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State of Utah In the Interest of Cindy Cooper and
Tracy Caine and Marvin Lentini and Judith D.
Lentini v. the State of Utah : Brief of Respondent

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest of
CINDY COOPER and TRACY CAINE

MARVIN LENTINI and JUDITH D.
LENTINI,

Petitioners and Appellants,

— v —

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Defendant and Respondent.

FILED

SEP 2 - 1965

Clt. L. Supreme Court, Utah

Case No. 10352

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
District Juvenile Court for Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Monroe J. Paxman, Judge

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Case No. 10352

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

The appellants Marvin Lentini and Judith D. Lentini, aunt and uncle of Cindy Cooper and Tracy Caine, appeal from a decision of the Juvenile Court for Utah County denying their petition for custody of the minor children.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On February 5, 1963, a petition was filed with the Juvenile Court for Utah County, alleging that the children of Linda Davis Fixel were neglected children within the meaning of Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. An amended petition was filed on February 21, 1963, and the parents of the children duly served. On April 5, 1963,

the court entered findings and decree determining Tracy Caine, Cindy Cooper, and other children neglected children. Cindy Cooper and Tracy Caine placed with the Utah County Department of Welfare. On May 21, 1963, a petition for a permanent deprivation of custody was filed, and on August 30, 1963, the children were permanently removed from the custody of their parents. On September 30, 1963, Marvin Lentini and Judith Lentini, of Elko, Nevada, filed a petition for custody of the children, along with a copy of the mother's consent to having custody over the children. A hearing was held on the 19th of November, 1963, and an order denying the petition entered on the 29th of January, 1964. Subsequent rehearing was granted and set for September 28, 1964. On the 26th of January, 1965, the court entered its findings of fact and decree denying the petition of the Lentinis. The instant appeal was thereafter taken, and on the 17th day of May, 1965, this court heard a motion of the State to dismiss the appeal. On August 2, 1965, the court denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent submits that the decision of the Juvenile Court should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent submits the following statement of facts:

Judith D. Lentini and Marvin Lentini are the aunt and uncle of Cindy Cooper and Tracy Caine. They are husband and wife and have been married for approximately five years (T. 5). At the time of the hearing, Mr. Lentini was an employee of the Nevada Bank of Commerce.

and was in the process of moving to Battle Mountain to become the bank manager in that town (T. 5). Mrs. Lentini is the sister of the children's mother. The children have not been with the Lentinis since two years prior to the time of the hearing, which was held in December of 1964 (T. 7). The mother of the children had been in the Lentinis' home approximately four or five times in the previous five years (T. 6). Mrs. Lentini indicated that there were communications with her sister and with her mother and father, but that they were not frequent (T. 12).

Both of the Lentinis indicated they had a good relationship with the children when the children had been in their home, and that they wanted to adopt the children (T. 6, 14, and 15). There was no dispute as to the competency and qualifications of the Lentinis apart from the relationship with the children's mother and the children's grandparents.

At the time the children were declared neglected, it appeared that the children's mother, Mrs. Fixel, was a highly promiscuous and immoral woman and could not adequately care for the children. The only evidence of record as to her wishes is a signed paper containing the mother's consent to the custody of the children by the Lentinis (R. 18).

Subsequent to the initial deprivation of Mrs. Fixel of her children, they were placed in foster homes and have resided in foster homes since that time. Mrs. Rochelle Augustine, a social worker with the Utah Welfare Department, Child Welfare Division, testified in opposition to the position of the Lentinis. She felt it was in the best interest of the children not to grant the petition (T. 27). Her position was based on the relationship between the Lentinis and

the children's mother and the children's grandparents noted a substantial conflict between the two children was in excess of that deemed normal (T. 26). She indicated that Tracy suffered serious personality problems when confronted with her mother (T. 26, 29). Tracy, seeing her mother, would become completely disoriented (T. 29).

Dallas C. Thompson, a Child Welfare worker with the Utah County Department of Welfare, had known Cindy since 1962, and was aware of the relationship between Cindy and her foster parents (T. 32). He felt the petition should not be granted because of possible conflicts that could arise within the family, and felt that the children had made a good adjustment to their foster homes. He indicated that Cindy desired to stay with her present foster parents (T. 35). He further indicated that where children had established good relationships, that it is a difficult, traumatic situation when they are shifted (T. 35). He felt that the anxiety in severing the present foster parental relationship should be avoided (T. 36).

The court entered its findings that it would be in the best interests of the children to remain with the present foster parents. The court found (R. 38):

“* * * The children have done well in their present foster homes and there is evidence that they have adjusted better apart from each other than together. The court concludes that said children will have a greater opportunity for stability and an absence of an upsetting experience, and that the best interests of the children can be served by adoptive placement with non-relatives.”

The record before the Juvenile Court disclosed that the grandparents have had a serious influence upon the children.

and that they suffered from psychological and psychological problems (R. 60). It further appears from the evidence that there is substantial friction between the various members of the children's natural family (R. 62).

Based upon the above evidence, it is submitted that the decision of the Juvenile Court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE COURT.

The appellants in three points attacked the decree of the Juvenile Court. The position of the appellants is simply that the decision of the Juvenile Court is contrary to the evidence, and that the court erred in weighing testimony and evidence presented before it. Since the points raised in the appellants' brief are, in fact, one, the respondent will answer on one point only.

It is well settled that this court will not reverse a decision of the Juvenile Court unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Thus, in *Debraux v. Brown*, 2 U.2d 334, 237 P.2d 377 (1954), this court observed:

*** The court is given broad and comprehensive latitude and discretion in determining the custody of the child and its orders may range from mere temporary custody pending an investigation or hearing or to meet a temporary emergency, to an order intended to permanently deprive the parent of the custody of his child by committing the child to the custody of a child placement society to be placed in a family for adoption without the consent of the parents. ***

In *State in the Interest of K*—, 7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 35 (1958), this court observed that the objective of Juve-

nile Court proceedings is to safeguard the welfare of the children involved, and that the court necessarily is empowered to make whatever orders are necessary in the interest of the children. In *State in Interest of L.J.J.*, 11 U.2d 345, 344 P.2d 981 (1959), it was stated:

“Hearings in the juvenile court involving questions as to the custody of children are equitable, and the court is charged with the responsibility of reviewing the evidence and will not disturb the findings of determination made unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence or there has been an abuse of discretion.”

See also *State in the Interest of L.J.J.*, 11 U.2d 393, 392 P.2d 486 (1961). Consequently, if there is any reasonable basis for the Juvenile Court decision in the instant case, the court should affirm.

It is clear the evidence in this case supports the Juvenile Court's determination. Although the Lentinis are people of unquestioned character, they have not had the custody of the two minor children for over two years since they were removed from their mother. During that time the children have formed new and positive relationships with their foster homes. The removal of the children from their current environment could recreate trauma and stress. The testimony of social workers who were acquainted with the children was to the effect that the disruption attendant to removing the children from their foster homes was such that the petition should be denied. Further, one of the social workers observed a substantial conflict and abnormal jealousy between Tracy and Cindy, and noted that the children had improved while living apart. By placing both children in the custody of the Lentinis, the conflicts and jealousy

which existed in the past could be reawakened. The trial court in its discretion could, therefore, properly find it in the best interests of the children that they remain apart.

In addition, it appeared that the children reacted in a hostile manner when confronted with their mother. Her presence caused extreme stress and anxiety. Since the children's mother is the sister of Mrs. Lentini and has on occasion visited in the home, the likelihood of exposure to the stress occasioned by the presence of the mother would be enhanced if the Lentinis were granted the children.

In *State v. Sorenson*, 102 Utah 474, 132 P.2d 132 (1942), this court considered an appeal from the Juvenile Court of the Sixth Judicial District, challenging the decision of the Juvenile Court not to grant a minor child to the natural father but to leave the child in the custody of grandparents. In holding the Juvenile Court had acted within its discretion, it was stated:

"It thus appears that where an order of the court has been made awarding custody of a minor child to a particular individual such order will not thereafter be modified without a showing of a change of conditions or circumstances meriting such modification. * * *"

In the instant case, the evidence does not disclose circumstances requiring a change of the court's previous decree which grants the custody of the minor children to the State Welfare Department. To the contrary, it appears that the children have adjusted well to their new foster homes, and substantial progress is being made in giving them a happy and adequate life. By placing the children with the Lentinis, this environment could be interrupted with possible dangerous results, in view of the relationship of the Lentinis to the children's mother and grandparents.

Further, by allowing the children to be removed to Nevada, the court's jurisdiction is necessarily impaired, and the future welfare of the children is not subject to as close scrutiny as it would be were the children left as the court decree provides.

The appellants' contention that the Juvenile Court is in not giving substantial preference to the wishes of the mother is not well taken. First, the children's mother did not express any deep and compelling desire that the children be awarded to her sister and brother-in-law. Rather, she merely signed a general consent which would acquiesce in their obtaining custody. Further, it does not appear that the children's mother is the type of person whose preference should be accorded great weight. She has obviously demonstrated little concern for the children in the past, and has led an immoral and socially disreputable life. Consequently, the weight to be accorded the parental preference, which necessarily must be like the weight accorded to any evidence and thus dependent upon the credence of the person making the recommendation, is not great in the instant case, and the court properly relied upon the circumstances relating to the welfare of the children in general.

The cases, *In Re State in the Interest of Black*, 311 P.2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955), and *In Re Bradley*, 109 P.2d 538, 167 P.2d 978 (1946), give no great weight to the appellants' argument, since they merely recognize the statutory admonition to the Juvenile Court found in Section 10-30(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that in selecting a guardian the court shall "give due consideration to the preference of parents."

In the instant case, the court weighed the issues carefully and fully and decided that it was in the best interests of the children

ought to leave them in the custody in which they had been held the previous two years. It cannot be said that this determination is unsupported by the evidence, and consequently there is no basis to overturn the Juvenile Court's decree. *In re Interest of K*—, 7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958).

CONCLUSION

This court has noted on many occasions that decisions of the Juvenile Court will not be disturbed in absence of a clear abuse of discretion. See *infra*, page 6. The evidence in the instant case supports the determination of the Juvenile Court that it is in the interests of the children involved that they remain in their current foster homes and not be removed and placed into the custody of the petitioners. Although the Lentinis are interested and qualified persons to have the custody of the children, the possible exposure to circumstances which would endanger the tranquility of the children and the need for the children to maintain some form of consistency in the pattern of their lives supports the determination of the Juvenile Court.

This court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

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