Geoffery S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘉𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘔𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺: 𝘙𝘦𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘣𝘦𝘵𝘸𝘦𝘦𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘥 𝘍𝘰𝘳𝘤𝘦𝘴, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴, 44 Hᴏᴜs. L. Rᴇᴠ. 553 (2007).
Recent events related to the planning and execution of the war in Iraq, most notably the perceived 2003 "firing" of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, have raised concerns over the effect of Executive Branch dominance of the military and how that dominance impacts the ability of Congress to obtain timely and important information. Such actions, perceived to discourage members of the military from providing candid views to Congress when they differ with the Administration, even if implied instead of express, strike at the very core of the founder's intent to balance military power within the national government. The military should be viewed as a national agency rather than an Executive Agency, with responsibilities to both the Executive and Legislative Branches, including providing clear and complete information to Congress. This article discusses the unique nature of the military and why it should not be considered an Executive Agency. Through historical constitutional analysis, the article argues that for Congress to perform its "necessary and proper" role, it must be fully informed on military issues within its area of competence and responsibility. The article then suggests the Congress is not currently receiving complete military information and proposes several methods to remedy this critical deficit.
44 Hous. L. Rev.
Houston Law Review