

1982

In the matter of the estate of Louis A. Grossen : Brief of Respondent Earl Louis Grossen

Utah Supreme Court

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Clark R. Nielsen; Attorneys for Appellants;

William L. Crawford; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Respondent;

Recommended Citation

Brief of Respondent, *Grossen v. Grossen*, No. 18075 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate)
)
 of)
) No. 18075
 LOUIS A. GROSSEN, a/k/a LOUIS)
 GROSSEN, MILTON GROSSEN, L.E.)
 GROSSEN, LARRY GROSSEN and)
 EDWARD GROSSEN,)
)
 Deceased.)
)
 _____)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT EARL LOUIS GROSSEN

Appeal from an Order of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge

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Eleanor Grossen Vincent and
Lucille M. Grossen Taylor

FILED

APR - 11982

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate)
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) No. 18075
 LOUIS A. GROSSEN, a/k/a LOUIS)
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 GROSSEN, LARRY GROSSEN and)
 EDWARD GROSSEN,)
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 Deceased.)
)
 _____)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT EARL LOUIS GROSSEN

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action to determine the testacy or intestacy of Louis A. Grossen, deceased, and to determine the validity or invalidity of the decedent's Last Will and Testament, dated July 10, 1974.

Appellants allege that the will is invalid because one witness was under the age of 18 when the will was executed. Respondents claim that at the time the will was witnessed, there was no legal age requirement for witnesses.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

An evidentiary hearing was held on September 21, 1981, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge. Judge Rigtrup found that the will had been validly executed and witnessed, and admitted it to probate. Judge Rigtrup further denied the Appellants' petition for appointment of personal representative and appointed Respondent personal representative.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmance of the disposition of the court below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The matters set forth in the first two paragraphs of Appellants' statement of facts are correct except that the record does not conclusively show that the decedent did not remarry his second wife after their divorce in 1943 (R. 20, 73-74).

The matters set forth in the third paragraph of Appellants' statement of facts are not properly facts before this Court. As Appellants concede, their proffer of testimony regarding statements allegedly made before the decedent's death was ruled inadmissible by the trial court (R. 71-72). Appellants have not challenged the validity of that ruling.

The court below found that the decedent executed the Last Will and Testament in dispute in this case and that it was properly witnessed (R. 81-82). It is irrelevant that Respondent did not file the will for probate until after Appellants filed their petition.

The court below did specifically find that, on the date that Mr. Grossen's Last Will and Testament was executed and witnessed, Scott Hill was only 16 years old (R. 33). The court also found that "the execution of the will by the decedent was made in the presence of Richard B. Hill and Scott Hill

as attesting witnesses, the decedent at the time of the execution of the will indicated to the subscribing witnesses that it was his will and requested them to execute the same, and the two attesting witnesses signed their names at the end of the will at the testator's request, in his presence, and in the presence of each other (R. 33, 81-82). Appellants have not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence upon which such findings were made. The testimony of Richard B. Hill and Scott Hill referred to in Appellants' brief, to the effect that their recollections of exactly what took place are poor, is therefore irrelevant to the issues on appeal herein.

Upon hearing the evidence presented at the hearing, the court below ruled that Mr. Grossen's Last Will and Testament was valid and properly executed and witnessed, and admitted that will to probate (R. 33-34, 81-82). Respondent was appointed personal representative (R. 37, 82). In admitting the will to probate, the court found that the will was validly executed and witnessed according to the law of the State of Utah at the time the will was executed, and that, at that time, such law did not include an age requirement for witnesses to a will (R. 80-81).

The matters set forth in the final paragraph of appellants' statement of facts are correct.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The only issue properly before this Court on appeal is the following:

Whether a will which was validly executed and witnessed in 1974 by two witnesses, one of whom was under age 18, and which was never revoked, remains valid under the Utah Uniform Probate Code as adopted in 1975, which requires that the witnesses to wills be over the age of 18 years.

Appellants argue in both Points I and II of their brief that the decedent's will was invalid because one of the witnesses did not meet the age requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-505 (1953, as amended, 1975). Both points present that single issue, and no other. Appellants nowhere argue that, prior to adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in Utah in 1976, Utah law imposed any specific age requirement on witnesses to a will and the court below found that no such age requirement existed before adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (R. 81). Nevertheless, Respondent will complete his argument by discussing in Respondent's Point II the absence of such an age requirement before 1977.

The court below made no finding of fact as to whether the decedent was married on the date of his death (R. 73). Given the disposition of the case below, such a finding was not necessary. In their Point III, Appellants assume it to be an established fact that the decedent was not, in fact, married at the date of his death. Such supposed fact is not conclusively

established in the record. Furthermore, the court below neither received evidence nor made any rulings as to the fitness of either candidate for appointment as personal representative, other than respondent. Point III of Appellants' argument is therefore not properly at issue on this appeal. If this Court should rule that Mr. Grossen's will should not have been admitted to probate, this case should be returned to the court below for further hearing and determination.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. A will which was validly executed and witnessed in 1974 and was never revoked remains valid under the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

2. The will in question was validly executed and witnessed according to Utah law in 1974.

3. If the court should rule adversely to respondent on this appeal, the case should be remanded to the trial court for further hearing to receive additional evidence and determine the most suitable personal representative.

ARGUMENT

I

A WILL WHICH WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED
AND WITNESSED IN 1974 AND WAS NEVER REVOKED
REMAINS VALID UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE.

As Appellants note, there is no question that the Utah Uniform Probate Code "applies to any wills of decedents dying"

after July 1, 1977. Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101 (2)(a) (1953, as amended 1975). Respondent does not argue, and the court below did not rule, that the Uniform Probate Code does not apply. Appellants' argument that the code applies, and indeed that it controls the validity of a will of any person dying after July 1, 1977, is entirely beside the point.

In fact, because it was validly executed and witnessed under Utah law in 1974, (as discussed in Point II, below), that will is valid according to the express terms of § 75-2-506 (1953, as amended 1975):

A written will is valid if executed in compliance with § 75-2-502 or 75-2-503 or if its execution complies with the law at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed. (Emphasis added)

In finding that the will at issue in this case is valid, the trial court did nothing more than apply the literal and unambiguous language of that section. As a general rule, the courts should not substitute their own interpretations for the clear, literal meaning of a statute. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967). See, also, the language from In re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P.2d 432, 434 (1943), quoted in Brief for Appellants at 9.

Any ruling other than that adopted by the court below would have contravened not only the language but also the policies underlying the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Given the clear language of § 75-2-506, the policy noted by Appellants

favoring "deference to the State Legislature in its determination of State probate procedures" (Brief for Appellants at 6), supports respondent's position. In this regard, it is worth noting that In re Estate of Lane, 99 Ida. 850, 590 P.2d 577 (1979), upon which Appellants rely extensively, is neither "factually identical" nor "directly applicable" to the case on appeal herein. In Lane, the Idaho court merely applied the witness age requirement to a will which was executed after the age requirement had taken effect. The Idaho court had no reason not to apply that age requirement strictly and literally, because nothing in the Idaho statutes directed it to do otherwise. In contrast, in the case on appeal herein, Respondent readily concedes that, with respect to wills to which § 75-2-506 does not apply, the provisions of § 75-2-505, requiring witnesses to be over age 18, deserve strict application. It is, however, just as important to apply the terms of § 75-2-506 strictly and literally, in deference to the judgment of the Utah Legislature.

Likewise pertinent are the policies expressly articulated in the Utah Uniform Probate Code itself. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 provides:

(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.

(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: . . . (b) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property; . . . and

. . . (e) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

(Emphasis added).

The trial court expressly found that the decedent executed his Last Will and Testament "of his own free will and choice" and not "as the result of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, or any other condition that would cause the will not to be valid" (R. 33). Thus, the intent of the decedent is not in doubt, and any attempt to ignore the clear language of § 75-2-506 would result in the defeat of that clearly expressed intent. (The circumstances and intention of the Testator at the time of execution of the will are, of course, controlling ones. Wright v. Wright, 520 P.2d 563 (Utah, 1974)). As a corollary to the policy which favors discovering and giving effect to the intent of a decedent, Utah law recognizes a presumption against intestacy. In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215 (Utah, 1980). Of course, these principles are ordinarily applied in interpreting a will itself, but there is no reason why this Court should not consider them in the course of statutory construction as well. Absent important policy considerations to the contrary, then, this court should not adopt a reading of § 75-2-506 which both ignores the clear language of that section and would result in the intestacy of the decedent and the defeat of his clearly expressed intent. In addition, to place any such construction on the statute could cause numerous wills to be invalidated; surely the Legislature would not have intended such a result.

Appellants neither cite nor refer to § 75-2-506 in their brief, so it is difficult to determine their position regarding its application. Appellants may have intended to argue that this Court should only apply that section to wills executed in states other than Utah. Aside from the fact that it would ignore the clear, unambiguous language of the section and the equally clear intent of the decedent, such a ruling would contravene the second expressed policy of the Utah Uniform Probate Code noted above, that favors uniformity of law. If the words "at the time of execution" are not to be ignored, such a limitation on the scope of the section would mean that, hypothetically, if the execution and witnessing of Mr. Grossen's will had taken place in Idaho before that State's adoption of a witness age requirement, and if that will were submitted for probate in Utah, the Utah court would admit that will, whereas an Idaho court would not, despite the fact that the will was valid in Idaho at the time it was executed. Likewise, an Idaho court would, by virtue of § 75-2-506, admit Mr. Grossen's will as actually executed and witnessed in Utah, although the will would not be admitted in Utah. Such a result does violence to the policy in favor of uniformity of law.

In addition, the results described above, which would necessarily follow from limiting the application of § 75-2-506 to wills executed in states other than Utah, would make little sense. A statute is not to be interpreted so as to produce

absurd and senseless results. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah, 1978).

Such a limitation of § 75-2-506 might be defensible if that section declared valid in Utah only those wills which are now valid in the states in which they were executed. Wills would then, under § 75-2-506, be universally either valid or invalid. That is, however, not what the section says. Rather, § 75-2-506 validates wills which were validly executed "at the time of execution [in] the place where. . . executed." It is a universal principal of statutory construction that statutes are to be interpreted so as to give effect to all of their parts. Millet v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah, 1980); Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).

II

THE WILL IN QUESTION WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED AND WITNESSED ACCORDING TO UTAH LAW IN 1974.

Prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-505 in 1975, Utah law contained no age limitations for witnesses to a will. Absent such a provision in the Probate Code, general provisions governed the competence of the witnesses to a will. 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 284 (1975). Under those general provisions, which were controlling in 1974, a sixteen-year-old was perfectly competent to act as a witness, absent some indication of mental incompetence or inability to understand or remember the subject of testimony. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1953);

State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah, 1978); State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). The court below found that the witnesses to the decedent's will were competent under the general rules with respect to witnesses in Utah. They therefore met the requirements of Utah law in effect at the time the will of decedent was executed.

III

IF THE COURT SHOULD RULE ADVERSELY TO RESPONDENT ON THIS APPEAL, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER HEARING TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND DETERMINE THE MOST SUITABLE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

In appointing respondent personal representative, the court below followed the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203 (1953, as amended 1975), which sets forth the priority among persons seeking appointment as personal representative. Because the will names respondent as personal representative, the court so ordered. (R. 36-37). The court therefore had no occasion to determine whether the decedent was married at the time of death, and if not, who would be most fit to act as personal representative.

Appellants request an order from this Court naming appellant Mrs. Vincent as personal representative, claiming that, "any allegation that Vivian Grossen has priority for appointment as personal representative under § 75-3-203(d), as surviving spouse of Louis Grossen, is defeated by the fact that at the time of Louis Grossen's death, Vivian was not, in fact, married to Mr. Grossen." (Appellants' Brief at 10). This


assertion is not conclusively supported by the record. While counsel for respondent did not attempt to present evidence on this point, the record does contain evidence from which the court could have inferred that the decedent was, in fact, married at his death, including the references in the will to "my wife, Vivian H. Grossen," (R. 20), and the certificate executed after the divorce of the decedent, sealing his marriage to Vivian H. Grossen, (R. 73-74). Furthermore, even if the decedent was not married at his death, the record herein is insufficient for this Court to reach an informed conclusion as to the relative fitness of either respondent or Mrs. Vincent, both of whom are children of the decedent, to act as personal representative. If this Court should find that the will is not valid under Utah law, then it should remand this case to the court below, whose province it is to make findings of fact in probate disputes. In re Estate of Astill, 14 Utah 2d 217, 381 P.2d 95 (1963); In re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 130 P.2d 432 (1943).


CONCLUSION

The Last Will and Testament of Louis A. Grossen was validly executed and witnessed under Utah law in effect on the date of execution. Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, which expressly validates wills executed in accordance with the law in effect at the time and place of execution, the will is therefore valid.

Should the Court rule in appellants' favor, however, this case should be remanded to the court below for further consideration of the issues which would then arise regarding appointment of a personal representative.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29 day of March,
1982.



WILLIAM L. CRAWFORD


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P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April 1982, I caused to be mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, postage prepaid, to Clark R. Nielsen, NIELSEN & SENIOR, Attorneys for Appellants, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.



Last Will and Testament

OF

LOUIS GROSSEN

I, LOUIS GROSSEN, a resident of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, being of sound mind and disposing memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or the undue influence of any person whomsoever, do make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament and do hereby expressly revoke all former Wills and testamentary dispositions heretofore made by me.

I.

MY HEIRS. My wife, VIVIAN E. GROSSEN--- (hereinafter sometimes designated "my wife"), and ~~and~~ my three (3) children whose names are LUCILLE TAYLOR, MAE ELEANOR VINCENT--- are living at the time of the execution of this Will. I have no other children. The terms "child," "children" and "issue" as used herein shall include legally adopted and hereafter born child, children and issue. EARL LOUIS

II.

DEBTS AND FUNERAL EXPENSES. I direct that my debts, last illness, funeral and burial expenses be paid as soon after my death as may be reasonably convenient, and I hereby authorize my Executor, as hereinafter appointed, to settle and discharge any claims against my estate in total absolute discretion.

III.

SCOPE OF THIS WILL. It is my intention in this Will to devise, bequeath and dispose of my entire estate consisting of all of my real, personal and mixed properties of every kind and description, wheresoever the same may be situated, and to exercise any power of appointment which I may own at the time of my death.

IV.

HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS. I declare that as of this date all household furniture and furnishings, appliances and equipment, carpets, silverware, books, pictures, paintings, works of art, and similar household items in any residential dwelling or home occupied by myself and my wife at the time of my death, are the sole and separate property of my said wife, having been given to her by me during my lifetime or having been acquired by her from her separate funds.

V.

DISPOSITION OF ESTATE. If my wife, VIVIAN E. GROSSEN--- survives me, then I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife my entire estate consisting of all of my real, personal and mixed properties, wheresoever the same may be situated, outright and free of trust.

EXHIBIT A

Louis Grossen 20

Executor of my Will, with the same powers and discretions as are herein vested in my Execut^r [In the event ^rNot applicable----- should decline or for any reason fail to serve hereunder, I hereby nominate and appoint ^rNot applicable----- to serve as Execut^r ^rN/A of my Will, without bond or other security being required of ^rN/A and with the same powers and discretions as are herein vested in my Execut^r ^rN/A]- Note: The last three sentences on page two of my will, beginning "In the event.....through the last sentence in the above section, page 3, ending "vested in my Execut.....are not applicable in this will of LOUIS GROSSEN.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of July, 1974. (Ten July 1974)

Louis Grossen

This instrument, consisting of three... (3) typewritten pages (including the attestation clause and signatures of witnesses), was subscribed by LOUIS GROSSEN----- on the day and year last above written in the presence of us, and at the time said Will was so subscribed LOUIS GROSSEN-----declared to us that this instrument is his Will, and thereupon, we, at his request, and in his presence, and in the presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as attesting witnesses the day and year last above written.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RESIDENCE</u>
<u>Richard B. Hill</u>	<u>737 E. 474 50-</u> S.L.C. UT.
<u>Scott Hill</u>	<u>937 E. 474 50</u> S.L.C. UT.

SEP 30 1981

WILLIAM L. CRAWFORD
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PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Personal Representative
79 South State Street
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

W. Sterling Evans, Clerk of Court
By John R. [Signature]
Deputy Clerk

MICROFILMED

DATE OCT 15 1981

BY Lucille Grosen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
OF) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
)
LOUIS A. GROSSEN,)
) Probate No. P81-671
Deceased)

* * * * *

The Petition of Mae Eleanor Grossen Vincent and Lucille M. Grossen Taylor for Appointment of Personal Representative and Determination of Intestacy and the petition of Earl L. Grossen for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, and the Objections to said Petitions on file herein, came on for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, on the 21st day of September, 1981. Petitioner Earl L. Grossen was represented by his counsel, William L. Crawford, of and for Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Petitioners Mae Eleanor Grossen Vincent and Lucille M. Grossen Taylor were represented by their counsel Clark R. Nielsen, of Nielsen and Senior. Richard B. Hill and Scott Hill, as subscribing witnesses to the Last Will and Testament of Louis Grossen, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. The Court having heard testimony introduced by the parties and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The document filed with this Court under Probate No. P81-671 captioned "Last Will and Testament of Louis Grossen" and dated July 10, 1974, is the Last Will and Testament of Louis Grossen, deceased.

2. Said Last Will and Testament was executed at the end thereof by Louis Grossen who was then over the age of 18 years, the execution of the Will by the decedent was made in the presence of Richard B. Hill and Scott Hill as attesting witnesses, the decedent at the time of execution of the Will indicated to the subscribing witnesses that it was his will and requested them to execute the same, and the two attesting witnesses signed their names at the end of the Will at the testator's request, in his presence, and in the presence of each other.

3. At the date of the execution of the Will, one of the witnesses, Scott Hill, was only 16 years of age.

4. At the time of the execution of the Will the decedent was acting of his own free will and choice and did not execute his Will as the result of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, or any other condition that would cause the Will not to be valid.

5. The decedent at the time of the execution of his Will had the capacity to dispose of his property by will.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the following:


CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Last Will and Testament of Louis Grossen dated July 10, 1974, which Will has been filed with this Court,

is valid and is entitled to be admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Earl Grossen, deceased.


DATED this 30TH day of September, 1981.

BY THE COURT:



The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
District Judge

ATTEST
W. STERLING EVANS
Clerk

By 
County Clerk

9/21

MICROFILMED

DATE OCT 15 1981
BY *M. L. G. G. G.*

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County

SEP 30 1981

W. Sterling Evans, Clerk
By *[Signature]* Deputy Clerk

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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE)
OF) FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL
LOUIS A. GROSSEN,) AND APPOINTMENT OF
Deceased) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Probate No. P81-671

* * * * *

Upon consideration of the Petition of Earl L. Grossen for Formal Probate of the Decedent's Will dated July 10, 1974, and for Formal Appointment of Earl L. Grossen as Personal Representative of the decedent, filed with the Court by Earl L. Grossen on September 7, 1981, and the Court having entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law in this matter, the Court further finds that:

1. The required notice has been given or waived.
2. The proceeding was commenced within the time provided by law.
3. The decedent died on April 17, 1981, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4. Venue is proper.
5. The testamentary instrument to which the petition relates is the decedent's Last Will.

6. Earl L. Grossen is entitled to appointment as the decedent's Personal Representative to act without bond.

7. The heirs of the decedent are as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Relationship</u>
Vivian H. Anderson Grossen	Spouse
Mae Eleanor Grossen Vincent	Daughter
Lucille M. Grossen Taylor	Daughter
Earl Louis Grossen	Son

THEREFORE:


1. The Will of the decedent dated July 10, 1974, is hereby formally probated.

2. Earl L. Grossen is hereby formally appointed as the Personal Representative of the decedent to act without bond.

3. Upon qualification and acceptance, Letter Testamentary shall be issued to the said personal representative.


DATED this 30th day of September, 1981.

BY THE COURT:



The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
District Judge

ATTEST
W. STERLING EVANS
Clerk

By 

Deputy Clerk

1 THE COURT: May this witness be excused?

2 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, your Honor, he may. I would call
3 then Mrs. Vincent to the stand.

4 THE COURT: For what purpose?

5 MR. NIELSEN: For the purpose of testifying that in
6 1976, your Honor, and in 1978 she had conversations with the
7 decedent wherein the decedant stated to her that he did not
8 have a Will, and that it's about time he made a Will.

9 MR. CRAWFORD: That's moot, your Honor. The statute
10 is clear that if you have a Will and you want to destroy that
11 Will there are certain procedures and manners in which you
12 can destroy your Will, by burning it, tearing it, mutilating
13 it, and such things as that, and I don't think he can revoke
14 a Will by telling somebody else that you don't think you have
15 a Will. I think any testimony that she could give concerning
16 what he told her would be, number one, hearsay; and number
17 two, irrelevant.

18 MR. NIELSEN: First of all, your Honor, the issue
19 isn't whether or not he revoked this document. The issue is
20 whether or not this document is his Will. And therefore,
21 I'm not suggesting that the testimony is that he merely
22 revoked this document.

23 Second of all, as to its being hearsay, it clearly
24 comes within the exception of his state of mind and his
25 belief at the time that he did not have a Will and that is

1 certainly relevant as to whether or not he had a Will.

2 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection.

3 MR. NIELSEN: May I proffer that testimony, then,
4 for the record?

5 THE COURT: You may.

6 MR. NIELSEN: May I then call Mrs. Taylor to the
7 stand for the same purpose?

8 THE COURT: I will sustain the objection on that.
9 You may make a proffer of what that testimony would be.

10 MR. NIELSEN: My proffer as to her testimony would
11 be that in 1980, in the fall of 1980, she had conversation
12 with her father in which her father asked her if she knew of
13 an attorney so he could make a Will, because he did not have
14 one and wished to make one and it was high time that he did
15 so.

16 THE COURT: Do you have anything else to offer?

17 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, your Honor. I would offer into
18 evidence the certified copy of the divorce decree signed in
19 1941 in which the purported surviving spouse of this
20 decedent was granted a decree of divorce from
21 Mr. Louis Grossen.

22 MR. CRAWFORD: I object to that, too, your Honor.
23 I think the Will leaves all the property to a named person.
24 He identifies her in the Will as his wife, but I think it's
25 immaterial whether she was in fact his wife, as long as she's

1 named as a beneficiary of his Will.

2 MR. NIELSEN: Certainly for the purpose of
3 interpreting the Will, that may be fine, your Honor. But
4 insofar as whether or not he would refer to her as his
5 wife, when he knew that they were not married and she was
6 not his wife, then I submit that it's relevant for the
7 purpose of showing whether or not this purported Will is
8 really his Will.

9 THE COURT: I don't see what bearing the marital
10 status has, necessarily, in this day and age.

11 MR. NIELSEN: For the purpose of if it's not his
12 wife, then he wouldn't have referred to her as his wife.
13 And I further proffer that Mrs. Vincent would so testify,
14 that she stated that she was not his wife and she had no
15 claim to him.

16 THE COURT: Is that an appropriate basis for
17 invalidating a Will?

18 MR. NIELSEN: I think it goes, your Honor, to
19 further testimony and further evidence that he never intended
20 this to be his Will and this is not his Will.

21 THE COURT: I'll receive the exhibit.

22 MR. NIELSEN: May I have just a moment, your Honor?

23 THE COURT: You may.

24 MR. NIELSEN: I have nothing further in the way of
25 testimony or evidence, your Honor, but I would continue my

1 objection that this is not the Last Will and Testament of the
2 decedent, and further, that the document was not properly
3 executed in accordance with the governing laws of the State
4 of Utah, and that, I suppose, goes to the argument which I'm
5 sure we're going to come to, which is which law applies in
6 this case.

7 MR. CRAWFORD: Well, your Honor, Counsel has
8 submitted an exhibit and I have an exhibit of my own.
9 Unfortunately, the people that have signed this exhibit, I
10 don't know where they are or who they are, but this is a
11 marriage certificate evidencing a sealing of this prior
12 marriage of Mr. Grossen and Mrs. Grossen, and it's dated
13 1957, which is some 16 years after that divorce decree.

14 I submit that this document goes more to showing
15 his state of mind as far as what he thought about his
16 marital relationship than that divorce certificate. I show
17 this to Counsel and I hope that Counsel would not object to
18 its admission into evidence because I don't have anybody
19 here that can testify as to it.

20 MR. NIELSEN: I'll certainly object to it on that
21 basis, your Honor, and he knew I was going to object to it.
22 In any event, it shows -- the document states on its face
23 that they were previously married on a previous day.

24 THE COURT: I'm going to admit it, feeling it's
25 about as admissible as the one I already received.

1 invalidating a lot of Wills, wouldn't it? Do you really
2 think that's the law?

3 MR. NIELSEN: I don't think it would, your Honor,
4 and that is a requirement that the Legislature put on the
5 Will and shows a specific public policy.

6 THE COURT: Even if the Legislature did that,
7 would it be constitutional for them to do that?

8 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, I think it would. If the Will
9 speaks upon the death of the testator, then we're not
10 talking about enacting a law which devises something which
11 has already come into being. The Will speaks upon the
12 death, not upon its execution. It means nothing as a
13 document until the death of the testator.

14 THE COURT: His signing and executing it is an
15 exercise of a private property right that one possesses to
16 dispose of his property, isn't it?

17 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, but it does not become effective
18 until his death.

19 (Whereupon, further argument was presented to the
20 Court.)

21 THE COURT: The law is clearcut in the new code and
22 it is the mission of the courts, I think, to carry out the
23 wishes of the decedent and to uphold the validity of a Will
24 where possible, rather than invalidate them for any reason.
25 There was no provision prior to the adoption of the Uniform

1 Probate Code prohibiting a witness from executing a Will if
2 he were below the age of 18, 21, or any other particular age.
3 There was no reference to age. I don't think it's my purpose
4 to write in requirements in the law about what a witness is
5 or isn't. There is no definition defining who can act as a
6 witness, and as long as that witness has the capacity and is
7 capable of reporting what he or she observes, I would
8 conclude that under prior law that was sufficient.

9 The Court finds that on July 10, 1974, Louis Grossen
10 requested Richard B. Hill and Scott Hill to witness the
11 execution of his Will, that he signed the document which has
12 been offered as his Last Will and Testament in the presence
13 of Richard Hill and Scott Hill and they, while in his
14 presence, executed it as well. They both have dim memories,
15 and I'd be confronted with the same problem you have. I've
16 executed a lot of Wills and if you were to ask me I couldn't
17 tell you one that I've executed. Short of seeing the
18 document, examining my signature, I couldn't record any
19 recollection at all of having witnessed a Will.

20 MR. NIELSEN: Well, I suppose I haven't lived long
21 enough to encounter that problem yet. I suppose I will as
22 I get older.

23 THE COURT: I think you'll find that my memory is
24 very alert and accurate and I'm not yet that far gone that
25 you're not going to be where I am in quick order.

1 MR. CRAWFORD: May the findings also recite that he
2 declared it to be his Last Will and Testament, sufficient
3 to meet the requirements of the statute?

4 THE COURT: Yes. I think the finding is that he
5 simply requested the two of them to execute his Will. I
6 don't think more is required by the law than that. At least
7 Mr. Hill, Sr., I think, understood it to be his Will. It
8 was executed for those purposes. There's nothing in this
9 record to indicate any duress, undue influence, fraud,
10 mistake and the Court finds that at the time he made the
11 request of the Hills that he appeared to the Hills to have
12 capacity to dispose of his property by Will.

13 The Court concludes it is a binding, valid Will and
14 Testament and shall be admitted to probate. Anything else?

15 MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. I take it that Mr. Earl Gossen
16 may be appointed the executor of this estate pursuant to the
17 Will?

18 THE COURT: He is appointed the executor of the
19 Will or personal representative to act without bond as
20 provided by the Will.

21 MR. CRAWFORD: Thank you.

22 THE COURT: This court will be in recess.

23 (Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m. court was in recess.)

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