Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance

Authors

Paul Rose
Bernard S. Sharfman

Abstract

Under an Arrowian framework, centralized authority and management provides for optimal decision making in large organizations. However, Kenneth Arrow also recognized that other elements within the organization, beyond the central authority, occasionally may have superior information or decision-making skills. In such cases, such elements may act as a corrective mechanism within the organization. In the context of public companies, this Article finds that such a corrective mechanism comes in the form of hedge fund activism, or, more accurately, offensive shareholder activism.

Offensive shareholder activism operates in the market for corporate influence, not control. Consistent with a theoretical framework that protects the value of centralized authority and a legal framework that rests fiduciary responsibility with the board, authority is not shifted to influential, yet unaccountable, shareholders. Governance entrepreneurs in the market for corporate influence must first identify those instances in which authority-sharing may result in value-enhancing policy decisions, and then persuade the board and/or other shareholders of the wisdom of their policies, before they will be permitted to share the authority necessary to implement the policy. Thus, boards often reward offensive shareholder activists that prove to have superior information and/or strategies by at least temporarily sharing authority with the activists by either providing them seats in the board or simply allowing them to directly influence corporate policy. This Article thus reframes the ongoing debate on the value of shareholder activism by showing how offensive shareholder activism can co-exist with—and indeed, is supported by—Kenneth Arrow’s theory of management centralization, which undergirds the traditional authority model of corporate governance.

This Article also provides a much-needed bridge between the traditional authority model of corporate law and governance as utilized by Professors Steven Bainbridge and Michael Dooley and those who have done empirical studies on hedge fund activism, including Professor Lucian Bebchuk. This bridge helps to identify when shareholder activism may be a positive influence on corporate governance.

Rights

© 2014 Brigham Young University Law Review

Recommended Citation

Paul Rose and Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss5/2