This Article challenges the basic assumptions of the emerging legal area of “cyber” or “cybersecurity.” It argues that the two dominant “cybersecurity” paradigms—information sharing and deterrence—fail to recognize that corporate information security and national “cybersecurity” concerns are inextricable. This problem of “reciprocal security vulnerability” means that in practice our current legal paradigms channel us in suboptimal directions. Drawing insights from the work of philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, this Article identifies three flaws that pervade the academic and policy analysis of security, exacerbating the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability—privacy conflation, incommensurability, and internet exceptionalism. It then offers a new paradigm—reciprocal security. Reciprocal security reframes information security law and policy as part of broader security policy, focusing on two key elements: security vigilance infrastructure and defense primacy. The Article concludes by briefly introducing five sets of concrete legal and policy proposals embodying the new reciprocal security paradigm.
© 2017 Brigham Young University Law Review
Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
2017 BYU L. Rev.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2017/iss5/6