BYU Law Review
Abstract
Ordinary meaning reigns supreme in modern statutory interpretation. Yet that supremacy can cause an interpreter to miss specialized meaning. And the Supreme Court has never fully clarified when ordinary meaning must give way to specialized or technical meaning.
This Article attempts to provide doctrinal clarification as to when one should use ordinary as opposed to other meanings through putting the doctrinal pieces together in a full and coherent way. That doctrinal clarity leads to a methodological refinement: rather than the starting point, ordinary meaning is the ending point of statutory interpretation.
This Article applies this doctrine and methodology, as well as illustrating the fault of ordinary meaning on steroids, through a case study of the term “undue hardship” in Title VII. Doing so shows that the term, long thought to be one of ordinary meaning, is actually a legal term of art that provides greater statutory protection than if interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. Thus, the Court, while moving closer in Groff v. DeJoy, missed an opportunity to restore the statute’s original meaning.
Rights
© 2024 Brigham Young University Law Review
Recommended Citation
James Phillips,
Ordinary Meaning as Last Resort: The Meaning of "Undue Hardship" in Title VII,
49 BYU L. Rev.
1319
(2024).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss5/7
