A few basic legal principles are helpful in framing this inquiry. To start, federal courts “are bound by the construction” that state courts give to their own states’ statutes.236 Moreover, federal courts may accept a state supreme court’s “narrowing of a state statute” “to avoid constitutional infirmities.”237 For these reasons, a state supreme court’s discretion-cabining construction of a discretion-granting concealed-carry permitting regime likely cannot be disturbed by a federal court.238

Turning to the Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island laws, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine may change the way that federal courts should think about at least one of these states’ concealed-carry permitting schemes. To start, Connecticut and Rhode Island are likely properly classified as shall-issue jurisdictions. The Bruen Court noted how both the Connecticut and Rhode Island courts have interpreted their concealed-carry permitting schemes to narrow discretion in such a way that does not present a constitutional problem.239 Whether those interpretations are correct is a separate question, but that question

234. Id.
235. See supra Section I.B.2.iv.
238. This Article assumes that the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine—even against the backdrop of the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states—does not override the ordinary rule that federal courts must accept state supreme courts’ constructions of state law when those constructions cure delegation issues.
239. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2123 n.1.
is not one that the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine would have anything to say about—at least not in the federal courts.

Yet Delaware is different in kind. Rather than pointing to a Delaware court’s narrowing construction of the permitting regime, the Court noted that as of its decision in Bruen, “the State ha[d] thus far processed 5,680 license applications and renewals in fiscal year 2022 and ha[d] denied only 112.”240 Relying on this justification, however, presents a Whitman problem. The fact that the government has prudently exercised improperly delegated discretion does not obviate what would otherwise be a Bill of Rights nondelegation issue.

Dissenting in Bruen, Justice Breyer noted an inconsistency in the Court’s classification of the different regimes. Justice Breyer questioned why the Court deemed Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island to be shall-issue jurisdictions when it recognized them as having may-issue statutory criteria.241 As Justice Breyer explained, “[T]hese three States demonstrate [that] the line between ‘may issue’ and ‘shall issue’ regimes is not as clear cut as the Court suggests, and that line depends at least in part on how statutory discretion is applied in practice.”242 Particularly as to Delaware, Justice Breyer is correct—and the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine provides the proper framework for understanding why. Whether Delaware operates in practice like a shall-issue jurisdiction is immaterial. The very fact of delegated discretion likely renders it a may-issue jurisdiction. For this reason, even in light of the way Delaware administers its concealed-carry licensing regime, Bruen seems to indicate that the scheme is unconstitutional when applying the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

B. Congressional Determinations of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness

The particularity requirement for warrants is not the only aspect of the Fourth Amendment on which the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine might bear. And the executive is not the only branch of government to which the doctrine would prevent delegation. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
243 The question of reasonableness usually turns on the question of whether the government has obtained a warrant.244 But courts sometimes determine what is "reasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes with reference to the judgment of a legislature.245

In United States v. Watson, the Supreme Court permitted introduction of evidence obtained pursuant to an arrest carried out by a federal postal inspector, despite the fact that the government had not obtained a warrant for the arrest.246 A federal statute had authorized such arrests.247 In the Court's view, that statute "represent[ed] a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable cause to do so."248 Quoting United States v. Di Re, the Court observed that it "should be reluctant to decide that a search . . . authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional."249 The Court noted that securing a warrant in advance of an arrest was ordinarily preferable.250 But it "decline[d] to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause[]."251

The relationship between wiretapping and the Fourth Amendment provides another example of judicial deference to congressional judgments of reasonableness. Initially, the Court in Olmstead v. United States held that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment.252 Nearly forty years later, the Court in Katz v.
United States took a different tack, determining that “[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Then Congress stepped in, enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. As Justice Alito has pointed out: “Since that time, electronic surveillance has been governed primarily, not by decisions of [the] Court, but by the statute, which authorizes, but imposes detailed restrictions on, electronic surveillance.” Some Justices take the position that when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, “[l]egislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than [judges] are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.” That view, if taken to its logical conclusion—judicial deference to legislative judgments about reasonableness—would present a constitutional difficulty when considered through the lens of the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

Courts are the proper determiners—in the first instance—of whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures are certainly more democratically accountable than courts are. And no one doubts that “legislatures (or agencies) can . . . create additional protections” above that which the courts have determined the

255. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427–28 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute, and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.” (first citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006); and then citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 850–51 (2004))).
256. Riley, 573 U.S. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2233 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In § 2703(d) Congress weighed the privacy interests at stake and imposed a judicial check to prevent executive overreach. The Court should be wary of upsetting that legislative balance and erecting constitutional barriers that foreclose further legislative instructions . . . . The Court’s decision runs roughshod over the mechanism Congress put in place to govern the acquisition of cell-site records and closes off further legislative debate on these issues.” (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010))).
Fourth Amendment’s floor to be. Indeed, Title III may in fact represent additional protections. Moreover, reference to a legislature’s judgment can provide evidence of what the society finds to be reasonable. But the issue comes when a court defers to a statute’s reasonableness determination if that statute goes below the floor of protection that the court would otherwise believe the Fourth Amendment secures. In effect, wholesale judicial deference to a legislature’s reasonableness determination works a reverse delegation of discretion—from the courts to the legislature—and contravenes the cardinal constitutional rule that “fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote” because “they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Such deference to the legislature violates the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

In practice, deference to congressional judgments about reasonableness prevents the courts from undertaking an independent inquiry into the Fourth Amendment’s floor. That independent inquiry guards against a legislature’s recalibration of the balance that the Framers already struck with respect to the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The inquiry entails the exercise of discretion—determining what is “reasonable” implicates a variety of considerations with no constraining principle. As discussed earlier in this Article, that discretion is dangerous. And in our system, the court must be the one exercising the discretion in this particular context.

C. Solving the Jarkesy Problem

The Fifth Circuit recently detonated an administrative and constitutional law bomb in Jarkesy v. SEC. There, a Fifth Circuit panel picked apart various aspects of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adjudicatory scheme on constitutional grounds,

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258. Cf. Silver, supra note 2121, at 1257 (describing how state “[a]ppellate courts are uniformly skeptical when a trial court farms out its decisionmaking powers to experts[,]” including reference to a Maine case in which the court “invalidated a parental rights order that ‘contact between the father and the older child shall resume “as therapeutically recommended”’ . . . because, while ‘the court can consider a therapist’s opinion’ in determining parental rights, ‘the court cannot make the visitation outcome dependent upon that opinion’” (quoting In re Children of Richard E., 227 A.3d 159, 169 (Me. 2020)).


including invocation of the Article I nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case.

In the early 2010s, after an investigation, the SEC determined that George Jarkesy had probably committed securities fraud. The agency then decided it would bring charges against Jarkesy. The steps here are important: the SEC (1) investigated Jarkesy, (2) concluded that he likely violated multiple federal securities laws, and (3) decided to bring charges. But before the SEC could bring those charges at step three, it still had one more thing to do: decide the forum in which it wanted to bring an enforcement action against Jarkesy. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC could choose to bring an enforcement action either within the agency (“in-house”)—with no jury afforded to the subject of the enforcement action—or in an Article III federal court.

The SEC has publicly stated that “when the misconduct warrants it, the Commission will bring both proceedings.” In-house adjudication occurs before an administrative law judge (ALJ). This adjudicatory regime is often far more efficient and, the numbers show, slanted in the agency’s favor. The ALJs are themselves SEC employees. Elizabeth Wang explains the difference between federal court adjudication and in-house adjudication well:

In federal court, defendants have access to a jury trial, independent judges, and deposition “testimony [that] is subjected to the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Alternatively, administrative proceedings are conducted before an ALJ, where there is no jury.

261. See id. at 449–50.
262. SEC v. Jarkesy, 143 S. Ct. 2688 (2023) (mem.).
263. Jarkesy, 34 F.4th at 450.
264. See id. at 455 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)).
267. See id. But cf. id. (quoting an SEC ALJ as saying, “The SEC can’t fire us, decide our pay or grade our performance . . . . There’s nothing the SEC can do to influence us and they don’t try to”).
discovery is restricted, hearings proceed on a rapid schedule, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.268

For the SEC, bringing the charges before an ALJ saves time, yields a high rate of success, and gets the case before an expert adjudicator whose primary role is to hear cases about securities law violations (as opposed to generalist Article III judges). It is no wonder, then, that “[t]he SEC has recently leaned more heavily on its in-house tribunal.”269 Naturally, the SEC brought its charges against Jarkesy in-house.270

In Jarkesy, the Fifth Circuit held—among other things—that the forum-selection provision of the Dodd-Frank Act violated the Article I nondelegation doctrine.271 In the statute, Congress provided no guidance for how the SEC was to choose between these two options. In the Fifth Circuit’s telling, “Congress gave the SEC a significant legislative power by failing to provide it with an intelligible principle to guide its use of the delegated power.”272 That legislative power, according to the Fifth Circuit, was “the unfettered authority to choose whether to bring enforcement actions in Article III courts or within the agency.”273

Jonathan Adler disagreed with the court’s Article I nondelegation holding. He put it the following way: “The delegated power at issue is the SEC’s authority to make case-by-case decisions about how to enforce the securities laws against individual regulated entities. This is not legislative power.”274 Rather, Adler wrote, “[t]his is the sort of prosecutorial discretion that lies at the core of executive authority. And because this is not legislative power, no ‘intelligible principle’ is required.”275 The Fifth Circuit had written that

269. Eaglesham, supra note 266.
270. Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 449 (5th Cir. 2022).
271. See id. at 451.
272. Id. at 459.
273. Id.
275. Id.
“[g]overnment actions are ‘legislative’ if they have ‘the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch.’” Adler countered that this definition “doesn’t do the work the Fifth Circuit wants it to. Jarkesy’s rights in an Article III court and in an administrative proceeding are what they are under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The SEC did not alter these rights. It merely chose how to enforce the laws Congress enacted.”

Adler is half-right. The delegation to the SEC to determine the forum in which to bring individual enforcement actions is significantly different than what the Article I nondelegation doctrine has traditionally condemned as delegation of legislative power. But the forum determination is not the same thing as prosecutorial discretion. When a prosecutor chooses whether to litigate in an Article III court or before an agency, that choice is different than the choice of the statute under which to prosecute or the choice of whether to prosecute at all. Ordinarily, as described above, an agency decides two things when bringing an enforcement action: (1) what statute—or implementing regulation—the alleged offender violated, and (2) whether to bring the action. But the Dodd-Frank Act added a third step to this decision-making process for the SEC: the question of the forum in which to bring the action (in a federal court or before the agency itself). And as the cases demonstrate, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine does not admit of a distinction between legislative rulemaking and adjudication when adjudication requires discretion and can lead to a rights violation. So even though the agency would exercise discretion on an individual basis with respect to individual subjects of enforcement, the underlying statute has a nondelegation problem in the same way that the speech licensing regimes had nondelegation problems in the cases discussed earlier in this Article.

Choosing in-house adjudication has real consequences. One such consequence has a Bill of Rights nexus: in-house adjudication provides no jury, potentially contravening the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in

277. Adler, supra note 274.
278. See supra notes 222–226.
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”

Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Jarkesy also held that the SEC’s in-house adjudicatory scheme violated Jarkesy’s Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury.

The better way to think about the delegation problem in Jarkesy is with reference to the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. The problem is an agency’s ability to decide—in its unfettered discretion—to litigate in a forum in which a subject of enforcement gets no jury. Under the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine, Congress cannot delegate this sort of discretion to an administrative agency when an enumerated right—here, the right to a trial by jury—is at stake. Moreover, applying Whitman, the SEC could not itself cure the delegation problem by setting forth limits on its own discretion. Assuming the in-house adjudication would violate the Seventh Amendment, the underlying statute thus likely violates not the Article I nondelegation doctrine but rather the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine.

Jarkesy is therefore a Bill of Rights nondelegation case. The problem is not just the statute as applied to Jarkesy; under the Court’s precedents, the whole forum-selection regime is vulnerable to a facial challenge because it impermissibly lodges discretion in the SEC with respect to an enumerated right. Even if the SEC never exercised its discretion to bring an enforcement action in the administrative forum (not the state of the world, to be sure), the law would still contravene a principle of nondelegation that has permeated the Court’s jurisprudence. And even though the SEC is probably not exercising a legislative power when determining—on an individual basis—whether to bring particular enforcement actions in-house or in federal court, the nondelegation doctrine (a

279. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Determining that the no-jury scheme of the administrative tribunal violates the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine likely requires an antecedent determination that having to submit to administrative adjudication would violate one’s Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. For an argument that the Constitution prohibits the juryless tribunals that have become a hallmark of administrative adjudication, see Richard Lorren Jolly, The Administrative State’s Jury Problem, 98 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).


281. The SEC had done exactly this, having “issued internal guidance on the selection between administrative and civil proceedings.” Kenneth Oshita, Home Court Advantage? The SEC and Administrative Fairness, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 879, 887 (2017); see also David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1207 (2016).
specific kind of nondelegation doctrine) still has something to say about the statute conferring that discretion.

IV. CAVEATS

This Part addresses some counterarguments and clarifies this Article’s thesis. Three points are important. First, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine and the Article I nondelegation doctrine differ in important ways. Second, the discretion at which the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine takes aim is different from prosecutorial discretion, which the doctrine does not address. Third, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is far from the only way in which courts enforce the Bill of Rights’ protections, and it is not necessarily enforced across the entirety of the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, reading the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases in relation to one another illuminates how the Supreme Court has given teeth to the Bill of Rights.

A. The Article I Nondelegation Doctrine vs. the Bill of Rights Nondelegation Doctrine

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is not the Article I nondelegation doctrine. Important, substantive differences exist between the two doctrines, which both fall under the umbrella of the “nondelegation doctrine.” The Article I nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating—to the executive—any of the legislative powers with which the Constitution has vested Congress. Meanwhile, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine prohibits the delegation of discretion to a branch of government when it would upset the Constitution’s allocation of power concerning an enumerated right. In the end, the most meaningful parallel is the bar on delegation itself, but the two doctrines are not the same.  

282. Understanding the Article I nondelegation doctrine as a distinct aspect of the nondelegation doctrine may shed some light on the relevance of certain legal materials to the question of whether the Article I nondelegation doctrine is consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. See, e.g., Eli Nachmany, The Irrelevance of the Northwest Ordinance Example to the Debate About Originalism and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev. Online 17 (2022) (arguing that the broad delegation of lawmaking authority in the Northwest Ordinance sheds no light on the original meaning of the Article I nondelegation doctrine because Congress enacted the ordinance pursuant to its power under Article IV as opposed to an Article I power).
Legislative power and discretion are similar. The term “legislative power” connotes the discretionary power to prescribe—subject only to the constraints imposed by the Constitution—the rules by which conduct is ordered in a given society. “Discretion” itself has a more particular definition. The relevant definition in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[f]reedom in the exercise of judgment; the power of free decision-making.” But this freedom, in the hands of the executive, invites the arbitrary exercise of will. The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine merely takes this observation, applies it when an enumerated right is at stake (whether as a result of legislative rulemaking or administrative adjudication), and safeguards this right by prohibiting the delegation of discretion to the wrong branch of government.

For that reason, the key takeaway is that the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is just as much about delegation as is the Article I nondelegation doctrine. In the First, Second, and Fifth Amendment cases, the delegation is clear: a legislature has delegated discretion to an executive official. That discretion could manifest as the power to deny a permit for expressive activity, to deny a permit to carry a concealed firearm, or to enforce a vague criminal ordinance. The Fourth Amendment cases are a bit trickier to analogize, but they too are about delegation. Here, the delegation is from the judicial officer to the police. Under the Constitution, the judicial magistrate is supposed to be the one who exercises the discretionary power to determine whether the warrant describes with particularity “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Just as the Article I nondelegation doctrine

283. For a particularly strong version of this argument, see generally Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019) (advancing an interpretation of the Due Process Clause that requires good-faith exercise of legislators’ discretionary powers in a manner actually calculated to achieve constitutionally proper ends).


285. Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing the Article I nondelegation doctrine as “ensur[ing] that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards” (emphasis added)).

286. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To be sure, this discretionary power is itself subject to a standard: the warrant may only issue “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” Id.
prohibits Congress from delegating certain legislative powers to the executive, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine prohibits the delegation of unfettered discretion when an enumerated right is at stake.

Still, separating the Article I nondelegation doctrine from the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine illuminates a deeper truth: the nondelegation doctrine is about more than Article I of the Constitution. The nondelegation doctrine is an umbrella term for at least two doctrines of constitutional law that can coexist. Whether the Supreme Court has applied the Article I nondelegation doctrine in the years since 1935 bears only on the continued vitality of that version of the nondelegation doctrine. As the cases demonstrate, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is alive and well.

B. Prosecutorial Discretion vs. Delegated Discretion

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine does not disallow all executive discretion. The doctrine leaves prosecutorial discretion—the classic example of permissible executive discretion—undisturbed. To see the point here, one must understand the difference between prosecutorial discretion and the other sort of discretion at which the doctrine takes aim.

Prosecutorial discretion is “the power of the Executive to determine how, when, and whether to initiate and pursue enforcement proceedings.”\(^{287}\) Given the executive’s need to allocate limited prosecutorial resources effectively, the traditional justification for the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in enforcing the law is that the discretion is a necessary corollary to the discharge

\(^{287}\) Peter L. Markowitz, *Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty*, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 489, 490 (2017); see also Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, *Faithful Execution and Article II*, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2115 (2019) (discussing the traditional understanding of federal prosecutorial discretion’s constitutional textual source); Josh Bowers, *Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute*, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1659 (2010) (“When it comes to critical determinations of normative blameworthiness in petty public order cases, prosecutors enjoy almost unbridled equitable discretion.”); Memorandum for the Commissioner from Bo Cooper, INS General Counsel, on INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 2 (July 11, 2000), https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Gov-ProsDisc-07.11.00.pdf (“Although prosecutorial discretion is sometimes viewed solely as the decision of a prosecutor whether or not to bring charges against an individual, the term also can apply to a broad spectrum of discretionary enforcement decisions taken by a law enforcement agency . . . .”).
of the executive’s duty. The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine has nothing to say about prosecutorial discretion, largely because the executive does not exercise such discretion pursuant to a delegation. Rather, the executive possesses an “inherent” prosecutorial discretion, yielding only to a “clear and specific” statutory limitation and ordinarily not subject to judicial review. Thus, the legislature may proscribe certain conduct (at times in violation of an enumerated right in the Bill of Rights), but the executive’s discretion about how to allocate resources in enforcing that proscription is not a problem of delegation.

The discretion at issue in the Bill of Rights nondelegation cases is of a different kind. In these cases, the discretion goes to the nature of the law itself. Suppose that a prosecutor’s office has a readily prosecutable case against a suspect thought to have committed murder. The law of murder is clear, and the prosecutor can potentially make the case that this suspect committed murder. Nevertheless, given how difficult it might be to collect the evidence, the prosecutor declines to prosecute. That is prosecutorial discretion. By contrast, suppose that the legislature had delegated to the prosecutor the power to define what the law of murder was, such that the prosecutor could decide whether the law should encompass the conduct in which the suspect had engaged. Here, the prosecutor has not been endowed with prosecutorial discretion. Rather, Congress has endowed him with a lawmaking discretion. The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine polices the latter kind of power grants—including conferrals of the power to determine whether a given individual has satisfied the necessary criteria to obtain a permit to speak or to carry a gun (an administrative adjudication). Understanding this distinction helps to clarify


289. Cooper, supra note 287, at 8. To be sure, prosecutorial discretion is still subject to constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”); cf. United States v. Texas, 577 U.S. 1101 (2016) (mem.) (granting a petition for a writ of certiorari and directing the parties to brief the question whether an executive policy of non-enforcement of immigration law as to a particular subset of aliens “violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution” before affirming the judgment of the lower court by an equally divided Court at 579 U.S. 547, 548 (2016)).
as a Bill of Rights nondelegation case masquerading as an ordinary Article I nondelegation case.

C. Bill of Rights Jurisprudence vs. Bill of Rights Nondelegation

Courts enforce the Bill of Rights in a variety of ways. The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is merely one such way. The vast majority of Bill of Rights cases focus not on the delegation of discretion to the executive but on the rights infringements themselves. Thus, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is best understood as existing within a broader framework of protections that the Bill of Rights guarantees the people. Moreover, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine does not necessarily apply across the board.

The Supreme Court is solicitous of individual rights claims when those rights are enumerated in the Bill of Rights. To take one example, the Court has routinely declared state and federal laws to be unconstitutionally violative of the First Amendment. From the State of Texas’s anti-flag burning statute in Texas v. Johnson290 to the federal Stolen Valor Act in United States v. Alvarez,291 the Court has exercised its power of judicial review many times when a law prohibits that which the Court believes the First Amendment protects. The same is true when the Court hears challenges under the Second Amendment.292

In these cases, the Court has confronted claims that either a “ban” or a limitation on this or that conduct impermissibly infringes on an enumerated right. When litigants make this point, the Court listens. While the Court often engages in “some type of means-end scrutiny” when evaluating these claims,293 the cases demonstrate that the Court has frequently found in favor of challengers. These claims are different than those that undergird the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine. For example, in both McDonald v. City of Chicago and District of Columbia v. Heller, the challenges under the Second Amendment were to laws that affirmatively banned handguns.294

294. See McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
are different—and perhaps facially more severe—than are mere grants of discretion to deny certain rights to certain individuals. Nevertheless, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine is a component part of the Court’s Bill of Rights jurisprudence. Still, this Article does not purport to claim that the doctrine has influenced the jurisprudence of every nook and cranny of the Bill of Rights—at least not yet.

CONCLUSION

The nondelegation doctrine is about more than congressional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. While those delegations may pose problems under the Article I nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court has long been applying another type of nondelegation doctrine in Bill of Rights cases. In cases involving permitting regimes for speech and guns, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine has disfavored the delegation of license-granting discretion to the executive. These cases typically declare that the entire permitting regime is unconstitutional because it confers too much discretion on the wrong governmental actor. When it comes to the First and Second Amendment, discretion about whether and when to grant permits must reside in the legislature—not the executive. When that discretion is delegated, the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine has come into play. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment caselaw also sounds nondelegation notes. The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement for warrants is a rule of nondelegation; it prohibits the delegation of discretion from the courts to the police about what to search or seize. And the Fifth Amendment’s void-for-vagueness doctrine prevents the delegation of penal lawmaking power from the legislature to the executive.

The Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine has several other potential applications—this Article discusses three. First, taking the logic of Bruen, courts might determine that other concealed-carry permitting regimes are unconstitutional, even if the executive has purported to limit its own discretion in carrying out the scheme. Second, courts should be careful about deference to the legislature’s determination of “reasonableness” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Third, seeing Jarkesy v. SEC as a Bill of Rights nondelegation case might clarify the Fifth Circuit’s nondelegation holding in its panel opinion. These potential
applications are not an exhaustive list, but they demonstrate the ways that recognizing the doctrine could change our law. Scholars and jurists have analyzed, applied, called for the revival of, and written obituaries for something called the “nondelegation doctrine.” Often, they are talking about the Article I nondelegation doctrine—a component of a broader nondelegation doctrine. As this Article demonstrates, the nondelegation doctrine also has a Bill of Rights component. Recognizing the Bill of Rights nondelegation doctrine could therefore help focus the nondelegation debate, clarifying the scope of originalist inquiry into the nondelegation doctrine’s historical pedigree.

The nondelegation doctrine is not dead. Indeed, it has been alive—at least a form of it has been alive—at the Supreme Court for many years. The Bill of Rights cases bear this out. From the First and Second Amendments to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court has frequently prohibited the delegation of discretion to violate enumerated rights.