COVID’s Counterpunch: State Legislative Assaults on PublicHealth Emergency Powers

Authors

James G. Hodge Jr.
Jennifer L. Piatt

Abstract

Amid the most impactful health crisis in over a century, COVID’s “counterpunch” entails aggressive efforts by numerous state legislatures to diminish state and local public health emergency powers. It is an incredulous movement facially supported by a need to appropriately balance economic interests and rights with communal health objectives. At its political core, however, is a “power grab” by legislatures to free their constituents from extensive emergency powers (e.g., social distancing, assembly limits, and business closures). Never mind the fact that these interventions, when used effectively and constitutionally, save lives and reduce morbidity. Public health agents and activists are understandably concerned about diminutions of their express and discretionary emergency powers. Yet affirmative and strategic uses of existing legal remedies examined in this brief commentary may blunt the impact of these legislative proposals.

Rights

© 2022 BYU J. Reuben Clark Law School

Recommended Citation

James G. Hodge Jr. and Jennifer L. Piatt, COVID’s Counterpunch: State Legislative Assaults on PublicHealth Emergency Powers, 36 BYU J. Pub. L. 31 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol36/iss1/9