

1992

# Janeane B. Delker v. Leon V. Delker : Brief of Appellee

Utah Court of Appeals

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Pete N. Vlahos, John W. Bradley; Vlahos, Sharp, Wight & Bradley; Attorneys for Appellee.

John M. Bybee; Attorney for Appellant.

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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

JANEANE B. DELKER, /  
Plaintiff and / Appellate Case No. 920423-CA  
Appellant, / District Court No. 860996098  
vs. / Priority No. 16<sup>15</sup>  
LEON V. DELKER, /  
Defendant and /  
Appellee, /

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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County  
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

---

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**FILED**  
Utah Court of Appeals

FEB 9 1993

  
Mary T. Noonan

UTAH

920423-CA

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

JANEANE B. DELKER,	/	
Plaintiff and	/	Appellate Case No. <u>920423-CA</u>
Appellant,	/	District Court No. <u>860996098</u>
vs.	/	Priority No. 16
LEON V. DELKER,	/	
Defendant and	/	
Appellee,	/	

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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County  
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

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### STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), stating that the Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction over appeals from the District Court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce and property division. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure also indicates a procedure for taking appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts. This Brief follows the structural requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal by Janeane B. Delker, Plaintiff, from an Objection to a post divorce order on pre-trial.

### STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the relief sought by appellant is barred by res judicata.
2. Whether an order which was set aside on the basis that notice of hearing was defective applies to all or part of the issues addressed in that order.
3. Whether section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code was improperly applied.
4. Whether Appellee is entitled to attorneys fees.

### STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

The standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellant Court must reverse only if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law, if the

evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must be rectified. That is English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from an Objection to a post divorce Order on Pre-Trial brought by Appellant's (hereinafter referred to "Janeane") Petition to Modify, heard by Commissioner Maurice Richards and entered by the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second District Court of Weber County on February 14, 1992.<sup>1</sup> R., page 239 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).

After oral argument and proffers by respective counsels and after receiving exhibits, Judge Taylor upheld Commissioner Richard's Pre-Trial Order, finding that there had been no substantial change in circumstances to increase child support and that there was no substantial change of circumstances or other basis to make the child support retroactive. R., pages 247-249 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and Subsequent

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<sup>1</sup> All references are to the pages of the original record as paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 25(e). All documents in the record referred to will be found in the Appendix in chronological order. For purpose of clarity, the following abbreviations shall be adopted by Appellee:

R. refers to the record with its page number and title of the document in parenthesis.

T. transcript.

Orders). The Court further ordered that Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Leon") continue to pay child support based upon his agreement with Janeane in August of 1990. R., page 248 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and Subsequent Orders).



### STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties herein were divorced through a Decree issued by the State of North Dakota in 1986. R., page 7 (Order). The North Dakota Court did not issue a decision regarding child support or custody of the parties' minor children, but declined to exercise jurisdiction to make these determinations, finding that the State of Utah was a more appropriate forum. R., page 7 (Order). Janeane filed a Petition to establish child support and custody of the three (3) minor children in the Second District Court of Weber County pursuant to the Order of the North Dakota Court. Leon received notice of a hearing scheduled on Janeane's Petition for September 9, 1986, but, in fact, that hearing was held on September 8, 1986. (this order will hereinafter be referred to as the "1986 hearing/order"). R., page 20 (Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody Under UCCJA). That Order required Leon to pay Janeane child support in the amount of \$116.00 per month per child. R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody Under UCCJA).

Leon subsequently made a Motion to Vacate that Judgment, which was heard on June 3, 1988. The Domestic Relations Commissioner held that Janeane's notice to Leon for the hearing to determine custody of the minor children was defective, in that it advised Leon that the hearing was to be on September 9, 1986, when, in fact,

the matter was heard on September 8, 1986. R., page 28 (Amended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment). The Court further reserved other issues to be decided at pre-trial on August 8, 1988. R., page 29 (Amended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment). Further hearing was held on August 8, 1988 in front of Commissioner Maurice Richards, wherein the Court addressed custody and also addressed child support to the extent that they noted that child support would be abated by one-half (1/2) during the summer visitations with Leon. R., page 105 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order).

Child support had previously been set in 1981 by an administrative order issued through the Office of Recovery Services and which obligated Leon to pay child support in the amount of \$75.00 per month per child. This Order was purported to be changed at the 1986 hearing, which increased the child support to \$116.00 per month per child. R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody Under UCCJA). As explained above, however, this Judgment was set aside due to the lack of proper notice to Leon. R., page 27-29 (Amended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment).

Janeane filed a Petition to Modify seeking, among other things, to increase child support, which Petition was filed on March 20, 1990. R., page 146 (Verified Petition for Modification or Judgment). Leon also filed

a Petition to Modify seeking custody of one (1) of the minor children and an adjustment of child support. This Petition was filed August 20, 1990. R., page 155 (Verified Petition). Hearing was held before Commissioner Maurice Richards on August 24, 1990. Child support was discussed at that hearing and Commissioner Richards specifically found that the Petition for an increase in child support should be dismissed on the basis that there is no substantial change in circumstances. R., page 161 (Commissioner's notes). Janeane filed an Objection to that recommendation. R., page 166 (Objection to Recommendations).

Notwithstanding the Commissioner's order that there was no substantial change in circumstances, the parties voluntarily agreed that child support be increased from \$75.00 per month per child to \$116.00 per month per child. R., page 169 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause). Janeane's objection was not heard until February 14, 1992 at which point the Court held that the matter was res judicata and that there was, in any event, no substantial change in circumstances justifying an increase in child support. R., page 247-249 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and Subsequent Orders).

### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Janeane raises three (3) separate issues in support of her contention that child support should be raised retroactive to the initial administrative order of 1981 or in the alternative, that child support be based upon the order entered in 1986, wherein Leon did not appear due to improper notice. Each of these arguments must fail because the issue regarding the increase of child support is res judicata. It was found to be res judicata by Commissioner Richards and that order was subsequently upheld by Judge Taylor.

Janeane argues that the 1986 order does not set aside child support, but only sets aside the order relative to custody. This argument fails, both on the basis that the matter is res judicata and on the basis that the matter was set aside because of improper notice to Leon. The Court's entire order would be inapplicable to Leon because the entire order would be set aside where the underlying problem is improper notice to a party.

Finally, Janeane's argument that the Court erred in applying Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code in determining child support modification fails because the Court specifically finds that whether it considers Leon's actual change in income, or the change based upon the guidelines, no substantial change occurred. In other words, the Court specifically found that even when this

statute is not considered, there was no substantial change in circumstances.

Because the matter is barred by res judicata, Janeane's entire appeal must fail. If not, her appeal must still fail on the basis that it was proper for the Court to set aside the entire default order rather than portion of it as argued by Janeane and because the Court did not err in misapplying the statute regarding child support.

## ARGUMENT

POINT 1: THE APPEAL MUST FAIL ON THE BASIS OF RES JUDICATA.

The doctrine of res judicata actually has two (2) branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion bars the relitigation by the parties of a claim for relief that was once litigated on the merits and resulted in a final Judgment between the same parties or their privies. The same rule also prevents relitigation of claims that could and should have been litigated in a prior action, but werenot. Penrod v. Nu Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that have been once litigated and determined in another action, even though the claims for relief in the two (2) actions may be different. Penrod at 875. In the case at bar, Janeane's claim is barred by claim preclusion.

A. JANEANE'S CLAIM COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN LITIGATED BUT WERE NOT.

As indicated above, the general rule is that claim preclusion bars relitigation of an action where that claim could and should have been litigated but were not. See also Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981). In the case at bar, Janeane had at least three (3) chances to litigate the issue regarding retroactivity of

child support, but failed to do so.

The first chance occurred on September 8, 1986 in a hearing before Judge John F. Wahlquist. This is the same hearing which was later set aside on the basis that Leon did not have proper notice. Notwithstanding what later occurred, the Court's order with regard to child support simply provided as follows:

It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that \$116.00 per month per child paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner and for child support.

The only other provision with regard to child support makes mandatory income withholding available. A copy of this order entitled Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody Under UCCJA is attached hereto as Appendix "A".

If Janeane was seeking to have child support be retroactive to 1981 when the administrative order was signed by Leon and which set child support at \$75.00 per month, she should have presented it at that time. While there is no transcript or findings upon which the Court can determine whether the issue was raised or not, it should not matter. If the issue was raised at that hearing, it is clear that Judge Wahlquist ordered that child support be increased to \$116.00 per month from that point forward. If the issue of having child support retroactive to 1981 was not raised, then it is barred on the basis of claim preclusion because it should have been

raised. If it was raised, then it is also barred on the basis of claim preclusion because it had been litigated at that point and the Court entered an order which does not address retroactivity to 1981.

The second opportunity to raise the issue occurred on June 3, 1988. At that point, a hearing was held in front of Commissioner Maurice Richards on Leon's Motion to Vacate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody. Janeane could have argued at this time that child support be retroactive to 1981 or that the 1986 order which set child support at \$116.00 a month, be applied, at least as to child support. However, all that is ordered in this hearing is with regard to setting temporary summer visitation and custody evaluations and reserves all other matters to August 8, 1988.

The third opportunity that Janeane had to litigate child support was at the hearing of August 8, 1988. At this point in time, it is clear that the Commissioner had set aside the default order entered in September of 1986, which changed the child support to \$116.00 a month. Notwithstanding this, it is also clear, based upon the Recommended Pre-Trial Order, that child support was discussed at least to the extent that child support would be abated by one-half (1/2) during the summer visitation. Janeane objected to the Commissioner's Recommended Order,



but limited her objections to the custody issue. Janeane could have and should have addressed the objections regarding retroactivity of child support and the setting aside of the child support order at the same time.

A fourth opportunity came for Janeane to address the issues of child support. This occurred on August 24, 1990. At this hearing, Janeane did object to the previous order regarding child support being set aside and did, apparently, argue about retroactivity of child support. In response to those arguments, Commissioner Richards specifically notes that at the time of the divorce, Leon earned \$2,109.00 per month and that at the time of that hearing, he earned \$2,324.00 per month. He further notes that Janeane's Petition to Modify was based on a change of circumstances and that Leon's obligation to pay child support was at \$75.00 per month. Based upon these factors, the Commissioner recommended that there was no substantial change in circumstances and that the Petition be dismissed. At that point in time, Leon voluntarily agreed to increase child support to \$116.00 per month per child.

Therefore, Janeane had the opportunity on September 8, 1986; June 3, 1988 and August 8, 1988 to raise the issue, but failed to do so. The issue was not raised until August 24, 1990, but clearly could and should have been raised prior to that time. "When there has been an

adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either tried and determined or upon all issues which the parties had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980).

POINT 2: THE ENTIRE 1986 JUDGMENT WAS SET ASIDE.

Janeane admits that the order and Judgment entered in 1986 was set aside based upon Leon's Motion to Vacate. However, Janeane asserts the argument that only the child custody issues were affected. This argument is without merit. The Court set aside the default order entered in 1986 on the basis that notice given to Leon was improper because the date was incorrect. This makes the entire 1986 Judgment and order void. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a Judgment is void and subject to collateral attack if a lack of jurisdiction in Court appears on the face of the record. Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 1952).

In the Bowen case, Appellant was improperly served in an action to quiet title. Service was made by publication and by mailing a copy of the Summons. The facts showed that Plaintiff in the underlying case knew or could have known of an address to serve Appellant properly, but failed to do so. Appellant moved to set the default aside, but the lower Court dismissed the action because the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was

not made within one (1) year after its entry, even though Plaintiff knew of the Judgment within the year. The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's dismissal of the Motion to Set Aside on the basis that a default Judgment was subject to collateral attack at any time when that Judgment is void because the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

In the case at bar, the Court also lacked jurisdiction when default was entered against Leon in 1986. In short, the entire default order was set aside. That order cannot be partitioned to say that a portion of it was set aside and a portion not set aside because the entire order was void due to the defective notice. Regardless of the language of the order or the fact that custody was the primary issue as opposed to child support, the entire order was set aside. It is ridiculous to propose that the Court was correct in setting aside the default order with regard to custody because notice was defective, but to assert that the default order was valid with regard to child support, even though the matter was completely resolved in the same hearing. The notice was defective, whether it was dealing with child support, custody or both. As a result of the defective notice, any order made by the Court would be void and subject to being set aside.

POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

Janeane argues that the Trial Court applied Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code incorrectly in finding that there was no substantial change in circumstances. However, a review of the transcript at the hearing shows that the Court's finding was not based solely upon this section of the Utah Code. Judge Taylor, in issuing his decision, said as follows:

The case, while complex and convoluted and having gone through a lot of problems, from the stand point of the law, I think is fairly clear. On the child support modification, whether we consider the increase in his salary as being the determinative factor or whether we consider the support guidelines themselves to be the factor in either one of those analysis, the change is something less than 20%, which would not justify a finding of a substantial change in circumstance which would vest in the Court jurisdiction to make modifications.

For that reason, the Court, in finding this is not a substantial change, denies the Petition. (Emphasis added). T., page 37 and 38.

The Court then clearly considered a substantial change in circumstances from two (2) points of view. First of all, it did consider whether there was a 25% difference between what Leon was paying under the guidelines as opposed to what he should be paying under the current guidelines based on Section 78-45-7.2 of the

Utah Code. However, it is also clear that the Court looked at a substantial change based solely on Leon's actual change in income over time and found that regardless of which way you look at it, his income did not substantially change sufficient enough to change the amount of child support. Janeane's argument, therefore, must fail because the Court's findings are sufficient to show that there was no substantial change in circumstances even if Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code is not considered.

POINT 4: APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 73-27-56, in any civil action the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 further states "if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

A frivolous appeal is one not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. U. Rules App. Pro. Rule 33. Appellant's argument is not

well founded. The entire matter has been ruled on two occasions to be barred by res judicata. There has been no inappropriate application of law. The child support portion of the order entered in 1986 was set aside just as all other portions of that order must be set aside as a result of the notice of hearing being defective.

This appeal is neither grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. As a result, appellee should be awarded his attorney fees and costs of appeal.

#### CONCLUSION

Janeane's argument must fail for three (3) reasons. First, the Court has held that her claim regarding child support was barred on the basis of res judicata. Claim preclusion provides that you cannot relitigate a claim that has previously been litigated or which should have and could have been litigated but was not. Janeane had at least three (3) opportunities to litigate the issues presented in her appeal prior to the hearing in front of Judge Taylor. She failed to do so at that time and she should not be able to relitigate the matter at this time.

Second, the entire default Judgment was previously set aside. The Judgment and order entered by Judge Wahlquist in 1986 was void because the notice given to Leon of the hearing was fatally defective. Once a Judgment is set aside, the entire Judgment is set aside. The notice cannot be defective for one purpose, i.e.,


child custody and not be defective for another purpose, i.e., child support. If Leon did not have proper notice, then he did not have proper notice. The Judgment is void in its entirety and, in its entirety, is set aside.

Finally, the Court found that there was no substantial change in circumstances, but did not base this findings exclusively upon the statute referred to by Janeane. The Court was very careful and very clear against finding that it considered both the change in Leon's actual income and the change in the guidelines in determining that there was no substantial change in circumstances.

Based upon the above and foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.


DATED this 9 day of February, 1993.

VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY

  
PETE N. VLAHOS,  
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent were posted in the mail and addressed to Attorney John M. Bybee, attorney for Appellant, at 795 24th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 on this 9 day of February, 1993.

  
PETE N. VLAHOS



## APPENDIX A

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.  
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385 - 24th Street, #522  
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Telephone: 394-9431

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY  
STATE OF UTAH

---

JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER,	)	
Petitioner,	)	JUDGMENT IN PETITION FOR
	)	AWARD OF CUSTODY UNDER
v.	)	UCCJA
LEON VERL DELKER,	)	
Resondent.	)	Civil No. 96098

---

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of September, 1986, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the above-entitled Court. The Petitioner was personally present before the Court and represented by her attorney of record, Richard G. Hamp of Utah Legal Services, Inc. The Respondent was neither personally present before the Court nor represented by counsel; however, a return of Personal Service being on file with the Court, Respondent's default was entered. The Petitioner was sworn and testified, the Court being fully advised herein, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Petitioner, JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, be and hereby

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Civil No. 96098

is awarded custody of the minor children, to-wit: Christopher Eric Delker, Nichole Joy Delker, and Jacob Lee Delker, of this marriage with reasonable rights of visitation in the Respondent, LEON VERL DELKER.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that \$116 per month per child paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner and for child support.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE that if the Respondent falls thirty or more days in arrears on his child support obligation, petitioner be and hereby is entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-45D-1 et. seq. (1985).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Respondent be and hereby is required to maintain health and dental insurance for the minor children of the parties if it is available through his place of employment. Further, Respondent is required to name said children as beneficiaries on his policy of life and accident insurance. In the event the Respondent's insurance does not fully cover the medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor children, then the Respondent is required to pay at least one half of all medical

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Deiker v. Deiker  
Judgment and Decree of Divorce  
Civil No. 96098

and dental expenses not covered by said insurance.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1986.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

\_\_\_\_\_  
ELLA VAN BERKOM

BY THE COURT:

\_\_\_\_\_  
District Court Judge

Date Entered:

\_\_\_\_\_

300 2400 0000  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401  
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## APPENDIX B

FILED IN THIS OFFICE ON JUNE 17, 1988

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2447 Kiesel Avenue  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY  
STATE OF UTAH

JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER,	)	AMENDED ORDER ON
	)	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
Plaintiff,	)	VACATE JUDGMENT AND
	)	INTERIM PRE-TRIAL
vs.	)	RECOMMENDED ORDER
	)	
LEON VERL DELKER,	)	CIVIL NO: 96098
	)	
Defendant.	)	

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 3rd day of June, 1988, before the Honorable Maurice Richards, Commissioner of the Domestic Relations Court sitting without a jury, on the Defendant's Motion to vacate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in petition for award of custody on Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify the Judgment, the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Richard A. Hummel, the Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, representations having been made to the court concerning Defendant receiving effective notice of the trial, and the

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ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
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court having heard argument dealing with visitation for the summer, verification of the decree and/or custody of the minor child, and the court being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining to therein, enters the following Recommended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate the Judgment of Petition for Award of Custody and the Interim Pretrial Order is set forth as follows:

THE COURT RECOMMENDS AS FOLLOWS:

1. That the Plaintiff's notice to the Defendant for the hearing to determine custody of the minor children was defective in that the Notice advised the Defendant to be in court on September 9, 1986 and the matter was heard on September 8, 1986.

2. That the Defendant shall be allowed to pick up the children on June 3, 1988 at 5:00 p.m. to take them back to Minot, North Dakota, provided however, that the Defendant shall return the children back by July 7 so the children may attend the Plaintiff's wedding, and the Defendant may then pick up the children on July 9, 1988 and return them back to Minot, North Dakota for the balance of his summer visitation.

3. That the matter shall be set one hour further pretrial on August 8, 1988 at 11:00 a.m.

*Utahes & Murphy*  
ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
2447 KIESEL AVENUE  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

Delker vs. Delker  
Civil No: 96098

4. That the Defendant is entitled to have a home study conducted in his home in Minot, North Dakota, and also a psychological evaluation, provided however, that the Defendant shall be responsible initially for the expenses and who pays the final bill will be an issue at the time of trial.

5. That both parties and the children shall cooperate in any psychological evaluation and/or home study, either in North Dakota or in the State of Utah.

6. That Plaintiff shall be entitled to telephonic communication with the children at all reasonable times at Defendant's residence in North Dakota.

7. That all other matters not resolved herein shall be reserved to the pretrial scheduled for August 8, 1988 and the children are to be present on that day.

8. That the child support during the two-month visitation that Defendant has the children shall be abated in total.

DATED this <sup>27th</sup>~~13th~~ day of July, 1988.

/s/ MAURICE RICHARDS  
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS  
Domestic Relations  
Commissioner

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Richard A. Hummel  
RICHARD A. HUMMEL  
Attorney for Defendant

AMENDED ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S

*Maurice Richards*  
ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
2447 KIESEL AVENUE  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401



O R D E R

The above and foregoing Amended Recommended Order approved by the District Court on this 28 day of July, 1988.

15/ Richard O. Hyde  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
COUNTY OF WEBER } SS:

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN MY OFFICE.  
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING THIS 28 DAY OF July, 1988  
RICHARD R. GREENE, COUNTY CLERK &  
EX OFFICIO CLERK OF 2nd DIST. COURT,  
BY Debra M. Nelson DEPUTY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28 day of July, 1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMENDED ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND INTERIM PRE-TRIAL RECOMMENDED ORDER by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

Richard A. Hummel  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
Utah Legal Services, Inc.  
385 24th Street, Suite 522  
Ogden, Utah 84401

Karen Humphreys  
SECRETARY

## APPENDIX C

FILE COPY

PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337  
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE  
Attorney for Defendant  
Legal Forum Building  
2447 Kiesel Avenue  
Ogden, Utah 84401  
Telephone: (801) 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, nka	)	
JANENE BUCKLEY DALTON,	)	RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL
	)	ORDER
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	
	)	
LEON VERL DELKER,	)	CIVIL NO: 96098
	)	
Defendant.	)	

This matter having come on regularly for pre-trial on the 8th day of August, 1988, before the Honorable Maurice Richards, Commissioner of the Domestic Relations Court, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Judith Mayorga, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and representations having been made by Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's attorney, depositions taken in North Dakota having been submitted to the Court, Affidavits and other documents having been submitted by Plaintiff's counsel, the psychological report of the Defendant and the children having been

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 1

ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
2447 KIESEL AVENUE  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

submitted to the Court, and the Court having accepted all of said exhibits and having allowed the Defendant to withdraw the depositions at the conclusion of the hearing, and the Court being requested to speak with the three (3) minor children, and the Court having spoken with the three (3) minor children outside the presence of the parties and having spoken to them individually, and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters the following Recommended Pre-Trial Order and is set forth as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That the three (3) minor children love both their parents and like both the stepfather and stepmother of the respective parties.
2. That the children do not have friends at either place.
3. That both homes are comparable and that both parents and the respective stepparents get along well with the children.
4. That the Plaintiff has had the primary care of the children from the time of the divorce and that the Defendant has visited regularly.

5. That the children all feel better off with the Plaintiff but want to and like to visit their father, the Defendant herein.

6. That all of the children agree that they like both homes equally.

7. That the Defendant's parents, or the children's grandparents, reside in Utah and primarily in Weber County.

8. That the parties have agreed and stipulated that the Defendant's parents, or the children's grandparents, shall be entitled to the Defendant's normal structured visitation as the Court applies it.

9. That from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters its Pre-Trial recommendations as follows;

PRE-TRIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Plaintiff shall retain the care, custody and control of the three (3) minor children.

2. That the Defendant shall have summer visitation of two (2) months each year, commencing the Monday following when the children are released from school and shall be entitled to pick up the children at 8:00 a.m. on the Monday following when the children are released from school and shall return them two (2) months later at 8:00 p.m.

3. That the Defendant shall have full access to all of the children's school records and/or medical records as needed.

4. That the Defendant's parents, or the children's grandparents, shall be entitled to the Defendant's visitation rights which the Court sets as follows:

(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

(b) Every other holiday exclusive of Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m. when they must remain in the custodial parent's home, and at 1:00 p.m. the grandparents shall be entitled to pick up the children for the balance of the day.

(c) That Defendant's parents are to have the children on Father's Day regardless of whose weekend, but that Plaintiff shall have the children for Mother's Day regardless of whose weekend.

5. That the child support shall be abated by one-half during the two (2) months summer visitation that Defendant has the children, provided however, that the Defendant shall be obligated to pay the costs of transportation to and from Plaintiff's residence in Layton, Utah.

6. That each of the parties shall assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
2447 KIESEL AVENUE  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

STIPULATED ORDER

1. That Defendant and his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, have stipulated that the Commissioner's Findings and Recommended Order shall become the Order of the Court, and that no trial be set in connection with this matter.

2. That the Court on its own finds that both parties have done an excellent job with the raising of these children and commends the parents and the respective stepparents in their raising of the children.

DATED this 17 day of <sup>Oct</sup>~~August~~, 1988.

MAURICE RICHARDS  
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS  
Domestic Relations  
Commissioner

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Judith Mayorga  
JUDITH MAYORGA  
Attorney for Plaintiff

O R D E R

The above and foregoing Findings and Recommended Order and stipulated by the parties to be a Final Order, was

ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
LEGAL FORUM BUILDING  
2447 KIESEL AVENUE  
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

signed by the above-entitled Court on this 18 day of Oct. August, 1988.

**RONALD O. HYDE**  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING


I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

Judith Mayorga  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
Utah Legal Services, Inc.  
385 - 24th Street  
Ogden, Utah 84401

for purposes of ascertaining when said items were mailed to Plaintiff's counsel.

  
SECRETARY

STATE OF UTAH } ss:  
COUNTY OF WEBER }

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY  
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN MY OFFICE.  
DATED THIS 21 DAY OF Oct. 1988.  
RICHARD F. GATE, COUNTY CLERK &  
EX OFFICIO CLERK OF 2nd DIST. COURT  
BY  DEPUTY



## APPENDIX D

SEP 20 1990

PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337  
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT  
Attorney for Defendant  
Legal Forum Building  
2447 Kiesel Avenue  
Ogden, Utah 84401  
Telephone: 621-2464

---

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY  
STATE OF UTAH

---

JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, n/k/a	/	
JANENE BUCKLEY DALTON,	/	
Plaintiff,	/	RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL
	/	ORDER AND RECOMMENDED
vs.	/	ORDER ON ORDER TO
	/	SHOW CAUSE
LEON VERL DELKER	/	
Defendant.	/	Civil No. <u>860996098</u>
	/	Judge _____

---

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 24th day of August, 1990, before the Honorable Maurice Richards, Commissioner of the Domestic Relations Court, sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, on Defendant's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and on the Order to Show Cause, and representations having been

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL  
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED  
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW  
CAUSE

made by both counsel, and the Court having conversed with the minor child, Nichole, who was born on April 24, 1976, and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters the following Recommended Pre-Trial Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and is set forth as follows:

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

1. That there is no substantial change of circumstances.

2 That the parties voluntarily agreed to stipulate that the child support be increased from \$75.00 per month per child to \$110.00 per month per child for the two (2) minor children that will reside with the Plaintiff.

3. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs.

RECOMMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

1. That the Defendant be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child, Nichole, born April 24, 1976.

2. That Plaintiff be granted visitation rights as previously granted to the Defendant.

3. That Defendant is to have the care, custody and control of said minor children immediately.

4. That the Defendant shall have the minor child for one (1) year and at the end of the year, the parties, or either of them, can petition the Court to modify this Order.

5. That Plaintiff shall not be obligated to pay any support to the Defendant for the minor child, Nichole.

6. That Defendant voluntarily agreed to increase the child support for the two (2) children residing with the Plaintiff to \$116.00 per month per child even though no substantial change of circumstance.

7. That Plaintiff shall be obligated to pay the costs of transportation for visitation with the minor child, Nichole, from Defendant's residence to the Plaintiff's residence and back to the Defendant.

8. That each of the parties shall pay their own attorney fees and costs.


9. That either party can petition the Court prior to the expiration of one (1) year if they so desire.

DATED this 25 day of September, 1990.

**MAURICE RICHARDS**

MAURICE RICHARDS,  
Domestic Relations Commissioner

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

  
JOHN M. BYBEE,  
Attorney for Plaintiff


RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL  
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED  
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW  
CAUSE

O R D E R

The above and foregoing Recommended and Stipulated Pre-Trial Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause signed and approved by the District Court on this 26 day of September, 1990.

**STANTON M. TAYLOR**  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

  
JOHN M. RYBEE,  
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING


Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing to Attorney John M. Rybee, attorney for Plaintiff, at 47 North Main Street, Kaysville, Utah 84037 on this 10 day of September, 1990 for purposes of establishing when said Order was mailed to Plaintiff's counsel.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary

STATE OF UTAH }  
COUNTY OF WEBER } ss

I Herby Certify That This is A True Copy  
Of The Original On File in My Office

DATED THIS 27 DAY of Sept 19 90  
BENJAMIN A. SIMS  
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY  DEPUTY

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL  
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED  
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW  
CAUSE

## APPENDIX E

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
County of Weber - State of Utah

to  
Part trial in pet to modify  
FILE NO. 860996098  
TITLE: (✓ PARTIES PRESENT) : COUNSEL: (✓ COUNSEL PRESENT)

JANEANE DELKER ✓

JOHN BYBEE ✓

VS

LEON DELKER ✓

PETE N VLAHOS ✓

2324

A. ASHBY

CLEAR

HON. M. RICHARDS

TAPE \_\_\_\_\_ DIGIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: AUGUST 24, 19

J. HARTMAN

BAILIFF

MARRIED: August 29, 1974

DIVORCE FILED: June 11, 1986

CHILDREN

at time of divorce - he earned \$2109  
now he earns \$2324  
at divorce she earned about 450 per mo  
His petition to modify is based on change of circumstance  
He pays 75 per mo support in a prior court order.  
He has re-married (wife earns  
2 grand he substantiates change of circumstances -  
but parties stipulated that support be  
renewed & pet should be dismissed

# SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

County of Weber - State of Utah

075C

FILE NO.

96098

TITLE (PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL (COUNSEL PRESENT)

Taneane Delker ✓

Bybee ✓

Leon Delker ✓

Vlahos ✓

Ref her petition to modify in file for custody of her

m H

CLERK

HON.

TAPE \_\_\_\_\_ DIGIT \_\_\_\_\_

Today

DATE: Aug 24, 90

BAILIFF

3 kids

recalc age 14 - I heard this case in approx 1988 - I then the child recalc - wanted to live with mother talked to recalc - lives w/ mother in dad lives N. Dakota

she says she will have a better life with her dad. She has been with dad for 2 months & is now back. She says the more is her idea - not her dad. She now has friends at dad's - likes back step for find - says she has lived with mom for 4 yrs & want to get to know her dad - & be with mom for 2 hrs in summer -

I find the child is not doing real good - school - her mother has a D - average (Chr so I don't think the mother is helping them as much as she should

1/2 of her 22 other kids & no support



## APPENDIX F

PETE N. VLAHOS, #0037  
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT  
Attorney for Defendant  
Legal Forum Building  
2447 Kiesel Avenue  
Ogden, Utah 84401  
Telephone: 621-2464

---

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

---

JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, (DALTON)	/	
Plaintiff,	/	FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
vs.	/	
LEON VERL DELKER,	/	Civil No.: 96098
Defendant.	/	

---

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, one of the judges of the above entitled Court, sitting without a jury, on Objection Hearing filed by the Plaintiff at the Pre-Trial, an Objection on the Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the exhibits having been offered to the Court by the respective counsel, and the Court having asked the parties if these were the issues and both attorneys having answered in the affirmative and the facts being basically stipulated, and the Court being fully cognizant of all

FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT  
ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
Ogden, Utah

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

matters pertaining therein enters the following Findings of Fact:

1. That Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in the State of North Dakota in 1986.

2. That the Plaintiff filed a Petition to establish child support and custody of the three minor children in the District Court of Weber County pursuant to an Order of the North Dakota Court.

3. That a hearing was scheduled on the Plaintiff's Petition for September 9, 1986, but in fact said hearing was held on September 8, 1986, and that the Commissioner has previously found that there was inadequate and improper notice given to the Defendant as to the date and time of the hearing.

4. That the Court on the September 8, 1986 hearing which has been previously vacated by the Court granted to the Plaintiff the custody of the three minor children and child support at the rate of \$116.00 per month per child.

5. That subsequent to said hearing, Motions and Affidavits were filed by the Defendant, along with a Memorandum to vacate the Order of September 8, and the Plaintiff also filed Affidavits and Memorandum the same.

6. That in the interim the Defendant also filed a Petition for custody of the minor children.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

7. That a hearing was held on the above matter on June 3, 1988, and at said date and time, the Court read and entered an Order vacating the Order of September 8, because the Notice was defective and granted to the Defendant the temporary custody of the children for purposes of having psychological evaluations.

8. That said matter was re-scheduled for August 8, 1988 at 11:00 A.M.

9. That the Court on August 8, 1988 entered a final Pre-Trial Order which all the parties agreed to wherein the Plaintiff was awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children, and the support remained as previously ordered by the Court which had been established by the Office of Recovery Services in which a written stipulation signed only by the Defendant had been entered in North Dakota Court.

10. That on or about March 14, 1990, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Modify the Decree, asking for an increase in child support and asking that the Child Support Order entered in September, 1986 of \$116.00 per month per child be granted and that the Plaintiff be granted the judgement for the arrearages.

11. That the Defendant filed an answer to the Petition alleging various defenses including res judicata.

DELKEP (DALTON) VS. DFLKER  
Civil No.: 96098

12. That in August, 1990, the Defendant filed a Petition to modify the Divorce Decree for the minor child, Nicky, born April 24, 1986 and also filed an Affidavit in order to show cause for temporary custody of the minor child.

13. That a hearing was held on all issues on August 24, 1990, and at that hearing, the Defendant was granted the care, custody and control of Nicky to be reviewed by the Court in a year and found no substantial change of circumstance to increase the child support.

14. That the Defendant, by stipulation in an effort to settle the matter, offered to increase the child support to \$116.00 per month per child for the two children remaining with the Plaintiff and now seek any child support for Nicky which the Defendant has custody of.

15. That said Order was entered and the Plaintiff objected.

16. That the Court finds that there is no substantial change of circumstance for which the Court can increase the child support of August, 1990 to the present.

17. That the Defendant has in fact been paying \$116.00 per month per child for the two minor children and not receiving any assistance from the Plaintiff per the agreement.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

18. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's request for the arrearage of child support from September through and including the present is res judicata in that said matter has been decided by the Court previously by that Order being dismissed.

19. That the oldest child has a learning disability and will be eighteen (18) in December, and is only a sophomore.

20. That said child may or may not complete school and may not continue to go to school after his 18th birthday.

21. That the Defendant is current in his child support on the basis of \$116.00 per month per child for the two children residing with the Plaintiff.

22. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Objections are res judicata as indicated herein and no substantial change of circumstances indicated herein.

23. That the Plaintiff by agreement in open Court stated that the Defendant may have the permanent care, custody and control of Nicky, subject to the visitation rights as previously ordered by the Court.

24. That from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court arrives at the following Conclusions of Law:

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

1. That the Defendant is entitled to have the permanent care, custody and control of the minor child, Nicky, subject to visitation as herein after set forth.

2. That the Plaintiff's claim for arrearage child support from September 8, 1986 to and including the present is res judicata and is denied; that said matter had been previously determined by the Court.

3. That there has been no substantial change of circumstance to increase the child support, but that the agreement of the Defendant in August, 1990 to pay \$116.00 per month per child for the two children residing with the Plaintiff shall remain in full force and effect.

4. That the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to pay to the Defendant support for the minor child, Nicky.

5. That there has been no substantial change of circumstance to justify any increase nor any legal basis to make the Child Support Order retroactive to 1986, and said increase in child support shall only become effective with the Court Order of August 24, 1990.

6. That the Defendant shall continue paying support for the oldest child until the oldest child is eighteen (18) or graduates from high school; provided however, said child support shall not go beyond the child's nineteenth (19) birthday; and provided further, that if the oldest child

WILLIAMSON, GRIFFIN & ASSOCIATES  
ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate when he reaches the age of eighteen (18) and shall terminate anytime after he turns eighteen (18) and terminates if he does not continue on with high school.

7. That each of the parties shall assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs.

8. That the previous Order entered by the Court in connection with the above matter concerning visitation and abatement of child support as filed while the Defendant's visitation shall remain in full force and effect.

9. That the Commissioner's Recommended Order and Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court at this hearing.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of May, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_  
STANTON, M. TAYLOR,  
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

\_\_\_\_\_  
JOHN M. BYBEE,  
Attorney for Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW



DELFER (DALTON) V. S. DELFEE  
Civil No.: 96093

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was posted in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Attorney John M. Bybee, attorney for Plaintiff, at 795 24th Street, in Ogden, Utah 84401 pursuant to the Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three (3) days for mailing and five (5) days prior to submission of same to the Court for signature of mailing same on this 19 day of May, 1992.

John M. Bybee  
Secretary

## APPENDIX G

PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337  
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT  
Attorney for Defendant  
Legal Forum Building  
2447 Kiesel Avenue  
Ogden, Utah 84401  
Telephone: 621-2464

---

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY  
STATE OF UTAH

---

JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER,	/	ORDER TO MODIFY
(DALTON)	/	DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,	/	AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS
vs.	/	
LEON VERL DELKER,	/	Civil No.: 96098
Defendant.	/	

---

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, one of the judges of the above entitled Court, sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the exhibits having been offered to the Court, and proffers of evidence having been made by both counsel, and argument having been made, and the Court being apprised that the parties basically agreed to the facts surrounding the matter, and the Court having reviewed the documents and the Court file having heard the argument of the respective

ORDER TO MODIFY  
DECREE OF DIVORCE  
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

THE LAW OFFICES OF  
 ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
 1000 RICHMOND STREET, S.W.  
 OAKLAND, CALIF. 94612

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

2. That the Plaintiff's claim for arrearage child support from September 8, 1986 to and including the present is res judicata and is denied; that said matter had been previously determined by the Court.

4. That the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to pay to the Defendant support for the minor child, Nicky.

ORDER TO MODIFY  
DECREE OF DIVORCE  
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

6. That the Defendant shall continue paying support for the oldest child until the oldest child is eighteen (18) or graduates from high school; provided however, said child support shall not go beyond the child's nineteenth (19) birthday; and provided further, that if the oldest child drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate when he reaches the age of eighteen (18) and shall terminate anytime after he turns eighteen (18) and terminates if he does not continue on with high school.

7. That each of the parties shall assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs.

8. That the previous Order entered by the Court in connection with the above matter concerning visitation and abatement of child support as filed while the Defendant's visitation shall remain in full force and effect.

9. That the Commissioner's Recommended Order and Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court at this hearing.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of May, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_  
STANTON, M. TAYLOR,  
District Court Judge

ORDER TO MODIFY  
DECREE OF DIVORCE  
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER  
Civil No.: 96098

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JOHN M. BYBEE,  
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and Subsequent Orders was posted in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Attorney John M. Bybee, attorney for Plaintiff, at 795 24th Street, in Ogden, Utah 84401 pursuant to the Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three (3) days for mailing and five (5) days prior to submission of same to the Court for signature by mailing same on this 19 day of May, 1992.

*John M. Bybee*  
Secretary

ORDER TO MODIFY  
DECREE OF DIVORCE  
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

U.S. District Court  
Northern District of California  
San Francisco, California  
Case No. 96-098  
Page 4 of 4

**TRANSCRIPT**

1 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2 IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY

3 STATE OF UTAH

4 JANEANE B. DELKER,

5 )  
6 Plaintiff,

7 vs.

8 LEON V. DELKER,

9 )  
10 Defendant.

CASE NO. 860996098

OGDEN, UTAH

FEBRUARY 14, 1992

11  
12 HEARING

13 HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, PRESIDING

14  
15 APPEARANCES:

16 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. JOHN M. BYBEE  
17 Attorney at Law  
18 795 24th Street  
Ogden, Utah 84401

19 FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. PETE N. VLAHOS  
20 VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT  
21 Legal Forum Building  
22 2447 Kiesel Avenue  
23 Ogden, Utah 84401  
24  
25



1 THE COURT: Okay. This is Dalton  
2 versus Delker. Is the petitioner prepared to  
3 proceed?

4 MR. BYBEE: Yes, Your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Mr. Vlahos, is the  
6 defendant prepared to proceed?

7 MR. VLAHOS: Yes, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: You may proceed.

9 MR. VLAHOS: Your Honor, I do have a  
10 brief opening statement. If counsel does, too,  
11 that's fine.

12 MR. BYBEE: Yes. I -- I have an  
13 opening statement, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. BYBEE: This is a -- for  
16 clarification, there's been a lot of proceedings in  
17 this case -- this is a petition by the -- or, yeah,  
18 by the plaintiff for modification of the child  
19 support award.

20 At approximately the same time -- or a little  
21 after we filed the Petition to Modify Child Support,  
22 defendant filed a Petition for Modification of Child  
23 Custody for one of the children.

24 At an Order to Show Cause that was held at the  
25 same time as the pretrial, the Commissioner

1 recommended that the custody of that particular child  
2 be changed. And although we filed an objection to  
3 that recommendation, we are not pursuing that. We  
4 are not pursuing the custody issue at this time. We  
5 have no problems with leaving the one child that is  
6 with the defendant; and the other two children are  
7 with the plaintiff.

8 So what we're here on then is just purely the  
9 child support modification. Now, I went through  
10 the -- the file this morning and made copies of  
11 pertinent items that I need to bring to the Court's  
12 attention. They've been marked as exhibits, but  
13 they're all copies out of the court file. And I did  
14 that because there's so much in the file. I wanted  
15 to clarify it for Court and counsel.

16 Exhibit Number Two -- I'll go through these in  
17 order. Exhibit Number Two -- and I'll try and do it  
18 chronologically. So chronologically, Exhibit Number  
19 Two and Exhibit Number One, and then Three, Four and  
20 Five.

21 Exhibit Number Two is a copy of the Order in  
22 the file from North Dakota saying that North Dakota  
23 did not have custody -- or jurisdiction of the  
24 custody matter between these two parties and it  
25 should be heard in Utah.

1           Again, a little more background. These  
2 parties -- he was living in North Dakota, she was  
3 living in Utah at the time of the divorce. They both  
4 had filed actions. And so that was the reason for  
5 that particular Order.

6           The next thing is Number One is a Stipulation  
7 and Agreement signed by Mr. Delker -- who was the  
8 plaintiff in North Dakota -- and not signed by Mrs.  
9 Delker. This comes in July of '86.

10           And the reason that I made a copy of this for  
11 the Court is down second paragraph from the bottom it  
12 talks about \$75 per month per child in child support,  
13 and refers to a Utah Order. That particular Utah  
14 Order was a order made by Recovery Services  
15 administratively in 1981 when these parties first  
16 separated that he was to pay \$75 per month per child.

17           Okay. Next one, Number Three, this is dated,  
18 signed October of 1986, wherein it sets child support  
19 at \$116 per month per child. Apparently -- there was  
20 not a copy in the court file, and so I did not make a  
21 copy for this morning. Apparently, the divorce was  
22 granted in North Dakota in the summer of '86, which  
23 did not refer to child custody or child support or  
24 any of those items. And so the only matter that was  
25 taken care of in Utah then was the child custody and

1 child support. Okay. That's the third item.

2 Number Four, as some background for Number  
3 Four, apparently there was some misunderstandings,  
4 miscommunications, typo errors on the hearing for  
5 child custody. It was set to be in Utah in September  
6 of '86.

7 The defendant, Mr. Delker, filed a petition in  
8 '88 saying: I didn't get proper notice, and the  
9 notice I got said September 9th. It was actually  
10 held on September 8th.

11 And there was affidavits filed back and forth  
12 and -- and the upshot of all of that was that there  
13 was a hearing held in June of 1988 wherein the  
14 judge -- the Commissioner recommended that the child  
15 custody portion of the Decree be set aside, that  
16 visitation be ordered, that a child custody  
17 evaluation be ordered. And if you'll look in  
18 Paragraph -- Paragraph Eight of that particular  
19 Order, the only thing it says about child support is  
20 that during the two month visitation that the  
21 defendant had the children in North Dakota there  
22 would be no child support. So that's Number Four.

23 Then we go to Number Five which is signed in  
24 October -- yeah, October of '88. This was the  
25 pretrial hearing held on August 8th, 1988, before the

1 Commissioner. The Commissioner recommended, after  
2 reviewing all of the custody evaluation and  
3 affidavits and letters and everything that's in the  
4 file, that the plaintiff continue having custody of  
5 the children; that Mr. Delker was, of course, to have  
6 visitation.

7 And, again, the only thing said about child  
8 support is in Paragraph Number Five, that during the  
9 two months summer visitation, the child support will  
10 reduce by one-half.

11 And then the next activity in the file is when  
12 I, on behalf of the plaintiff, filed a Petition to  
13 Modify the Child Support.

14 Now, we have -- and then we -- and they filed  
15 their Petition for Change of Custody, and then we  
16 went to a pretrial in August of 1990 on our Petition  
17 to Modify and their Order to Show Cause and Change of  
18 Custody.

19 At that time the position was taken by counsel  
20 for defendant and the Court that child support was at  
21 \$75 a month. In fact, that's what he had been  
22 paying, \$75 per month per child since the divorce had  
23 been entered. We had asked for a modification based  
24 upon increase in income.

25 The defendant's position was -- was that based

1       upon the statute then enacted that his income had not  
2       changed by more than 25 percent -- 25 percent  
3       since -- since 1986 to 1990 and so he was not -- or  
4       we were not entitled to a child support modification.  
5       And, in fact, the Commissioner recommended that our  
6       petition be dismissed on the modification.

7               Then they went into the custody portion, his  
8       Order to Show Cause, and gave custody to -- of the  
9       one child to Mr. Delker. Then the Commissioner  
10      recommended that he pay 116 per child per month for  
11      the remaining two children. And that's where we've  
12      been since then.

13             Now, our problem here today is, first of all,  
14      as far as the statute is concerned, it was my  
15      understanding of the statute at that time that if you  
16      were using the guidelines to change child support,  
17      there had to be at least a 25 percent change in the  
18      child support before you could get that modification.

19             Counsel's position was -- and the Court agreed  
20      with him -- that there had to be a 25 percent change  
21      in income. So that's the reason he recommended no  
22      change in the child support.

23             Second issue is, we -- and I may be wrong. I  
24      mean, this is up for the Court to make a decision.  
25      The facts are pretty well not disputed. Mr. Delker

1 has a certain income; Mrs. Dalton now does not have  
2 any income. There's no dispute as to those facts.

3 MR. VLAHOS: Oh, yeah, there is,  
4 Counsel. Go ahead.

5 MR. BYBEE: Oh, okay. Excuse me.  
6 So a finding can be made on that issue.

7 The other issue is, is we would like a finding  
8 from the Court today that the child support from 1986  
9 through 1990 was \$116 per month per child and that  
10 we -- if there is an arrearage there that we need to  
11 do then an Order to Show Cause for child support  
12 arrearage for the difference between the \$75 he was  
13 paying and the 116.

14 So we have the two issues before the Court.  
15 We'd like relief on both of them and we would leave  
16 that in the discretion of the Court.

17 Thank you, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Thank you.

19 MR. VLAHOS: If the Court please,  
20 there is some very substantial differences in  
21 connection with this matter. Let me explain to the  
22 Court what happened in this particular case.

23 There should be an affidavit in the file  
24 signed by both my client, his attorney in  
25 California --

1 MR. BYBEE: North Dakota.

2 MR. VLAHOS: -- or North Dakota,  
3 excuse me.

4 THE COURT: California was  
5 yesterday.

6 MR. VLAHOS: Yeah. California was  
7 yesterday; North Dakota is today. I apologize, Your  
8 Honor.

9 THE COURT: We tried a child custody  
10 case all day yesterday and we're both a little  
11 punchy.

12 MR. VLAHOS: That's probably true,  
13 Your Honor.

14 Let me tell you what happened. There was a  
15 hearing -- my client received a Notice for a Hearing,  
16 I think it was September the 9th in 1986, if I'm not  
17 mistaken. My client had retained an attorney in  
18 North Dakota, and my client fully intended on being  
19 here on September the 9th.

20 And low and behold, the hearing was held on  
21 September the 8th. My client has always driven from  
22 North Dakota here to contest this matter. And when  
23 he called the clerk -- or his attorney called the  
24 clerk, whatever, they said, well, that hearing was  
25 today, tough.



1           You know, so his attorney immediately filed --  
2           and it should be on file -- an affidavit by the  
3           attorney, a motion, and then there was a Motion to  
4           Vacate that entire order.

5           Now, during the interim, you'll -- the file  
6           again will show there were memos filed by both  
7           plaintiff and defendant in that particular case. The  
8           end result was we didn't come to a hearing on that  
9           until 1988. In 1988, the Commissioner found that the  
10          man did not get proper notice, and has never -- never  
11          had proper notice for that hearing.

12          Now, the Order says custody of the children,  
13          but the Order is in regard -- I think if you'll look  
14          at the Commissioner's notes -- and I prepared the  
15          Order, I'll take responsibility for that -- the  
16          Commissioner set the whole thing aside because there  
17          was no notice. You've got an improper notice in this  
18          particular case.

19          There are affidavits in the file. I've -- my  
20          problem is I've got two files with me and I've got  
21          another file that thick because at the same time  
22          these were going on, there was also a Petition to  
23          Modify the custody of the children, and all this was  
24          being heard.

25          The end result is we had a hearing in June of

1       '88. My client got custody of some children for a  
2       few months. The Court was to make a final  
3       determination. There was some psychological  
4       evaluations in North Dakota, here; depositions were  
5       taken in North Dakota, here.

6               Then we had a pretrial in August of 1988. At  
7       that time the Commissioner spoke with the children.  
8       The children wanted to go with their dad, wanted to  
9       spend the summer with their dad or a substantial  
10      period of time, and wanted to stay with their mother.

11             At that time the Commissioner made an Order,  
12      and that Order was that the children stay with the  
13      mother in connection with this particular case.

14             Now, that Order has stayed in place until  
15      these proceedings started, for this particular  
16      situation. Now, we have exhibits to show what my  
17      client's income was at the time of divorce, we have  
18      exhibits to show what it was at the time of the  
19      pretrial hearing and what it is today.

20             His total increase from the time of the  
21      divorce to the present has been 12 percent. That's  
22      been his total increase in reference to this matter.  
23      I think the evidence will show further that my client  
24      is clear -- is current in all payments.

25             Now, if you'll look at the pretrial order

1 entered in 1990, the Commissioner found -- found no  
2 substantial change of circumstance. My client agreed  
3 voluntarily, to see if we could put the matter to  
4 rest once and for all, that he would agree to pay the  
5 116 forward, and he has.

6 So bear in mind, this man has paid faithfully  
7 every dime he was ever ordered to pay. Bear in mind  
8 that he pays 116 for the two children that are with  
9 Mrs. Delker, who's now remarried, and has not asked  
10 for any support for the child he's had custody of the  
11 entire time since the hearing.

12 Now, our position is, one, Your Honor, this is  
13 res judicata in that when we had a hearing in 1988  
14 after the Commissioner had set aside the prior Order  
15 because of no proper notice. I don't think you can  
16 have a judgment entered where a person has not been  
17 given adequate notice. I think you'll find in the  
18 file that is absolutely correct. So the Commissioner  
19 set that aside.

20 Then we had all this -- all the other matters,  
21 and at that time, all these issues were decided.  
22 That becomes res judicata, Your Honor. And then,  
23 like I said, from then -- then we move on to what's  
24 occurred in 1990 when counsel filed his petition.

25 Now, I don't think you can sit back four years

1 and say, all of a sudden, ah ha, I want to go back in  
2 and make this thing retroactive, when we've been to  
3 court at least a half a dozen times for various  
4 matters. Never raised.

5 At all times Mrs. Delker was represented by  
6 counsel. At no time did she represent herself. So I  
7 would submit to this Court two things: One, I think  
8 if you'll read the Commissioner's notes -- and if  
9 there's a Scribners error, I think there's allowance  
10 for it.

11 The Commissioner set the whole Order aside  
12 that was entered in 1986 because there was no proper  
13 notice. And I don't think you can get a judgment  
14 with no proper notice. That's like saying, you  
15 appear in court -- well, exactly what happened. You  
16 appear in court on the 9th, we get a judgment on you  
17 on the 8th, and whether you appear on the 9th, that's  
18 tough because it was -- a judgment was granted on the  
19 8th.

20 That's exactly what happened in this case. So  
21 I submit, Your Honor, that the Commissioner's finding  
22 that there was no substantial change of circumstance  
23 is correct. My client has been voluntarily paying  
24 \$116 per month per child and is willing to continue  
25 doing that. Clearly, I have -- clearly, the one

1 child wants to remain with his -- with her dad, so I  
2 don't see that as a problem.

3 That's our position, Your Honor, and I have  
4 various documents relative to that. And I just want  
5 the Court to be aware that this Order that was  
6 entered in 1986, the 8th of September, there were  
7 affidavits filed by my client, his attorney, and  
8 motions filed by his attorney, and that's why I don't  
9 have them, but I -- in that file, it will clearly  
10 reflect this was not sat on two years. It was done  
11 immediately. Thank you.

12 I can have my secretary, Your Honor, get the  
13 other thick brown file if you want and bring it over  
14 here, but I just didn't have enough space to bring  
15 it.

16 THE COURT: Frankly, my dear  
17 Scarlet.

18 MR. VLAHOS: Uh?

19 THE COURT: I don't want to look at  
20 your file.

21 MR. VLAHOS: Well, I mean to bring  
22 over those documents.

23 THE COURT: No, no, no. That's  
24 fine.

25 MR. VLAHOS: As a matter of fact, I

1 have a copy of the Commissioner's notes in my file.

2 THE COURT: Well, the Commissioner's  
3 notes are in the Court's file and the Court has had  
4 an opportunity to examine them.

5 MR. VLAHOS: Okay. Okay.

6 THE COURT: Yeah.

7 MR. BYBEE: Your Honor, may I amend  
8 my opening statement?

9 THE COURT: Why don't you amend your  
10 opening statement.

11 MR. BYBEE: There is one additional  
12 matter that needs to be brought up and that goes on  
13 what Mr. Vlahos says. He says everything was set  
14 aside, and obviously by the copies I've given the  
15 Court, there is no other order concerning child  
16 support.

17 If the Court, for instance, was to take the  
18 position that there had to be a 25 percent change and  
19 that the proper order was \$75 per month per child,  
20 that doesn't go to 1986. That goes to 1981 when that  
21 first -- that amount was first entered.

22 So if the Court was to find, yeah, \$75 per  
23 month per child is the correct amount -- you know, I  
24 find as a matter of law that through all these  
25 documents that it wasn't 116, it was \$75 per month

1 per child, then our change of circumstances doesn't  
2 go back to 1986. It goes back to 1981 when that  
3 Order was first entered. That -- that's the other  
4 issue. If that's what the judge -- if the Court  
5 finds then --

6 THE COURT: Now, let me ask a  
7 question -- not to interrupt you.

8 MR. BYBEE: Okay. That's fine.

9 THE COURT: But I'll interrupt you,  
10 I guess.

11 The divorce was granted in North Dakota.

12 MR. BYBEE: Right.

13 THE COURT: Presumably the North  
14 Dakota Decree did not make an order concerning child  
15 support.

16 MR. BYBEE: That's correct.

17 THE COURT: The \$75 was based upon  
18 an administrative order of the Office of Recovery  
19 Services, presumably sometime after the divorce; is  
20 that correct?

21 MR. BYBEE: No, no, no. That was  
22 made in 1981, five years before the divorce.

23 MR. VLAHOS: Well, the stipulation  
24 is dated July 10th of '86 that my client signed,  
25 which is in the court files in the State of North

1 Dakota.

2 MR. BYBEE: Right.

3 MR. VLAHOS: And that's the  
4 stipulation that counsel indicated. That's the  
5 Order --

6 THE COURT: But that was based upon  
7 the \$75 ORS Order of an earlier date.

8 MR. BYBEE: Right. Right. Right.

9 THE COURT: So the divorce was  
10 actually not granted or obtained until '86.

11 MR. BYBEE: That's correct, Your  
12 Honor.

13 THE COURT: Okay.

14 MR. VLAHOS: But the Stipulation,  
15 which is part of the file, states -- and I quote --  
16 that the plaintiff should --

17 THE COURT: I've read it.

18 MR. VLAHOS: Okay.

19 MR. BYBEE: And, of course, that  
20 Stipulation was not signed by Mrs. Delker and it was  
21 just an exhibit. I'm not even sure why it was an  
22 exhibit. It was a North Dakota document that was put  
23 as an exhibit into a Utah case. And I wasn't  
24 representing Mrs. Dalton at that time so I don't know  
25 why they put that in there since it was not signed by



1 her.

2 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of  
3 the Decree from North Dakota?

4 MR. BYBEE: I don't.

5 MR. VLAHOS: And I didn't bring one,  
6 Your Honor.

7 MR. BYBEE: I think Mr. Dalton has a  
8 copy.

9 MR. DALTON: Which Decree are we  
10 looking for?

11 MR. BYBEE: From North Dakota --  
12 Decree of Divorce from North Dakota.

13 (Mr. Dalton tenders document to Mr. Bybee.)

14 MR. BYBEE: Yes.

15 THE COURT: Would you show that to  
16 Mr. Vlahos? (Tenders document to Mr. Vlahos.)

17 MR. VLAHOS: Well, this is Findings  
18 of Fact --

19 MR. BYBEE: And Order for Judgment.

20 MR. VLAHOS: -- and Conclusions of  
21 Law. I don't see that as a judgment.

22 THE COURT: They may -- they may  
23 delineate it differently than we do, if it says  
24 Order.

25 MR. VLAHOS: The Court -- and I

1 can't tell you if this is the Divorce Decree, Your  
2 Honor. The only thing it says here: In The Matter  
3 of the Care, Custody and Control, et cetera, subject  
4 to jurisdiction of the State of Utah, including  
5 visitation rights. But I can't tell you whether this  
6 is the Decree because it says Findings of Fact and  
7 Conclusions of Law.

8 MR. BYBEE: Do you have anything  
9 else?

10 MR. DALTON: No.

11 THE COURT: May I see it?

12 MR. BYBEE: The last -- yeah. The  
13 last thing it says, "Let judgment be entered  
14 accordingly".

15 THE COURT: So there probably is a  
16 separate judgment. This should be the Findings of  
17 Fact. And this was entered sometime in '86.

18 MR. BYBEE: Right.

19 So -- so our point is we either have \$116 per  
20 month from September of '86, or we have 75 per month  
21 from 1981. If the 116 is correct, then we have a  
22 child support arrearage issue. If the 75 is correct,  
23 then the modification issue is not what he was  
24 earning in '86, but what he was earning in '81.

25 So we have an either/or type of position here.

1 MR. VLAHOS: Well, except for one  
2 thing. The Commissioner found that in '86 -- which  
3 is the time of the divorce -- is when the figures  
4 were used, whatever that may be. You can't go beyond  
5 the Decree.

6 So what you're looking at is the Commissioner  
7 had the information before him. Counsel wasn't there  
8 in reference to it.

9 MR. BYBEE: Right.

10 THE COURT: Hold on just a second,  
11 please, Mr. Vlahos.

12 MR. VLAHOS: Okay. I apologize.

13 THE COURT: I'm taking a look at  
14 some things in the file and I'm having difficulty  
15 listening and reading at the same time.

16 MR. VLAHOS: Okay.

17 THE COURT: September 8th -- that's  
18 the one you say you didn't get notice of; is that  
19 correct, Mr. Vlahos?

20 MR. VLAHOS: He never -- he got  
21 notice, Your Honor, but for the 9th.

22 THE COURT: The 9th. And that would  
23 be understandable. The previous hearing was for  
24 August 9th, and, presumedly, they made a mistake  
25 on the -- transposing.

1           It's kind of fun to read through this file.  
2       One of the -- well, it's nice to hear the kids saying  
3       really nice things about everybody. You know, they  
4       like their parents and they like their in-laws and  
5       their step-parents and that's -- that's wonderful.  
6       You don't see that often. So you're both to be  
7       complimented in that regard.

8           So I understand it, it is the position of the  
9       parties -- the petitioner feels that the \$75 was  
10      instituted in 1981 by the Administrative Order, and  
11      then subsequently was changed by the divorce -- or  
12      the Decree of Judge Wahlquist in '86 to 116.

13                 MR. BYBEE: That's correct.

14                 THE COURT: And then there was a  
15      subsequent Order based upon an agreement in '90 when  
16      there was a change of custody situation.

17                 MR. BYBEE: '88.

18                 THE COURT: '88.

19                 MR. VLAHOS: No. The change of  
20      custody was in '90. You're right. The '88 --

21                 THE COURT: That's where the 116  
22      came up again.

23                 MR. VLAHOS: Correct.

24                 THE COURT: Yeah. At that point the  
25      judge ordered 116 for the two children and --

1 MR. BYBEE: The remaining two.

2 THE COURT: -- and no reciprocating  
3 support for him.

4 MR. BYBEE: Right.

5 THE COURT: And then your position,  
6 Mr. Vlahos, is the '86 Decree was set aside by Judge  
7 Hyde's subsequent Order.

8 MR. VLAHOS: Well, by Commissioner  
9 Richards in reference to it because --

10 THE COURT: Well, by Judge Hyde  
11 actually confirming the Order.

12 MR. VLAHOS: Yes.

13 THE COURT: And the only portion of  
14 the Commissioner's recommendation that was objected  
15 to was the custody issue.

16 MR. VLAHOS: I think the total thing  
17 was objected to by the affidavits on file by my  
18 client and his attorney. They prepared those in  
19 North Dakota and forwarded them here, and I wasn't  
20 involved until later.

21 THE COURT: But the objection was by  
22 the petitioner based upon the change of custody  
23 situation.

24 MR. VLAHOS: Yeah, but the total  
25 thing is what I'm saying, Your Honor, because of no

1 notice.

2 THE COURT: Yeah, but the Order by  
3 Judge Wahlquist -- right. So that was set aside.

4 MR. VLAHOS: I think this Court  
5 would have to set it aside as a matter of equity when  
6 there was improper notice to the parties.

7 THE COURT: Well, I think the effect  
8 of Judge Hyde's confirmation of the Commissioner's  
9 Order is to set it aside.

10 MR. VLAHOS: And we're willing to  
11 pursue -- to leave it as is, with her still not  
12 having to pay any money. And he is current.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- let me  
14 ask just for a proffer on a couple of points that may  
15 resolve some of the issues, at least in my own mind.  
16 Let me get the most current schedule here.

17 MR. VLAHOS: If you're asking what  
18 the current support would be, I compute it at just --

19 THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's do  
20 this kind of a computation. The -- the petitioner  
21 apparently doesn't have an income now, is taking care  
22 of the family.

23 MR. VLAHOS: My understanding is,  
24 Your Honor, she told my client she's going to work at  
25 Hill Field at the Officer's Mess or the mess there.

1 That's why I said, I dispute the fact she's not  
2 working, but I think imputed income can be entered.

3 THE COURT: Well, yeah, I was going  
4 to suggest perhaps the appropriate way, even if she  
5 wasn't working, probably would be fair to impute  
6 income, since she's made a decision not to work, to  
7 take care of the family.

8 MR. BYBEE: We were going to show  
9 her 1986 tax return when she did last work. And her  
10 gross income for 1986 was \$3,016. That was prior to  
11 her marriage to Mr. Dalton.

12 THE COURT: What -- what I would  
13 probably --

14 MR. VLAHOS: Yeah.

15 THE COURT: -- be inclined to do,  
16 would be impute minimum wage which is --

17 MR. BYBEE: 737 a month.

18 THE COURT: Yeah, 737, 736,  
19 something in that area. Let's say 737.

20 MR. VLAHOS: Your Honor, I've done  
21 that and I can give the Court some figures, if the  
22 Court wants. I've already done it.

23 THE COURT: All right. Why don't  
24 you do that. Why don't you tell me the basis of your  
25 conclusion.

1                   MR. VLAHOS: My client's current  
2 income -- and that includes his most recent pay  
3 stub -- he has an hourly rate. It's 13.95 or 2,418  
4 per month. I've computed that out and his gross  
5 income --

6                   THE COURT: Well, let me -- hold on  
7 just a second and let me -- let me do some figuring  
8 quietly on my own and then we'll talk about it.

9                   MR. VLAHOS: His gross is 2,418 a  
10 month. That's on a four and a third week basis.

11                  THE COURT: I'm not sure I have a  
12 current schedule. What is the current schedule?  
13 It's not the '89 one.

14                  MR. BYBEE: No, it's not. There's  
15 one in the Commissioner's office, if you'd like me to  
16 get that.

17                  MR. VLAHOS: I have it. Is that  
18 what you're looking for?

19                  THE COURT: Yeah. What's the most  
20 current one?

21                  MR. VLAHOS: This one here.

22                  THE COURT: I was looking at mine  
23 yesterday, but I must have put it in the papers.

24                  MR. VLAHOS: Well, it's the same  
25 one. I don't think it's been changed.



1           Your Honor, I've taken his income -- like I  
2       said, it comes out to 2,418, and I've taken her at  
3       736, for a combined income of 3,154. That relates to  
4       76 percent that my client would pay. The child  
5       support on the three children is 742, or 187.98 per  
6       month per child.

7           Mrs. -- well, I don't know what her new name  
8       is and I apologize --

9           MR. BYBEE: Dalton.

10          MR. VLAHOS: -- Delker would be  
11       obligated to pay 24 percent of 742, and that's \$178.  
12       And she would be paying 59.36 per month per child.

13          Since my client has -- since there are two  
14       children living with Mrs. --

15          MR. BYBEE: Dalton.

16          MR. VLAHOS: -- Dalton, excuse me.  
17       Dalton. My client would be ordered to pay 187.98  
18       twice which is 375.96, minus 59.36, which is her  
19       portion for the one which is a net 316.60.

20          My client has health and accident insurance,  
21       half of which is for the children. That runs about  
22       \$35 a month. The bottom line is 281.60 as opposed to  
23       232.

24          The Commissioner ordered -- if you'll take it  
25       on a basis of her income, I can represent to the

1 Court -- and I have an exhibit. He is exactly the  
2 same thing he was right after in '86, a wage  
3 grade 10 - step four, except he's now a step five.

4 But at the time of the divorce -- which I  
5 think is the period you have to consider -- he has  
6 had a gross income of 12 percent, and I've given it  
7 by the year, up to and including the present. If it  
8 will assist the Court I'd offer this --

9 THE COURT: Mr. Vlahos, please. I'm  
10 really trying to do some thinking and figuring on my  
11 own. I'd prefer that I be able to do that.

12 This is your copy, Mr. Vlahos.

13 MR. VLAHOS: Thank you, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Now, let me -- let me  
15 kind of go through the figures as I've -- as I've  
16 perceived them. Figuring the obligation that would  
17 be assessable under the present schedule at the  
18 present time, based upon both of their incomes --  
19 see, if -- see, if I'm -- we've got, basically, 736  
20 or 737. For sake of argument, let's say 736 income  
21 imputed to the petitioner.

22 You've got 2,418 which the parties apparently  
23 agree is his gross income per month. Right?

24 MR. BYBEE: Assuming I can see a pay  
25 stub, I would agree on that. Assuming that's

1 correct, there's no problem.

2 THE COURT: Yeah.

3 MR. VLAHOS: He'll testify under  
4 oath that's what it is.

5 THE COURT: If you have a pay  
6 stub --

7 MR. VLAHOS: I don't have one, Your  
8 Honor, and he didn't bring one with him.

9 THE COURT: Anyway, the total of  
10 that would be 3,155. If you run 3,155 for three  
11 children, the schedule would reflect \$747, right?

12 MR. VLAHOS: 742 was what I show,  
13 but I could be in error.

14 THE COURT: Let me -- let's see.  
15 3,155. My schedule, and, in fact, your schedule, I  
16 think, would reflect 747, Mr. Vlahos. Why don't you  
17 check that. That's 3,155.

18 MR. VLAHOS: Well, I apologize. I  
19 don't have my glasses on. Whatever the schedule  
20 says, I have no problem with.

21 THE COURT: Okay. Anyway, it's in  
22 that area someplace.

23 Now, if you -- if you divide the -- in  
24 determining what each share is then you -- you divide  
25 the 736 by 3,155 which would give you her percentage

1 share. As I recall, it was 23.3 percent or something  
2 like that. Somewhere between 23 and 24 percent.

3 MR. VLAHOS: I come out 24 percent.

4 THE COURT: Yeah. I think if we  
5 rounded it off correctly we'd come up with 24. The  
6 actual figure was 23.3 percent or something.

7 If you multiply those figures out then, 23  
8 percent of 747, you come up with \$174, which would be  
9 her share. And the balance would be \$543, which  
10 would be his share for the three children.

11 Is that consistent with your figures, Mr.  
12 Vlahos? Roughly, 174 and 543?

13 MR. VLAHOS: I've got 563.92, but  
14 it's so close that, you know, it's not going to vary  
15 very much.

16 THE COURT: Yeah. Now, if you  
17 figure the -- the schedule then, the total obligation  
18 each of them have is the 174 and the 543 for the  
19 three children. He has two -- or she has two of the  
20 children and he has one of the children. Her share  
21 then --

22 MR. BYBEE: Excuse me, Your Honor.  
23 Your figures are 174 and 543?

24 THE COURT: Yeah.

25 MR. BYBEE: But that only adds up to

1       717. It wouldn't add up to 747.

2                   THE COURT: That's what I said, if  
3 my mathematics are correct. I wonder how I did that.  
4 Well, let's look. Let me run those again. 3,155 --  
5 (Figuring amounts.)

6                   I take it back. It's 573, isn't it?

7                   MR. BYBEE: Uh uh.

8                   MR. VLAHOS: Did Your Honor take 76  
9 percent of 747?

10                  THE COURT: Well, it's -- it's  
11 actually a little over 76. 76.3 or something like  
12 that.

13                  MR. VLAHOS: Okay. Fine. I  
14 didn't -- I didn't carry it out that far.

15                  THE COURT: Yeah. I just ran the  
16 figures right on out. So it's 174 and 573. Then her  
17 share of one of the children would be the 174 divided  
18 by three, right?

19                  MR. BYBEE: (Nods head up and down.)

20                  THE COURT: So her -- her  
21 obligation -- child support obligation back to the  
22 defendant would be \$58 for the one child that he has.  
23 Then his obligation would be for the two children,  
24 which would be two-thirds of 573, right -- or 382.

25                  You deduct her obligation from his obligation.

1 Under the present schedule that would be 382 minus --  
2 minus 58 for \$324, which would be his obligation  
3 under the present schedule.

4 MR. VLAHOS: Minus the health and  
5 accident insurance.

6 THE COURT: Yeah, whatever he's  
7 paying for health and accident.

8 MR. VLAHOS: And it's roughly \$35.

9 THE COURT: Okay. So we're talking  
10 just a little under \$300. Right?

11 MR. VLAHOS: 289, I guess.

12 THE COURT: Uh huh. Let's figure it  
13 exactly, if we're going to. Thirty-five, did you  
14 say?

15 MR. VLAHOS: Yes, and some odd cents  
16 beyond that, Your Honor. They take out 34.67 per pay  
17 day. Half of that is for him, the other half is for  
18 the children. You've got four and a third pay days,  
19 but it's -- you know, it's a dollar, dollar and a  
20 half and I'd just soon round it off.

21 THE COURT: Okay. So that would be  
22 289. And he, under the previous Commissioner's  
23 recommendation from '90, would be paying at the  
24 present time 232?

25 MR. VLAHOS: Yes, Your Honor. And

1 he is current with those payments.

2 MR. BYBEE: I want to give you a  
3 slight correction on that. Office of Recovery  
4 Services show he's \$66 in arrears.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MR. VLAHOS: Well --

7 THE COURT: Pretty close.

8 MR. VLAHOS: No. Let me tell you  
9 how that comes about and let's correct it right now.  
10 The way the government works, they're paid every two  
11 weeks, so they divide it by 26 weeks --

12 THE COURT: Twenty-six weeks.

13 MR. VLAHOS: And it's being reduced  
14 each month, but the two extra pay days will catch it  
15 up.

16 THE COURT: They do that in court,  
17 too.

18 MR. VLAHOS: And I think you'll find  
19 out he's current or will be current at the end of  
20 year.

21 MR. BYBEE: Okay.

22 THE COURT: Okay. You divide 57 by  
23 the 289, come up with about something less than 20  
24 percent.

25 MR. BYBEE: What were those last

1 figures?

2 THE COURT: Well, his obligation to  
3 her under the new support guidelines -- based upon  
4 their incomes and deductions and additions and so  
5 forth -- would be \$289.

6 MR. BYBEE: Right.

7 THE COURT: There is a -- if you --  
8 if you subtract what he's presently paying, which  
9 is --

10 MR. BYBEE: Oh, which is 232.

11 THE COURT: -- 232, you come up with  
12 \$57.

13 MR. BYBEE: Okay.

14 THE COURT: And if you figure that  
15 on a percentage basis, there's only -- well, it's  
16 19.7 percent or something difference between what  
17 he's paying, and under the new guidelines what he  
18 would pay.

19 There seems to me to be two specific issues:  
20 an arrearage issue, depending on at what point we  
21 assess the 116; and -- and whether there's a  
22 substantial change of circumstance that would justify  
23 a modification of the present support level.

24 MR. BYBEE: Now, the -- we're not  
25 seeking to modify 232. We're seeking to modify



1       whether it was 116 per child for three children, or  
2       75 per child for three children back in August of  
3       1990. The 232 that he's paying now was the  
4       Commissioner's recommendation based upon him  
5       receiving one child and her receiving two children.

6               So our modification is not of the 232, it's  
7       the 116 or 75.

8               THE COURT: Well, except that the  
9       Commissioner's Order concerning the 232 based upon  
10      the change of circumstance, the child going to him,  
11      would be an Order of the Court; and, therefore,  
12      that -- that's, basically, what we would be  
13      modifying.

14              If -- if we were going clear back, you know,  
15      of course -- obviously we'd be modifying the \$75, but  
16      it sounds to me like the Commissioner's already done  
17      that. There was jurisdiction for that based upon the  
18      substantial change involving the change of custody  
19      which obviously opens up the whole thing so that we  
20      can modify all aspects that seem to be inequitable in  
21      view of the change.

22              So that the -- the -- the ongoing order --  
23      well, all right. Does everybody agree that  
24      essentially what has been presented to the Court  
25      would be the evidence that was going to be presented

1 by the -- by the parties?

2 MR. VLAHOS: Basically, correct,  
3 Your Honor, except --

4 MR. BYBEE: Yes.

5 MR. VLAHOS: -- I do have the  
6 exhibit that shows his income in '86, '90, and even  
7 with his current rate, which I'm willing to give you.  
8 And like I said, I've calculated it out --

9 THE COURT: Why don't you hand that  
10 to Mr. Bybee and he'll have an opportunity to examine  
11 it.

12 (Mr. Vlahos tenders document to Mr. Bybee.)

13 MR. VLAHOS: There's a 12 percent --

14 THE COURT: 12 percent from when to  
15 when?

16 MR. VLAHOS: From '86 to the  
17 present. I -- I -- in 1981, Your Honor, I don't  
18 think my client even can recall what his income was.

19 THE COURT: I don't think what  
20 happened in '81 is probably a relevant issue anyway.

21 MR. VLAHOS: And, also, I'd point  
22 out to the Court that the Notice is improper. For  
23 one thing, it's improper. For another thing, we came  
24 into court in '88. The Court ruled on that. I think  
25 that's res judicata at that point.

1           And we all agree, that was the Order provided  
2           that both parties agreed to have the pretrial order  
3           be a part of the Order. And it's set forth in that  
4           Order.

5                   THE COURT: The '88 -- or the --

6                   MR. VLAHOS: '88.

7                   THE COURT: That was the --

8                   MR. BYBEE: Custody.

9                   THE COURT: That was the \$75 order.

10                  MR. VLAHOS: That was -- yeah.

11                  Everything was an issue at that point.

12                  MR. DALTON: With all due respect,  
13                  Your Honor, in '88 --

14                  (Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Bybee  
15                  and Mr. Dalton.)

16                  THE COURT: I know. I know.

17                  All right. Let's take a five-minute recess.

18                  MR. BYBEE: Okay.

19                  (WHEREUPON, at this time there's a recess,  
20                  after which proceedings resume in open court as  
21                  follows:)

22                  THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me  
23                  preface my comments by a statement that I hope that  
24                  what happens here today is not going to effect the  
25                  sense of cooperation that I've sensed in the raising

1 of your children. And -- and in that regard, you're  
2 doing fine.

3 And I guess on behalf of society, I'd like to  
4 say to you thank you because, in candor, all day  
5 yesterday I was faced with a situation where the  
6 parents in the situation were not -- had not been  
7 able to reconcile themselves to the fact that they  
8 didn't like each other very much, and the impact that  
9 that was having on the child.

10 Mr. Vlahos was involved in that trial and I'm  
11 sure that he will be inclined to agree that the child  
12 was not in as good a position, psychologically, as  
13 apparently your children are. And I would like to  
14 compliment you for that.

15 The -- the case, while complex and convoluted  
16 and having gone through a lot of problems, from the  
17 standpoint of the law, I think is -- is fairly clear.  
18 On -- on the child support modification, whether we  
19 consider the increase in his salary as being the  
20 determinative factor or whether we consider the  
21 support guidelines themselves to be the factor, in  
22 either one of those analysis, the change is something  
23 less than 20 percent, which would not justify a  
24 finding of a substantial change of circumstance which  
25 would vest in the Court jurisdiction to make

1       modifications.

2               For that reason, the Court in -- in finding  
3       this is not a substantial change, denies the  
4       petition.

5               Concerning the -- the other mess, it appears  
6       very complex, but the Court, after listening to the  
7       proffers, would find, number one, the \$75 per month  
8       figure was established through Recovery Services in  
9       the year -- in the early '80's; that Judge Wahlquist,  
10      in his 1986 Decree, did change that to 116.

11              The problem with that was that the defendant  
12      in the case had not been given proper notification.  
13      As a result of that, the -- that decree was set aside  
14      in, as I recall, '88, and there was not a subsequent  
15      modification of the continuing support of \$75 per  
16      month until the 1990 recommendation in conjunction  
17      with the change of custody.

18              So the Court finds that the support, from the  
19      date of their separation to the modification by the  
20      Commissioner -- which was approved by Judge Hyde --  
21      would be \$75 per month per child. That would be 116  
22      from that date to the present.

23              And if there is any arrearage or anything that  
24      we need to talk about, I guess you could do that by  
25      way of affidavit, Mr. Bybee, and the Court could

1       reconcile those issues, if that is -- that appears to  
2       be appropriate.

3               MR. VLAHOS: Your Honor, I think  
4       Your Honor is aware of how they take this out, and I  
5       think at the end of year each, I think you'll find  
6       that he is current.

7               THE COURT: Yeah. It's based on 26  
8       pay periods, and I think that's the way they work it.  
9       And the fact he might be, you know, 25 or 30 or \$60  
10      behind now because he hasn't yet got that -- the  
11      third pay check in a particular month, we would  
12      consider that to be current.

13              MR. BYBEE: The 116 per child was  
14      since August of '90. Is that what the Court found?

15              THE COURT: I think that was -- that  
16      was the date of that Order.

17              MR. BYBEE: Right. Right.

18              THE COURT: That's right. And I --  
19      and understand that that 116 for the two -- you know,  
20      each for two children is based upon the idea that she  
21      isn't paying anything back to him.

22              MR. VLAHOS: Yes, we understand  
23      that. We have no problem with that.

24              MR. BYBEE: Right.

25              THE COURT: Okay. Right. Okay.